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ABSTRACT 
STATE POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND THE AFFORDABILITY OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION: A MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF STATE 
HIGHER EDUCATION SYSTEMS ON THE COST OF ATTENDING COLLEGE 
Angela Perkins Girdley 
November 20, 2003 
The purpose of this study was to understand variance 
in state system performance in affordability using 
variables describing the state political environment and 
the higher education governance structure. Understanding 
how the political culture of states affects higher 
education illuminates agendas, priorities, and motivations 
of key decision-makers in higher education. 
The dependent variable was affordability of higher 
education measured by the National Council on Public Policy 
in Higher Education Measuring Up (2000) grade. Independent 
variables were the impact of special interest groups, the 
state higher education governance structure, legislative 
professionalization, and the institutional strength of the 
governor. Pearson product-moment correlations and multiple 
regression analysis provided the data analysis. 
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The results of this study indicated that the 
combination of political culture and governance structure 
variables contributed 19% to the variance in affordability 
grades. Each independent variable contributed some unique 
variance to the prediction of affordability. 
The conclusion of this research elucidated the need 
for state and campus officials to collaborate on issues of 
affordability and higher education performance. The study 
echoed calls by numerous researchers and analysts to work 
together in establishing comprehensive policies that bridge 
state appropriations, local tuition prices, and financial 
aid. 
vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................... i v 
ABSTRACT ........................................... v 
LIST OF TABLES ........................................ ix 
CHAPTER 
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................... 1 
State Role and Influence on Affordability ....... 3 
State System Performance ........................ 5 
Research Problem ............................... 11 
Purpose ........................................ 13 
Research Questions ............................. 14 
Null Hypotheses ................................ 15 
Defini tion of Terms ............................ 16 
Significance of the Study ...................... 17 
Limi tations .................................... 19 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW .............................. 21 
Relationship between State and Campus .......... 23 
Governance Structures and Influences ........... 44 
State Roles .................................... 71 
Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1 71 
I I I . METHODOLOGy.................................... 174 
Theoretical Framework ......................... 174 
vii 
Research Design ............................... 175 
Subjects ...................................... 176 
Independent Variables ......................... 176 
Dependent Variable ............................ 187 
Data Arlalysis ................................. 190 
IV. RESULTS ........................................ 195 
Reliabili ty Arlalyses .......................... 196 
Descriptive Statistics ........................ 199 
Multiple Regression Arlalysis .................. 202 
V. DISCUSSION ..................................... 216 
Discussion of the Results ..................... 216 
Implications .................................. 222 
Future Research ............................... 224 
Conclusion .................................... 225 
REFERENCES 
APPENDIXES 
227 
239 
CURRICULUM VITAE ..................................... 250 
viii 
LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE PAGE 
1. Description of Variables, Measurements, 
and Sources .......................................... 193 
2. Intercorrelations for Affordability and the Individual 
Items of Beyle (1999) Scale for Institutional Strength 
of the Governor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198 
3. Descriptive Statistics (N = 50) ....................... 200 
4.Intercorrelations of Variables for Affordability 
Regression with Beyle (1999) Composite Score .......... 203 
5. Intercorrelations for Variables for Affordability 
Regression with Beyle (1999) Tenure Potential Score ... 205 
6. Summary of Standard Regression Analysis with 
Affordability ......................................... 206 
7. Summary of Standard Regression Analysis with 
Affordability ......................................... 207 
8. Case Summaries for Regression Model Predicting 
Affordability with Impact of SIGs, Higher Education 
Governance Structure, Legislative Professionalization, 
and Governor Tenure Potential ......................... 214 
9. Case Summaries for Regression Model Predicting 
Affordability with Impact of SIGs, HE Governance 
Structure, Legislative Professionalization, 
and Beyle (1999) Composite Score for Institutional 
Strength of Governor .................................. 215 
x 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The ivied walls that used to shelter American higher 
education from external expectations of performance are 
eroding under the weight of scrutiny from multiple 
constituencies. Business leaders, policymakers, and the 
public-at-Iarge were once content with sending their 18-
year-olds away for four years of distant scholarly pursuit. 
Now, the public market is demanding more from higher 
education. A diverse student body, a technological 
workplace, and a culture of accountability have forced 
colleges and institutions to become more accountable and 
responsive to societal needs (Tierney, 1998; Alexander, 
2002) . 
The rising price of college attendance has been a 
particular concern of the American public. A recent 
national survey revealed that people were as worried about 
the affordability of higher education as they were about 
issues like child safety and health care (American Council 
on Education, 1998). 
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These public concerns are grounded in documented 
observations about the performance of colleges and 
universities. Studies (National Commission on the Cost of 
Higher Education, 1998; National Center for Public Policy 
and Higher Education, 2001) indicate that in our society 
where career success increasingly requires higher 
education, the opportunity of affordable education is 
diminishing. Over the past two decades, the average 
college tuition has increased by 110%, while median family 
income has increased only 27%, and governmental financial 
aid has increased only 36%. The result of these figures is 
a 95% increase in net price (total price minus financial 
aid) at four-year institutions, a 64% increase in net price 
at private institutions, and a 169% increase at public two-
year schools (College Board, 2001). 
The changing context of higher education and the 
rising cost of attending college have captured the 
attention of state policymakers. States have taken new 
r~les in their relationship with colleges and universities 
in an effort to promote efficiency and responsiveness to 
public demands for affordability. Structural 
reorganization, increased regulation, assessment, and 
expectations of economic return now accompany the taxpayer 
resources channeled by the state to higher education 
2 
institutions (Sabloff, 1997; Alexander, 2000). In 
addition, states are initiating creative financial 
strategies to combat diminishing affordability (Bell & 
Michelau, 2001; State Higher Education Executive Officers, 
2003) . 
State Role and Influence on Affordability 
Three important stakeholders-the state, the market, 
and individual institutions of higher education-
continuously discuss among themselves the idea of quality 
higher education and the understanding of how to meet new 
expectations (Berdahl, Altbach, & Gumport, 1999; 
Richardson, Bracco, Callan, & Finney, 1999). Tension 
continues to mount among higher education stakeholders as 
each tries to determine its legitimate role in defining 
American higher education priorities and in evaluating 
appropriate policies to reflect quality, affordability and 
access. 
Policy papers, discussed fully in Chapter II, 
highlight state higher education financial strategies and 
their effect on tuition. Analysts point out that states 
cut higher education budgets in poor economic times. 
Institutions raise tuition rates to make up for budget 
" shortfalls. The bad economy, higher tuition, and less 
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available financial aid exacerbate the diminishing 
affordability for families. 
Policymakers in many states have created merit-based 
scholarship programs, tax incentives, and college savings 
plans to enhance affordability. Critics claim that these 
incentives, while politically popular, target middle-class 
families and decrease higher education access by widening 
the enrollment gap between middle-income and low-income 
students (Bell & Michelau, 2001; Longanecker, 2002; 
National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education, 
2002). Analysts insist that state long-term strategy to 
integrate appropriations, financial aid, and tuition policy 
is necessary to maintain affordability for families of all 
income levels (Heller, 2001; Longanecker, 2002; Callan, 
2003) . 
Another current debate between state policymakers and 
leaders of universities encircles the proper role of each 
in affecting quality, efficiency, and productivity. Some 
theorists insisted that positive higher education 
performance was contingent upon the autonomy of the 
institution (Berdahl, 1971; Millet, 1984; Newman, 1987). 
Other researchers demonstrated increased performance, at 
--\ 
best, or no correlation, at least, in more centralized 
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relationships (Volkwein, 1986, 1989; Volkwein & Malik, 
1997) . 
In recent years, states have used reorganization of 
higher education governance as a strategy to promote better 
performance. McGuinness (2002) warned that change in 
structure is often not effective, because states fail to 
evaluate the long-term goals and consequences of 
restructuring of higher education. 
State System Performance 
Many entities have assessed individual colleges and 
institutions for aspects of quality over the years. 
States, until recently, have not been subject to the same 
level of comparative analysis (Callan, 2000). Martinez 
(2002) explained that most state system evaluation related 
to legislative action or state funding, but "there has been 
no external evaluation of state higher education 
performance that is driven by a national interest free from 
individual state nuances or institutional concerns" (p. 2). 
In 2000, The National Center for Public Policy and 
Higher Education (NCPPHE) conducted the first statewide 
comparison of higher education in five areas of 
performance. The NCPPHE evaluation, called the National 
) 
Report Card on Higher Education (2000), gave insight into 
state system performance beyond the quality of individual 
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colleges and universities. One of the grades provided by 
the National Report Card was for state system 
affordability. The comparative assessment reflected family 
ability to pay for higher education in their state. 
The state-level analysis of this study was important, 
because states have assumed more leadership and control for 
their state system performance. As students and 
institutions respond to higher accountability standards, so 
must the state at the system level. State policy leaders, 
legislators, and state education personnel benefit from 
understanding factors influential to state system 
performance and affordability of higher education; but, 
very little research exists to understand the variance in 
NCPPHE report card grades. 
Martinez (2002) published the first research 
attempting to understand the variance in state grades. His 
predictor variables included socioeconomic, ethnic, and 
other state contextual variables. The ratio of higher 
education appropriations to tax revenues per capita was a 
positive predictor of affordability; and the ratio of total 
population to higher education enrollment was a negative 
significant predictor of affordability. 
Martinez (2002) encouraged researchers to investigate 
further state characteristics associated with scores. He 
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emphasized that his predictor variables for affordability 
explained only about 54% of variance among states. 
Influence of Political Culture on System Performance 
The primary vehicle of states in coordinating state 
systems is policy that creates incentives and disincentives 
for institutions to address state priorities (Richardson, 
1999). Besides socioeconomic factors, as studied by 
Martinez (2002), political scientists study political 
factors to help understand the differences among state 
policies (Gray, 1999). Higher education analysts cited the 
impact of the state political culture on higher education 
policy (Newman, 1987; Richardson, 1999). McGuinness (1999) 
explained that higher education policy has subtle, yet 
unique differences among states due in part to political 
culture and locus of political power. 
Empirical research, discussed fully in Chapter II, 
showed interesting and significant effects for political 
factors on higher education policy. Studies demonstrated 
significant effects for political variables on various 
higher education policies and policy processes (Gittell & 
Kleiman, 2000; Blackwell & Cistone, 1999; Frost, Hearn, & 
Marine, 1997). In discussion of state affordability 
strategies, Bell and Michelau (2001) quoted several 
7 
legislators who commented that their policies were "good 
politics." 
Gray (1999) listed the following specific political 
culture variables as important in understanding differences 
in state policy: (a) the strength of interest groups, (b) 
the institutional power of the governor, and (c) the 
professionalization of the legislature. According to Gray, 
these state characteristics have been important in 
explaining policy patterns. 
Interest Group Strength 
An interest group is "an association of individuals or 
organizations, usually formally organized, that attempts to 
influence public policy (Thomas & Hrebenar, 1999). 
Lobbyists from special interest groups (SIGs) work hard to 
influence politicians toward their perspective on an issue. 
Thomas and Hrebenar (1999) contend that increased 
numbers, greater variety, and intensified lobbying of SIG's 
effectively increased the role of state government since 
the 1970's. States vary in the amount of power or 
influence they allow SIG's to have in policy-making. 
In higher education, Benjamin and Carroll (1998) 
asserted that the current system of higher education 
governance is dysfunctional, lacking clear priorities, and 
open for undue pressure from SIGs. Pusser (2001) presented 
8 
an example of interest-group influence in California's 
access and diversity policy. The University of California 
Board of Regents, through Proposition 209, eliminated 
affirmative action in spite of protests from mUltiple 
campus-level constituencies. According to Pusser, the 
policy process demonstrated a shift in ideology from campus 
decision-makers to political decision-makers driven by 
special interests. 
Gubernatorial Powers 
The governor stands at the top of the state 
bureaucratic hierarchy. Gilley (1997) explained that 
governors enjoyed increased authority and enthusiasm after 
the Reagan era shifted power from the federal government to 
the states. 
The governor's support and agenda often determine the 
success of higher education reform. A study by Peterson 
(1976) demonstrated that gubernatorial power was a 
significant predictor of state appropriations to higher 
education. More recently, the governor of Kentucky, 
elected in 1995, made higher education reform a top agenda 
priority for his administration. Several financial 
incentives and state system changes ensued. Major changes 
also happened in Georgia and North Carolina with strong 
support from their governors (Trombley, 2000). 
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Gilley (1997) reported the results of a 1986 survey of 
governors that indicated a majority of governors rarely 
received policy direction from higher education leaders. 
Instead, they relied on cabinet officers, special 
assistants, and other governors. Gilley summarized that 
governors perceived unresponsiveness from campus leaders 
and preferred to keep distance between themselves and 
campus officials. 
The state constitution, statutes, and voter referenda 
determine the amount of power a governor possesses. Beyle 
(1999) listed six areas that affect gubernatorial power: 
(a) election of separate state-level officials; (b) tenure 
potential; (c) appointment privilege; (d) budgetary 
control; (e) veto power; and (f) political party control. 
Professionalization of the Legislature 
A significant evolution in state government has been 
the professionalization of legislators. Hamm and Moncrief 
(1999) explained that variety among states is extremely 
evident in state legislatures; but all legislatures are 
more professional than they were a generation ago. They 
defined degrees of professionalization based on salary, 
staff, and session length. 
At least two studies of higher education policy 
demonstrated significant effects for more professionalized 
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legislatures. The 1976 Peterson study found legislative 
professionalism to be another significant predictor of 
state appropriations. Sabloff (1997) found a positive 
correlation between the length of legislative sessions and 
the number of regulatory higher education laws passed. In 
follow up interviews, she determined that professionalized 
legislators were more loyal toward voters and financiers 
than they were toward higher education clients who only 
provided information and policy support. 
The review of literature illuminated that higher 
education is highly subject to the political culture within 
a state. What is not clear yet is the degree that 
political variables influence statewide affordability in 
higher education. 
Research Problem 
The American society is increasingly viewing higher 
education as important to success (Callan, 1999; Losing 
Ground, 2002). As a result, business leaders, parents, 
students, and. !other members of the public are demanding 
more from higher education. They have been particularly 
critical toward the increasing costs of attending colleges 
and universities. 
The economy has been sluggish, state appropriations to 
higher education are down, tuition is up, family income has 
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decreased, and financial aid has not kept pace with 
tuition. Citizens are concerned that their ability to pay 
for college has diminished when the importance of an 
education is greater than ever before. Moreover, the 
enrollment gap between middle and lower-income students 
continues to widen. The perennial American value of 
affordable public higher education for the masses is in 
jeopardy. 
Elected officials have attempted to respond to these 
public concerns through increased scrutiny of higher 
education, restructured governance, performance incentive 
funding, and other channels of greater accountability. 
Policymakers have also taken initiatives to address 
affordability through strategies that specifically help 
middle-class families. 
The problem of this study is that state leaders cannot 
create effective policy to improve affordability without 
understanding factors that affect public university 
performance. Policy and research literature shows a 
relationship between political culture and higher education 
policy; but, very little empirical state-level comparative 
research exists about the relationship among state 
political environment variables, state higher education 
12 
governance structure, and affordability in higher 
education. 
purpose 
The purpose of this study is to understand variance in 
state system performance in affordability using variables 
describing the state political environment and the higher 
education governance structure. Understanding how the 
political culture of states affects higher education 
illuminates agendas, priorities, and motivations of key 
decision-makers in higher education. 
with a better understanding of the drivers of 
affordability, governors, legislators, campus leaders, and 
state officials can make decisions and implement 
appropriate policy to encourage and support statewide 
higher education improvement. Higher education leaders 
then can understand differences in policy among states; 
the public can be better informed about responsiveness to 
their needs and desires; and all stakeholders can have 
tools to help them construct the most effective educational 
relationships possible among all parties. 
The independent variables are professionalization of 
the legislature, strength of the governor, political impact 
of special interest groups, and state higher education 
13 
governance structure. The dependent variable is state 
higher education affordability. 
Research Questions 
The review of the literature regarding statewide 
coordination of higher education provided the foundation 
for five research questions: 
1. To what degree do combined political culture and 
governance structure characteristics explain 
differences in higher education affordability among 
states? 
2. To what degree does the impact of special interest 
groups uniquely explain differences in higher 
education affordability among states? 
3. To what degree does the professionalization of the 
state legislature uniquely explain differences in 
higher education affordability among states? 
4. To what degree does the institutional strength of 
the governor uniquely explain differences in higher 
education affordability among states? 
5. To what degree does the state higher education 
governance structure uniquely explain differences 
in higher education affordability among states? 
14 
Null Hypotheses 
Testing the null hypotheses in inferential statistics 
is a method to determine whether significance in 
variability is due to sampling errors or actual effect. 
This study is a population study, so the testing of null 
hypotheses is not to indicate the generalizability of a 
sample to the population. The null hypotheses are used 
here as an indication of the magnitude of the relationship 
of the independent variables to the dependent variable. In 
this population study, the emphasis is on proportion of 
effect not inferential statistical significance of sample 
statistics to population parameters. 
Null hypothesis 1 (Hi): Political culture and 
governance structure characteristics do not explain 
any amount of shared variance in state performance in 
higher education affordability. 
Null hypothesis 2 (H2): The level of special interest 
group impact in a state explains no unique variance in 
state performance in affordability. 
Null hypothesis 3 (H3): The professionalization of the 
state legislature explains no unique variance in state 
performance in affordability. 
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Null hypothesis 4 (H4): Gubernatorial strength 
explains no unique variance in state performance in 
affordability. 
Null hypothesis 5 (H5): State higher education 
governance structure explains no unique variance in 
state performance in higher education affordability. 
Definition of Terms 
The following definitions of terms apply to this 
study: 
1. State political culture-aspects of the state 
policy environment determined by the balance of power 
and influence of the governor, legislators, political 
parties, lobbyists, and other key policymakers. 
2. Affordability-the ability of a state to maximize 
tuition and fees against available financial aid to 
enable all qualified citizens, in relation to their 
family income, to financially access higher education 
in their state. 
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3. Special interest group-a group of individuals or 
organizations formed to intentionally influence public 
policy at the state level. 
4. Professionalization of state legislature-the 
degree of commitment required for the members of a 
state legislative body with regard to the length of 
legislative sessions, the scope of legislative 
responsibility, and salary. 
5. Strength of the governor-the amount of 
institutional power assigned to the state executive 
through the state constitutiop:, state statutes, and 
voter referenda. 
6. Higher education governance structure-the formal 
framework used by the state for interaction among 
local institutions of higher education and state 
government entities and the system that coordinates 
the work processes of state higher education. 
Significance of the Study 
The NCPPHE National Report Card has become a focal 
point for state higher education leaders in comparing their 
system performance with other states ("Student Aid News," 
17 
2002; Stambaugh, 2002; "Project to Improve," 2003). As an 
evaluation and policy tool, the report card is only 
valuable if higher education leaders understand drivers of 
the performance grades. 
The grade for affordability indicated how financially 
accessible schools within a state were to its citizens. 
Heller (2001) listed affordability as one of three key 
issues currently facing public higher education, because 
the ability to pay for college is key to the opportunity of 
access to education. 
The primary role" of the state in higher education 
is to balance the needs of the institutions with the needs 
of the citizens (Richardson et aI, 1999). The ultimate 
accountability of a state to its citizens requires states 
to understand the policy environments, structures and 
contextual factors that affect system performance. 
Little previous research exists to demonstrate or 
explain key state characteristics that determine state 
level performance in higher education affordability. The 
National Report Card initiated a state level analysis of 
higher education performance. The new task is to 
understand the differences in grades. Martinez (2002) 
demonstrated economic and ethnic state characteristics that 
18 
accounted for some variance in the grades. Much of the 
variance was unexplained. 
A review of higher education literature suggested that 
the political environment was an important consideration in 
state higher education performance. This present study 
seeks to understand political and policy structural 
variables that have an effect on state affordability 
performance. 
Information from this study will help inform 
states about their environments and frameworks for state 
coordination. When states have the necessary tools, they 
can construct systems that effectively open doors of 
opportunity for all state citizens. 
Limitations 
Three primary limitations exist for this study. 
First, in any study on performance or quality, chosen 
indicators unmask particular values and priorities of the 
personnel choosing the indicators. The indicator of 
statewide affordability performance in this study, selected 
from the National Report Card (2001), reflects priorities 
the NCCPHE considered of public concern. Other researchers 
could debate the legitimacy of these indicators, the 
absence of some measurements, and the definition of 
specific categories. 
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Second, no state exactly replicates another state. 
Martinez (2002) admonished in his study, "the complex 
mixture of variables that influence any given state's 
performance will be different, thus making it difficult to 
establish a perfect macro model" (p. 14). His advisement 
pertains to this research, as well. The relationship among 
myriad state characteristics presents a challenge in 
finding single predictors of variability. 
Third, this study uses secondary data, information not 
gathered specifically for the research question at hand 
{Stewart, 1984). Stewart admonished that there are several 
limitations to secondary data: (a) Unintentional bias may 
result from data gathered for a purpose other than that 
intended for the study; (b) Intentional bias occurs when 
researchers purposely alter data sets to achieve a desired 
objective; (c) Information often becomes lost with combined 
or summarized data; and (d) Original categories and levels 
of measurement may not be appropriate for the new 
investigation. Further, by definition, researchers do not 
collect secondary data specifically for the study at hand, 
so the data may not represent the most current conditions 
or measurements. 
20 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This dissertation researches the state political 
climate as it relates to statewide performance in higher 
education affordability. To provide a sufficient 
background for the study, readers need a broader 
under~tanding of the state role in higher education. This 
literature review traces research about the roles state 
governments play in coordinating, regulating, and funding 
higher education. 
The relationship between state government and 
institutions of higher education is dynamic, often changing 
due to political, economic, and environmental factors. 
States, entrusted with the protection of the public 
interest, insist on accountability and efficiency in higher 
education. Higher education institutions, valuing autonomy 
and academic freedom, defend themselves from unwarranted or 
superfluous regulation. The ideological pendulum swings 
between those values of public accountability and 
professional flexibility. Understanding this precarious 
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state-institution relationship and the factors influencing 
it is a significant pursuit for higher education. 
Studying the state role of higher education is 
important, because higher education has become more complex 
with potentially competing missions and constituencies. 
"How to shape the structures and policies for a 
constructive relationship between the state and higher 
education will be one of the most important challenges of 
the next decade" (McGuinness, 1995). 
Because more programs are competing for precious state 
resources, coordination and accountability from a 
centralized source can influence good stewardship. 
Professional academicians possess skills and knowledge 
necessary for quality educational inputs, throughputs and 
outcomes, but sometimes lack the statewide perspective a 
state agency can provide. 
The organization of this literature review includes 
the following sections: (a) The relationship between the 
state and the campus, (b) governance structures and 
influences, and (c) the role of the state. Each of these 
sections helps provide perspective on state coordination of 
higher education. 
The section on the relationship between the state and 
the campus explores issues of autonomy and accountability. 
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The amount of centralization or decentralization within a 
state system determines the flexibility local institutions 
have to create their own agenda. Highly centralized states 
maintain more power over statewide coordination. 
The section on governance structures and influences 
includes subsections for (a) structures and (b) political 
influences. Governance structures are the frameworks 
states use for organization, coordination, and regulation 
of higher education. Research about structure provides 
information on decision-making hierarchy within a state. 
Political influences explain entities that shape state 
higher education decision-making. 
The final section on state roles covers an array of 
issues associated with state policy and function, including 
subsections for (a) tuition and appropriations, (b) direct 
student aid, (c) funding and access, (d) performance 
funding, (e) performance, (f) private institutions, and (g) 
policy. These topics help undergird the myriad avenues 
states use to coordinate and regulate higher education. 
Relationship Between State and Campus 
The relationship between state and campus encompasses 
many factors: (a) the way policies are introduced, passed, 
and implemented; (b) how much flexibility the state gives 
to local campuses; and (c) how much regulation or 
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centralization the state keeps. Each of these issues 
varies from state-to-state and across time. The literature 
reviewed in this section provides information about the 
evolution of state involvement, issues surrounding 
autonomy, and empirical research of variables involved in 
the relationship between state and campus. 
In 1959, Moos and Rourke had already characterized the 
relationship between state government and institutions of 
higher education as tense. They maintained that anxiety 
between the state and campus had been growing since 1917. 
They described the early control increases by state 
governments as primarily administrative rather than 
legislative. The development of executive budgets, state 
centralized controllers, purchasers, and personnel offices 
initiated regulation in many parts of state government, 
including higher education. As state government embraced 
the mantra of efficiency and economy, higher education 
institutions felt the scrutiny of fiscal guardians. 
Moreover, growing appropriations from state budgets 
provided justification for the control. 
Moos and Rourke (1959) expressed the difficulties in 
providing quantitative accountability of efficiency in the 
intricate world of higher education. Yet, they also touted 
the unreasonableness of expecting complete autonomy and the 
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seemingly similar motivations between state leaders and 
campus leaders for quality higher education. They also 
admonished campus leaders to assume the language of state 
budget personnel to effectively communicate in the new 
world of coordination. 
Moos and Rourke (1959) described that the early 
influences of state government into the decisions of 
individual campuses were in these areas: (a) physical 
plant and building plans; (b) personnel and hiring 
restrictions; (c) curriculum; and (d) research agenda. 
Initial influences were managed through budgetary 
restrictions or earmarking of certain funds for state 
priorities. 
Moos and Rourke (1959) listed three forms of early 
coordination: (a) a central governing board with direct 
control over each state university or college; (b) a 
voluntary coordinated agreement among institutions with 
'-" 
separate boards of trustees; and (c) a master board 
overseeing all the boards of trustees in a state. They 
summarized, 
At its best, an effective system of coordination can 
do much to relieve pressure for greater state control 
over higher education. For there can be little doubt 
that much of this pressure comes from the 
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particularism and intensive competition that have 
long plagued higher education in some areas. But at 
its worst a tightly coordinated system of higher 
education can leach quality and originality out of 
state colleges and universities. (p. 226) 
Berdahl (1971) admonished the need to recognize a 
difference between classic academic freedom and 
administrative autonomy. He explained that academic 
freedom encompassed academe's privilege to discuss 
controversial subjects without censorship. Autonomy was a 
management issue of locus of governance. 
He also explicated two branches of autonomy: (a) 
substantive autonomy of making policies, goals, and 
programming and (b) procedural autonomy of methods to 
achieve specified policies, goals, and programming. 
Berdahl (1971) insisted that any discussion of state 
involvement should differentiate between necessary and 
marginal impositions into either of the two kinds of 
autonomy. 
Berdahl (1971) saw futility in attempts to excise all 
state control, expressing the expediency of partnership 
between the state and campuses. He advised officials at 
all levels to communicate and set goals that do not 
substitute utility for excellence. "Surely, then, it is 
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time for administrators, trustees, faculty, students, and 
alumni to acknowledge that the state has a legitimate role 
to play in helping to determine policies in higher 
education; and, accordingly, to cooperate in establishing a 
system that will protect the public interest and at the 
same time pr~serve the essential ingredients of autonomy" 
(Berdahl, p. 253). 
The evolution of coordination was evident in Berdahl's 
1971 taxonomy of state governance. The basic framework 
echoed the Moos and Rourke (1959) description; however, 
Berdahl included three versions of the coordinating board: 
(a) a board with institutional representatives and advisory 
capacity; (b) a board with lay members and advisory 
capacity; and (c) a board with lay members and some 
regulatory authority but no governmental responsibility. 
Berdahl (1971) characterized the state higher 
education policy process as primarily a function of the 
state higher education agency. He maintained that 
government officials rarely sent legislation to them, but 
rather counted on their work to initiate policy. 
Berdahl and McConnell (1999) explained the onerous 
balance between autonomy and accountability. They 
surmised, "if a college or university is effectively to 
define its goals and select or invent the means of 
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attaining them, it must have a high degree of substantive 
autonomy" (p. 70). At the same time, they recognized the 
need for public accountability. The public, more aware of 
the necessity of higher education for economic stability 
and personal goal achievement, is demanding more scrutiny 
of institutions and processes. Berdahl and McConnell 
admitted that not only is the public interest becoming more 
complex, but so also is the task of communicating quality. 
Accountability begs many questions related to values, 
priorities, and qualification. Berdahl and McConnell 
defined accountability in two layers: (a) general response 
to the public at large and (b) particular response to 
limited constituencies. 
States assert that their broad view of state goals and 
economic needs places them in the proper position to 
coordinate a statewide framework for higher education 
performance. They also aver that their position as 
financial provider fully justifies their authority. They 
further contend that powerful political leaders of 
individual institutions may unduly influence appropriation 
decisions and damage the broader objectives of statewide 
reform. Gordon Davies (2002) upon his resignation as 
leader of the Kentucky Council on Postsecondary Education, 
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wrote a scathing rebuke of practices by some local 
university presidents: 
The great injustice to Kentucky is that the leaders 
of some universities and their political patrons are 
playing at reform. They are reasonably well-funded 
institutions that are using the rhetoric of reform to 
justify wringing ever more money from a poor state. 
As one of their presidents told me early in 1998, 
"It's my turn at the trough, and I intend to eat all I 
can." (p. D1) 
Davies allegorized state performance incentives as the 
rudder of a ship to steer local institutions toward 
statewide goals. He maintained that the importance of 
individual institutional improvement lay in their benefit 
to the general good of all Kentuckians. 
College and university leaders offer another 
perspective on quality and progress. Many campus leaders 
insist that schools have always been responsive to public 
needs, but local campus leaders and state political leaders 
often have conflicting objectives and disparate views about 
public needs (Newman, 1987; Benjamin & Carroll, 1998; 
Ewell, 1998). Even the process of accountability, with its 
accompanying regulations and paperwork, has drawn precious 
campus resources away from teaching and research to channel 
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them toward assessment activities (Benjamin & Carroll, 
1998). Campus leaders contend that states are assuming 
increased liberty in making functional decisions of 
operation that academic professionals are more qualified to 
make. Newman (1987) labeled such activity as 
"inappropriate intrusion." 
The acrimony between states and campuses usually 
manifests itself in arguments of autonomy versus 
flexibility; however, many higher education leaders have 
outlined the wisdom of partnership between the two 
entities, each playing a unique role (Newman, 1987; 
Berdahl, 1989; Ewell, 1998; Richardson, Bracco, Callan, & 
Finney, 1999). Newman (1984), for example, cited the 
importance for states to develop appropriate policy and to 
abstain from inappropriate intrusion. He maintained that 
intrusion characteristically included unnecessary 
bureaucratic regulation, politically motivated decisions of 
self-interest, and ideological impediment of university 
activity. 
The following empirical studies explored autonomy, 
accountability, and the effects these issues have on higher 
education. Each of the studies provided further insight 
into the relationship between the state and campus. 
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Volkwein (1986) tested the relationship between campus 
autonomy and measures of university quality. There were 
four dependent variables in his study: (a) faculty 
quality, measured with. 4 composite score of national 
reputational ratings in 20 fields; (b) undergraduate 
quality, measured with a composite score based on three 
national ratings of undergraduate competitiveness, 
selectivity and academic quality; (c) amount of 
governmental grants; and (d) amount of endowment and alumni 
gifts. 
The independent variables for this study were measures 
of academic and financial flexibility. Volkwein (1986) 
developed these measures by extracting factors from a 
national survey on university flexibility and a survey he 
had developed in a previous study to measure financial 
control. In addition to the independent variables, 
Volkwein used several institutional and environmental 
variables as control: (a) Full-time equivalency enrollment 
(FTE); (b) institutional age; (c) constitutional status; 
(d) flagship status; (e) existence of certain types of 
schools; (f) variations in state appropriations per 
student; (g) cost of living; and (h) level of employee 
unionization. 
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Five mUltiple regression analyses provided the 
predictive information for the independent and control 
variables on the dependent variables. The results 
indicated that (a) Financial flexibility was not a 
significant predictor for any of the measures of quality 
employed in this study; (b) academic flexibility was a 
significant predictor for only one dependent variable, 
amount of endowments and gifts (~ = .23, p < .01); (c) 
state appropriations per FTE was a significant predictor 
for every measure of quality; and (d) size was 
significantly predictive for faculty quality (~ = .67, p < 
.001) and undergraduate quality (~ = .27, P < .05). 
Fisher (1988) examined higher education laws in four 
states over an 80-year period to determine if legislative 
activity indicated a trend away from institutional 
autonomy. She selected four states through a random sample 
stratified by (a) expenditures for higher education and (b) 
population. Her sample included Tennessee, Washington, 
Idaho, and New Hampshire. 
Fisher (1988) categorized all higher education 
legislation for the four sample states into (a) laws 
imposing control, (b) laws granting flexibility, and (c) 
neutral laws. Using analysis of covariance for pools of 
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biennial data, she tested for significant differences in 
the ratio of restrictive to permissive legislation. 
Fisher (1988) found that the biennial linear trend was 
significant for every state and the group of states toward 
(a) increased amount of legislation, (b) legislation 
restricting institutional autonomy, and (c) legislation 
increasing institutional autonomy. The ratio of control to 
flexibility laws was not significant. Fisher concluded 
that increased legislation reflected parallel growth in the 
higher education sector and maintained that the laws did 
not reflect a tendency toward increased or decreased 
autonomy. 
Volkwein (1989) added to his earlier research 
concerning campus flexibility by researching (a) whether 
more autonomous campuses show greater gains in quality over 
time; (b) whether flexibility is more important for poorly 
funded campuses; and (c) whether a campus must be 
adequately funded before it can take advantage of its 
autonomy. He used data collected from his earlier study 
and made comparisons with 1985 data measuring changes in 
quality of graduate programs, student quality and grant 
funds. 
Pearson correlations showed no significant 
relationships among quality ratings and autonomy measures 
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of budget, personnel and academics. In seven mUltiple 
regressions, flexibility measures did not explain any 
significant amount of variance in measures of faculty or 
student quality. Volkwein (1989) concluded, "apparently, 
improvements in quality and funding have little to do with 
the amount of state regulation exerted on public 
universities in the early 1980's" (p. 144). 
A case study of specific state regulation by Frost, 
Hearn, and Marine (1997) examined the relationship between 
state policymakers and local higher education institutions. 
The study explored the decision-making process within North 
Carolina's higher education system. The authors used a 
state policy limiting out-of-state higher education 
enrollment to analyze three research areas: (a) principle 
decision-makers in higher education policy, (b) methods for 
decision-making, and (c) implementation methods of policy 
at the local level. 
Bureaucratic-rational theory provided the authors with 
definitions and characteristics of multipurpose 
organizations. The researchers developed the description 
of North Carolina's higher education system as an 
organization with multiple goals and missions. 
Management literature provided the authors with their 
theoretical framework concerning decision-making processes. 
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They defined procedural rationality as a form of decision-
making steeped in information gathering and systematic 
examination of issues. They described an alternate method 
of decision-making as social interaction. Groups using 
social interaction do not rely on objective evidence and 
quantitative information, rather they rely on political 
reasoning. 
Prior studies had suggested that higher education 
policy-making had relied heavily on social interaction. The 
purpose of this case study was to test what degree North 
Carolina's policy makers had relied on social interaction 
and procedural ration?lity measures to create the policy 
limiting out-of-state enrollment. 
Frost, Hearn, and Marine (1997) used analysis of 
documents and semi-structured interviews to gather their 
data. Documents included legislative reports, media 
accounts, and internal communication and reports in the 
North Carolina system. The researchers interviewed 
legislative staff leaders, board members of the University 
of North Carolina (UNC) system, board members of the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC-CH), high-
ranking administrators of the UNC system and the UNC-CH 
campus, UNC-CH student government leaders, and UNC-CH 
faculty members. Interviewers followed an interview 
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protocol and subsequently transcribed and categorized 
responses. 
The results of this study suggested that the 
legislature and state higher education system officials 
formulated the state policy on out-of-state enrollment with 
little input from campus-level personnel. The results 
further suggested that social interaction was the 
predominant method of decision-making throughout the policy 
process. 
The authors explained that stakeholders at various 
levels used different language in expressing their role in 
the decision-making process. System officials and 
legislators used the language of top leadership; campus-
based stakeholders used the language of mid-level leaders 
without power to influence decisions. 
Another finding in this study showed a lack of 
reliance on research-based information in the decision-
making process. Policy-makers enacted the legislation with 
little regard for existing theory or scholarly research. 
Frost, Hearn, and Marine (1997) also found that 
institutional leaders defined and implemented the state 
policy with latitude favoring their particular 
institution's mission. Campus leaders used the lack of 
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policy details as an opportunity to mold the policy to 
their campus needs. 
Frost, Hearn, and Marine (1997) concluded that their 
case study illuminated a situation where legislative 
accountability and political reasoning took precedence over 
institutional mission and educational values. They 
presented evidence to support more active involvement by 
campus-leaders in matters of educational policy and more 
reliance on research-based information. 
Sabloff (1997) explored changes in the nature of state 
politics to see if those changes contributed to the 
continuing loss of institutional autonomy in higher 
education. She outlined several aspects of state politics 
that indicated the professionalization of legislatures in 
state politics: (a) the changing role of party 
affiliation, (b) the loss of power for political parties in 
elections, and (c) the narrowing distance between 
gubernatorial and legislative power. In addition to these 
circumstances, Sabloff reported four trends in the 
legislative structure that have increased 
professionalization: (a) increased time for legislative 
sessions, (b) rise in the educational level of legislators, 
(c) rules in the legislative process easing the passage of 
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bills, and (d) increased professional staffs for 
legislators. 
The researcher conducted four comparative analyses of 
all 50 states and a case study of Pennsylvania to test her 
hypothesis that states with higher levels of 
professionalization exhibited decreased institutional 
autonomy. The independent variables, representing 
legislative professionalization, were: (a) the impact of 
special interest groups (SIG's), (b) the strength of the 
Republican and Democratic parties, (c) the authority of 
state higher education boards, and (d) the average number 
of months the legislature in a state meets. Political 
science literature provided the levels for each independent 
variable. 
The dependent variable was the number of laws 
regulating higher education passed by the legislature in 
each state. The range of scores for the dependent variable 
was zero (Nebraska and Vermont) to six (Florida and Iowa) . 
The dependent variable represented the amount of regulation 
controlling higher education and thus decreasing 
institutional autonomy. 
Sabloff (1997) used a one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) to test each of the relationships between the 
number of laws passed and: (a) impact of SIG's, (b) 
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strength of parties, and (c) the authority of state boards; 
because each of these independent variables was measured on 
a nominal or ordinal scale. She used a Pearson Correlation 
Coefficient to test the relationship between the length of 
legislative sessions and the number of laws passed, since 
both of these variables are measured on the interval scale. 
The results of this study indicated no statistically 
significant relationship between the dependent variable, 
number of regulatory higher education laws, and three of 
the independent variables: (a) impact of SIG's, (b) 
strength of political parties, and (c) the authority of 
state higher education boards. However, the results did 
indicate a statistical significance between the number of 
regulatory higher education laws and the length of the 
legislative sessions. Sabloff did not report the specific 
Pearson r value, but she did say the relationship was 
significant at the .05 alpha level. 
Sabloff (1997) further examined the effect of 
political changes on decreased institutional autonomy with 
a case study of Pennsylvania. She selected Pennsylvania, 
because political scientists characterized this state as 
having a professionalized legislature. 
Sabloff (1997) utilized archival research, semi-
structured interviews of long-tenured Pennsylvania 
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legislators (N = 5), and structured interviews of a 
stratified random sample of legislators (N = 30) based on 
party affiliation, gender, number of years served and 
committee assignments. Interviews confirmed the political 
science description of professionalization in the state 
legislature. Archival research confirmed the evolution of 
more regulatory higher education bills for the state of 
Pennsylvania. 
The interviews also showed a lack of consistency 
between whether legislators verbally supported that states 
should not restrict institutional autonomy and their 
willingness to vote to maintain autonomy. Specifically, 
81% of the legislators indicated favor for maintaining 
autonomy, but 92% supported a bill to regulate teacher 
requirements. 
Sabloff (1997) interpreted a final revelation of the 
interviews as lawmaker loyalty to clients versus patrons. 
Patrons were constituents who provided financial support 
and votes, thus carrying more weight in influencing the 
decisions of legislators. Clients, by contrast, served the 
legislators by providing information and support. Sabloff 
interpreted lawmaker interview responses to be that 
universities were clients and should help inform decisions, 
but that the preponderance of loyalty was with the 
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constituency who held the votes and the financial resources 
for legislators. These perspectives led Sabloff to 
determine that autonomy at the institutional level would 
continue to decrease. 
Another study about campus autonomy detected results 
conflicting with the results of Sabloff (1997). Volkwein 
and Malik (1997) studied the relationship among (a) 
institutional autonomy, (b) state characteristics, and (c) 
local campus characteristics. The researchers used a 
survey and secondary data from all United States 
institutions classified as Research I and II or Doctoral I 
and II by the Carnegie Foundation. Secondary data came 
from the U.S. Census, the Integrated Postsecondary 
Education Data System (IPEDS), National Center of Education 
(NCE), and other national databases. The researchers 
adapted a 1983 Volkwein survey to use in this study. 
The variables were from three different categories: 
(a) state regulation; (b) state attributes; and (c) campus 
characteristics. Factor analyses procedures reduced the 
data. 
The authors used a factor analysis to detect 
relationships among variables associated with campus 
autonomy. The results of the analysis for administrative 
flexibility yielded four separate factors: (a) revenue 
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flexibility; (b) expenditure detail flexibility; (c) budget 
detail flexibility; and (d) tuition and fee revenue. The 
results of the analysis for academic flexibility yielded 
six separate factors: (a) program flexibility; (b) 
standards; (c) accountability requirements; (d) 
disciplinary flexibility; (e) department flexibility; and 
(f) degree requirements. 
Volkwein and Malik (1997) next compared 1983 and 1995 
data associated with decreased state control and increased 
campus flexibility. In contrast to Sabloff's (1997) study 
resulting in issues of decreased local autonomy, the 
comparison resulted in demonstrating that many states have 
given campuses more flexibility. 
The researchers used the administrative and academic 
flexibility measures as dependent variables in four 
multiple regression equations. For two of the regressions, 
the predictor variables were nine political, economic and 
cultural measures of the state. Only one factor, state 
size, was significant and accounted for 12% (R2 = .12) of 
the variance in administrative flexibility. No variables 
were significant predictors of academic flexibility. 
Two more regressions used 12 measures of campus 
characteristics (e.g., size, wealth, faculty quality) to 
predict academic and administrative flexibility. Only the 
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percentage of minority students was a significant predictor 
and only for administrative flexibility (R2 = .07). 
Finally, Volkwein and Malik (1997) tested measures of 
faculty and student quality as dependent variables in two 
multiple regressions against measures of academic and 
administrative flexibility as predictors, controlling for 
state and campus characteristics. The results of those 
analyses indicated no significance between campus autonomy 
and quality. 
While Volkwein and Malik (1997) demonstrated a plateau 
or decrease in centralization, other researchers indicated 
more regulation, growing tension, and less communication 
between states and campuses (Sabloff, 1997 and Frost, 
Hearn, & Marine, 1997). These studies have demonstrated a 
growing force of coordination for higher education from 
state government. 
A common theme in the research regarding the 
relationship between the state and the campus was the 
disagreement among leaders in each area about proper roles 
for various entities (Moos & Rourke, 1959; Berdahl, 1971; 
Newman, 1987). Political culture (Frost, Hearn, & Marine, 
1997; Sabloff, 1997), governance structure (Berdahl, 1971), 
and state characteristics (Volkwein, 1989) each contributed 
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to the framework of coordination for state higher education 
systems. 
The literature explained that the relationship between 
the state and the campus has evolved over time. The 
frameworks states used to coordinate their systems of 
higher education evolved, as well. These state governance 
structures provided information about the channels of 
influence and power within the system. The next section 
illuminates more information concerning the state 
structures and levels of influence in state higher 
education systems. 
Governance Structures and Influences 
The formation of state higher education systems varies 
from state to state. Convention defines state systems 
within three basic types: (a) consolidated governing boards 
where one board manages and controls a cluster of 
institutions; (b) coordinating boards where one board 
assigns duties for statewide higher education but does not 
have legal management; and (c) planning agencies where the 
duties are more voluntary and organizational (McGuinness, 
1997). Most state systems fall within one of these 
frameworks, albeit many systems have some variation to the 
design. 
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States frequently restructure and change their systems 
to meet new demands. Restructuring often reflects shifting 
political, economic, and environmental circumstances. 
McGuinness (2002) admonished that structural changes are 
often made without first evaluating the total system of 
coordination. Restructuring without ample assessment may 
prevent states from accomplishing their coordination 
objectives. The following empirical studies investigated 
variables associated with state governance structures. 
Structures 
Examining a state higher education structure gives the 
observer a sense of the hierarchy of influence, the method 
of coordination, and the degree of control among and 
between various players in the higher education arena. The 
studies in this section examine the relationship between 
and among a state structure and (a) policy innovation, (b) 
leadership strategy, and (c) performance. In addition, 
these studies exhibit the evolution of the market 
description of higher education (Martinez & Richardson, 
2003). 
Hearn and Griswold (1993) investigated the 
relationships between state governance structures and 
policy innovation in higher education. They examined 
secondary data from several national databases. 
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The dependent variables for their study included 
measures of policy innovation both in category and 
quantity. The independent variables were categories of 
state higher education governance structures. Control 
variables were measures of population, region, educational 
development and socioeconomic condition. 
The research designs for this study were bivariate 
correlational analysis and multiple regression. The 
correlations provided information about the relationships 
between governance structures and (a) individual policy 
innovations and (b) innovations in different policy 
domains. A series of mUltiple regressions analyzed the 
relationship between governance structures, the control 
variables and (a) policies concerning assessment 
requirements, (b)(college attendance financing, (c) 
teacher education, and (d) the total number of innovative 
policies. The authors examined three regression models for 
each dependent variable: (a) a model with only contextual 
control variables; (b) a full hierarchical model with 
control and governance variables, and (c) a reduced 
backward entry model with control and governance variables. 
The researchers found significance in governance 
structures for predicting some higher education policy 
innovation. Specifically, the results indicated: 
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1. Centralized governance was a significant predictor 
for policy innovation in academic reform and legislative 
treatment for college businesses. It was not a significant 
predictor for innovative college affordability policies. 
2. There was no significant difference between 
governance structures in the total amount of higher 
education policy innovation. 
3. Population, a control variable, was a significant 
predictor of the dependent variables. Larger states were 
more innovative in four of the eight policy arenas. 
Smaller states were significantly correlated to policy 
innovation in assessment requirements and financing. 
4. Region was a significant predictor in several of 
the regression mQdels. 
5. States with weak educational development were more 
likely to enact reforms for teacher education and finance; 
they were less likely to adopt reforms for college 
businesses and assessment requirements. 
Hearn and Griswold (1993) cited two themes emerging 
from this research study. First, they observed that 
governance structures influenced direct educational reform 
for states but did not influence financial affordability. 
Second, they did not observe a significant difference in 
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innovation between states with consolidated governing 
boards and strong coordinating boards. 
Marcus (1997) analyzed the determinants of governance 
restructure in state higher education. He surveyed the 49 
state higher education executive officers (SHEEO) by mail. 
Thirty-nine SHEEO's returned the survey; eight more 
responded after a follow-up mailing; and Marcus telephoned 
state officials of the remaining two states for their 
responses. Survey questions queried the participants 
concerning: (a) proposals for restructuring in their state; 
(b) initiators of proposals; (c) precipitating issues; and 
(d) enactment of~roposals. 
The survey responses indicated 49 proposals had 
progressed in 29 states between 1989 and 1994, and states 
had finalized action on 38 of those proposals. Legislators 
initiated the most proposals (N = 25), but those from state 
boards were most likely to be enacted (80%). Proposals 
that contained (a) measures to contain or reduce costs 
(63%), or (b) measures to increase institutional 
accountability (68%) had the highest pass rate. Efforts to 
increase the governor's or the legislature's role in higher 
education had a high rate of passage (64%). Marcus 
concluded from the responses that cooperation among campus 
level officials, state higher education officials, and 
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legislators lessened the amount of legislative regulation 
concerning governance. 
Bracco, Richardson, Callan, and Finney (1999) 
conducted a three-year, national comparative study of state 
higher education governance structures. The 1999 article 
focused on three states, Illinois, Georgia, and Michigan, 
to illustrate the major structural and leadership 
differences among states. They chose these three states as 
representative, because the states had similarities in size 
and student populations but were different in state higher 
education structure. 
The authors interviewed more that 200 individuals and 
searched documents and archival data to assemble their 
qualitative analysis. After data were collected, the 
researchers wrote an interpretive synthesis to explain (a) 
the relationship between performance and state governance 
design; and (b) the effect of state structure on leadership 
strategy. 
The results of the data analysis suggested that state 
governance structures included two dimensions: (a) the 
policy environment, or how states balance the interests of 
academia, the interests of the market, and the interests of 
the legislature; and (b) the structural environment, or how 
the state establishes lines of authority and 
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accountability. These two dimensions became the foundation 
to explore each case state. 
Bracco, Richardson, Callan, and Finney (1999) 
characterized Illinois as having a federal model of higher 
education governance and a steering role in policy. This 
combination focused on responding to the environment and to 
market forces. The researchers concluded that legislators 
were pleased about the performance of the state system. 
Bracco, Richardson, Callan, and Finney (1999) 
characterized Georgia as having a unified structure between 
governance and policy. The centralized regulation is 
compatible but not responsive to market forces. 
Bracco, Richardson, Callan, and Finney (1999) 
characterized Michigan as a segmented system of governance 
with the state policy environment being focused on 
providership. General satisfaction in Michigan seemed to 
be based on deference to professional values even though 
the system was inefficient. 
Analysis of the case studies led the researchers to 
summarize that the balance between policy environment and 
state structure was important in influencing satisfaction 
in state higher education performance. They concluded that 
mismatches in policy and structure created contentious 
situations where leadership was difficult. 
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Martinez (2002) used the Bracco (1999) framework to 
determine if it was applicable to a state not used in the 
derivation of the framework. He used a case study of South 
Dakota's higher education system to analyze (a) the 
efficacy of the existing framework in analysis of the South 
Dakota system and (b) conclusions from the South Dakota 
application that might illuminate future research on 
additional state systems. 
Martinez (2002) chose this framework to explore, 
because he felt its multidimensional nature captured more 
Of the character of state systems than previous 
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unidimensional descriptions. Martinez chose South Dakota 
as the state for the case study, because National Center 
for Public Policy in Higher Education (NCPPHE) officials 
thought there might be policy-driven change in the state's 
higher education. 
The case study method included document research, 
onsite and telephone interviews. Onsite interviewees 
included higher education administrators, board members, 
legislators, and policymaker aides (n = 11); telephone 
interviewees included additional administrators (n = 3), 
faculty members (n = 3), and state economists (n = 2). 
Martinez (2002) transcribed, coded and sorted the interview 
data according to an a priori coding scheme based on the 
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three levels of the higher education system framework laid 
out by Bracco (1999). 
The results of the case study analysis found two 
strengths within the system framework that helped explain 
the specific structure in South Dakota. First, the 
framework aided researchers in examining the state's higher 
education structure as an open system. The analysis showed 
relationships between and among political, structural and 
performance aspects of state higher education. Second, the 
case study showed that the three-level framework called 
attention to whether South Dakota had compatibility between 
and among levels. 
Martinez (2002) discussed whether compatibility was 
necessary for policy-driven change, or whether tension 
between levels of higher education might actually induce 
change. His analysis also raised an issue for future 
research of the unique and complementary roles of higher 
education boards, legislators and institutions in making 
and influencing policy. 
As the literature evolved and understanding of the 
higher education market developed, analysts envisioned a 
need for a conceptual definition of the broad higher 
education market. Martinez and Richardson (2003) developed 
a framework to examine policy interaction among key 
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stakeholders in the higher education market. They used 
literature review, case studies of the higher education 
policy environment in New Mexico and New Jersey, and 
performance grades for the NCPPHE report card to formulate 
their taxonomy. 
The components of their model included (a) the policy 
environment, (b) the means that states used to influence 
higher education by system design and fiscal policy, (c) 
the system behaviors, and (d) performance. The researchers 
determined the key groups of stakeholders to be (a) higher 
education institutions, (b) the state, and (c) consumers. 
Martinez and Richardson (2003) characterized the 
nature of communication among the three key stakeholders as 
interactions of influence. They determined that 
interaction between higher education and the consumer took 
the form of services, programs, information, tuition 
levels, and student preferences. Interactions between the 
state and the consumer consisted of state aid and 
information. Interaction between higher education and the 
state consisted of governance, finance, accountability, and 
information. The nature of these interactions defined 
three different types of state-level higher education 
markets: (a) a balanced market where each group of 
stakeholders had relatively equal input; (b) a market 
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monopoly where higher education institutions had a greater 
portion of the influence; and (c) a regulated market where 
the state had a greater portion of the influence. 
The case study of New Mexico illuminated a 
circumstance where the institutions had more influence than 
the state or the consumer; therefore, the authors 
characterized New Mexico as a market monopoly state. 
The case study for New Jersey exhibited a balanced 
market. When the researchers compared performance grades 
for these two states, they saw high grades for New Jersey 
across most measures of performance. For New Mexico, only 
the measures for accessibility, a priority for the state, 
were high. 
Based on the results of the case studies, Martinez and 
Richardson (2003) theorized that balanced market states 
would perform proportionately better across a broad range 
of indicators. Further, monopoly and regulated market 
states would produce higher grades on only single 
indicators. They encouraged future research to test this 
theory along with environmental variables outside the 
control of the market. 
As research on governance structures has shown, higher 
education exists within an environment where political 
variables are influential. The next section outlines 
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research about various political variables within the 
culture of higher education. 
Political Influence 
The political environment is a significant influence 
in the design, structure and process of statewide higher 
education. Within an ideal system, state legislators seek 
to balance the needs of the voting constituency with the 
needs of the higher education institutions. 
In recent years, political tension increased as a 
result of five trends: (a) escalating demands from higher 
enrollments and broader public expectations; (b) severe 
economic constraints; (c) reluctance to change by those in 
academia; (d) negative public opinion; and (e) more 
instability in the political processes caused by term 
limits and professionalism of legislators (McGuinness, 
1999). McGuinness called for higher education leaders to 
become intentional in the process of defining a positive 
and necessary relationship among political and 
institutional players. 
Several researchers have explored the political 
players in higher education and the interaction among 
levels of hierarchy. These following studies provide 
insight into the political influences in higher education. 
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Blackwell and Cistone (1999) investigated the 
hierarchy of power in Florida's higher education policy 
environment. Using a mailed survey instrument, they 
queried 290 higher education presidents and vice presidents 
and members of the executive and legislative branches of 
state government for their perception of the influence of 
specific individuals and groups within the higher education 
policy environment. The total response rate was 72%: (a) 
85% response from private institutions, (b) 93% from 
community colleges, (c) 90% from state universities, and 
(d) 41% from state government affiliates. 
The survey questions asked respondents to rate various 
personnel associated with higher education policy (N = 18; 
e.g., the governor, state legislators, and faculty) 
according to their influence on state higher education 
policy, using a 7-point, Likert-type scale (1 = very low 
influence, 7 = very high influence). Blackwell and Cistone 
(1999) ranked the 18 policy actors using the mean scores 
from the surveys then compared the means of adjacent pairs 
using independent samples t-tests to determine any 
statistical significance between means. A cluster analysis 
grouped policy actors into five clusters which the 
researchers interpreted as (a) the insiders who exerted the 
most political influence, (b) the near circle--the second 
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most influential group, (c) the far circle--an influential 
but non-crucial group, (d) the sometimes players who are 
formally involved but not very influential, and (e) the 
often forgotten players who have an interest in higher 
education but seldom show influence in policy matters. 
The results of this study indicated that Florida 
higher education personnel perceived leading members of 
legislative committees as having the single-most influence 
in state higher education policy-making (M = 5.95). 
Significant mean differences existed between (a) the state 
legislature (M = 5.89) and the state university system 
chancellor (M = 5.46); (b) the state board of regents (M = 
5.28) and the governor and executive staff (M = 4.78); and 
(c) education interest groups (M = 4.12) and faculty 
organizations (M = 3.58). 
The results of the cluster analysis grouped the first 
cluster, or insiders, as (a) legislative committee members, 
(b) state legislature, (c) key legislative staff 
consultants, (d) the university system chancellor, and (e) 
the state board of regents. The second group, or near 
circle, were (a) the governor and executive staff, and (b) 
senior staff in the state Department of Education. The 
third cluster, or far circle, were (a) the courts and (b) 
federal policy. The fourth group, sometimes players, were 
57 
(a) lobbyists from public institutions, (b) non-education 
interest groups, (c) all education interest groups, and (d) 
lobbyists from private institutions. The final cluster, 
often forgotten players, were (a) faculty organizations, 
(b) citizen referenda, (c) student organizations, (d) 
education research organizations, and (e) producers of 
education materials. 
Blackwell and Cistone (1999) noted that these results 
were not necessarily indicative of actual influence but 
rather perceptions of influence by state higher education 
personnel. The authors summarized that there was consensus 
among higher education leaders as to the power of various 
participants in policy development. 
Martinez (1999) conducted a survey and analysis of 
state legislator views about higher education governance 
and public policy. Assistants to Martinez conducted 25 
telephone interviews with state legislators in 18 states. 
The interview protocol was a 12-question, semi-structured, 
in-depth conversation with each participant. The sample 
was purposeful, selected from recommendations by the higher 
education policy community of legislators who had 
knowledge, insight, or influence on public university 
governance and trusteeship. The sample also included 
58 
legislators with a broad variety of political, contextual, 
and governance perspectives. 
Martinez (1999) identified themes in the interview 
responses and analyzed the data using two, two-dimensional 
data matrices. He also conducted chi-square distribution 
analyses on some of the data to determine significant mean 
differences among responses. 
The results of the analyses led Martinez (1999) to 
identify three major themes in the legislator responses: 
(a) Citizen trustees in higher education governance have a 
responsibility to serve as an institutional advocate; (b) 
citizen trustees in higher education governance have a duty 
to guard the public trust; and (c) citizen trustees have 
difficulty balancing the two responsibilities. Martinez 
reported 88% of interviewees mentioned areas where trustees 
needed to look beyond the needs of individual institutions: 
(a) Awareness of individual institution's role in the 
state's total system of higher education; (b) knowledge of 
the board's work to promote seamless K-16 education; and 
(c) knowledge of broader state issues, needs, and problems. 
One survey question asked legislators to rate the 
importance they gave to various responsibilities affiliated 
with governance, based on a 5-point, Likert-type scale (1 = 
very unimportant, 5 = very important). Martinez (1999) 
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grouped the respondents according to four types of state 
governance patterns: (a) mixed, (b) consolidated, (c) 
multicampus, and (d) single boards. He ran a chi-square 
distribution on the responses, but found the low sample 
size invalidated the efficacy of the test. A Statistical 
Analysis Software (SAS) contingency table and frequency 
distributions provided revised information. 
The responsibilities of governing boards receiving the 
highest importance ratings from the legislators were (a) 
evaluating the performance of the university president 
(65.2%); (b) overseeing the institutional budgets (63.6%); 
(c) creating a positive culture dispassionate toward 
personal and political interests (61.9%); and (d) holding 
campuses accountable against their missions (59.9%). 
Legislators from states with mixed and single governance 
structures placed more weight on accountability and 
positive board culture. 
A final observation by Martinez (1999) described 
respondent terms for responsibility of campus-level 
personnel as operational and managerial, whereas state 
responsibility terminology was accountability, duplication, 
and operation from a statewide perspective. Martinez 
summarized that legislators recognized trustee board 
success when a balance was achieved between advocacy for 
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the institution and the broad picture of guarding public 
interests. 
Griswold (1999) interviewed researchers, consultants, 
and financial aid authorities (N = 11) who had been 
involved with the National Commission on Student Financial 
Assistance to examine popular beliefs that these 
researchers were affected by political constraints. The 
commission was formed in 1980 under the Carter 
administration to assess national aid policy and 
effectiveness. 
The results of the interviews indicated that the 
commission had both explicit and implicit goals, both of 
which fluctuated as presidential administrations changed. 
Goals were also affected by time and budget constraints, 
reflected by political priorities. 
The interviewees agreed that the commission was 
successful in propagating the need for data collection 
concerning higher education. Some interviewees suggested 
that more should have been done with collected data. 
Griswold (1999) reported that the interviewees 
described political interference in actual commission 
research at three points: (a) goal formation, (b) during 
data collection and analysis, and (c) in reporting. 
Usually, these political influences were associated with 
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unrealistic time-lines, lack of financial support, and 
political framing of issues. 
Griswold (1999) summarized that the commission 
produced data and research that continued to be valuable in 
educational policy. She theorized that policy researchers 
might be more effective if they advocate policy based on 
their findings. She warned researchers to consider the 
political influence of certain research and warned policy 
makers to understand the limitations of research in 
political arenas. 
McLendon and Peterson (1999) examined the effects of 
press coverage on a higher education appropriations policy 
in Michigan. Their purpose was to see if media coverage 
was biased toward a particular viewpoint and could 
influence local public opinion. 
The context for their study was a Michigan legislative 
decision to change state higher education appropriations to 
Michigan State University (MSU) and the University of 
Michigan (UM). Traditionally, the state had a voluntary 
coordination structure honored by the governor, the 
legislature, and the college presidents. The 1995 
legislature provided a disproportionately larger increase 
for MSU in comparison to UM. 
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McLendon and Peterson (1999) analyzed the content of 
news stories in the Ann Arbor News and the Lansing State 
Journal to see if their reporting favored one side of the 
appropriations issue. Communication and media theory 
suggested that the Ann Arbor News would report favorably 
toward UM because of its proximity to the school and media 
tendency to use convenient sources. For the same reason, 
The Lansing State Journal would report favorably toward 
MSU. 
The authors tested their hypotheses using content 
analysis methodology. They obtained all copies of both 
newspapers published between January and July 1995. A 
search of the papers resulted in 67 articles that pertained 
to the conflict. The researchers eliminated editorial or 
opinion pieces and only retained news stories for their 
analysis (N = 15 for the Ann Arbor News and N = 18 for The 
Lansing State Journal). They developed an analytical 
protocol and coded data according to four categories: (a) 
news volume, (b) source attribution, (c) tone, and (d) news 
themes. 
A line-count of coverage provided information about 
volume of coverage. The Ann Arbor News gave 1,405 lines 
coverage to the issue; the Lansing State Journal devoted 
852 lines to the issue. Seventy-nine percent of the 
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coverage in the Ann Arbor News focused on UM, while 74% of 
the Lansing State Journal's coverage focused on MSU. 
To test the source attribution, McLendon and Peterson 
(1999) coded and counted source distribution in each 
article. They used interviews and background data to 
assess the affiliation of each source. 
The assessment of source attribution showed papers 
primarily using sources affiliated with their local 
schools. In the Ann Arbor News, 91% of the sources were UM 
officials or legislators affiliated with UM; six percent of 
the sources were affiliated with MSU. For the Lansing 
State Journal, 76% of its sources were from MSUi nineteen 
percent were affiliated with UM. 
McLendon and Peterson (1999) assessed tone by coding 
each quotation as positive, negative or neutral in tone 
toward each school. The results for the Ann Arbor News 
were 86% positive quotations for UM and 76% negative 
quotations for MSU. The results for the Lansing State 
Journal were 89% positive quotations for MSU and a small 
number of negative quotations equally divided between the 
universities. 
The final assessment by the authors involved analyzing 
the articles for news themes that might be biased toward 
their local school. They categorized the stories as (a) 
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supportive UM, (b) hostile UM, (c) supportive MSU, or (d) 
hostile MSU. The results yielded these themes for the Ann 
Arbor News: (a) 22% in the supportive UM category, (b) 13% 
in the supportive MSU category, (c) 13% in the supportive 
MSU themes, and (d) 52% in the hostile MSU category. The 
results for the Lansing News Journal were (a) 5% in the 
supportive UM category, (b) 18% in the hostile UM category, 
(c) 71% in the supportive MSU category, and (d) 6% in the 
hostile MSU category. 
McLendon and Peterson (1999) concluded that the two 
newspapers had divergent patterns of coverage for the 
appropriations issue. The coverage tended to show media 
bias toward their local schools. McLendon and Peterson 
observed that the use of university officials as sources 
shaped the news coverage and implied that the role of 
university officials potentially influenced public policy. 
A comparative study by Gittell and Kleiman (2000) 
analyzed the impact of state politics on higher education 
policy. They used two policy areas as their basis for 
comparison in Texas, North Carolina and California: (a) 
access in public higher education and (b) economic 
development. Primary and secondary data sources and 100 
interviews of state-level higher education officials 
provided the data for the study. 
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Gittell and Kleiman (2000) discussed the role of 
political players in higher education policy debate. They 
listed the main components in state higher education 
regimes as (a) the governor, (b) state legislatures, (c) 
the business community, (d) higher education officials, (e) 
faculty, (f) coordinating boards, (g) private institutions, 
(h) community colleges, and (i) interest groups. 
Based on the political climate in North Carolina, 
Gittell and Kleiman (2000) categorized the state's 
political culture as a progressive plutocracy, closely tied 
to private sector interests. The researchers suggested 
that the effects of North Carolina's political culture were 
evident in underfunded public schools, poor quality in non-
flagship universities and community colleges focused on 
private sector interests. 
Gittell and Kleiman (2002) described California's 
political climate as direct democracy. Initiative, 
referendum, and recall had been part of the state 
constitution for 80 years. The authors explained that 
California's higher education system was volatile and 
subject to sudden changes from voter initiatives. 
The political culture in Texas was highly 
decentralized and individual. political power was not 
dependent on political party, but on business interests and 
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personality of the individual candidate. Gittell and 
Kleiman (2000) described higher education in Texas as 
uncoordinated and driven by pork-barrel interests. 
The researchers concluded that each study state showed 
close correlations between higher education system effects 
and political culture. Further results of their study 
suggested that decisions of elected leaders were more 
influential in higher education policy than was the input 
of public education leadership. 
Gittell and Kleiman (2000) tested their observations 
by studying the decision processes of two higher education 
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policy issues: (a) access and (b) economic development. 
They evaluated access in each state by studying who 
participated in higher education, who received degrees and 
how affirmative action debate evolved. They studied 
economic development by analyzing the extent of actual 
development and the political actors influencing 
development. 
The results of the policy comparison suggested that 
each state was in process of reevaluating longstanding 
affirmative action policies in public higher education 
institutions. In California, the change in affirmative 
action originated in regent vote and public initiative. 
The higher education regime's response was weak, and the 
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state political culture was influential through strong 
gubernatorial power and a weak legislature. 
In Texas, the courts initiated affirmative action 
debate through the Hopwood decision. Both the higher 
education system and the state legislature responses were 
active. 
Reevaluation of affirmative action in North Carolina 
originated with the University of North Carolina president. 
The state higher education regime response had been 
moderate, and the primary impetus had remained in 
centralized leadership at the University of North Carolina. 
The authors were not able to assess economic 
development. They found that cross-state indicators did 
not reveal a linear connection between higher education and 
economic development. 
Gittell and Kleiman (2000) concluded that (a) 
political culture was influential on state higher education 
policy, (b) an active state legislature made a positive 
contribution to higher educational issues, and (c) there 
was poor communication among higher education policy makers 
within each state. They suggested that the combination of 
political influence and poor communication created a 
precarious environment for most public higher education 
institutions. 
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State government structures of higher education run 
between extremes of voluntary guidance and mandated 
regulation. The political environment of the state often 
determines these opposite dimensions of coordination. 
While communication between campus-level personnel and 
state-level policymakers varies across the states, analysts 
have called for increased understanding between the two 
roles. 
Richardson (1999) insisted that the proper role of the 
state is to balance the needs of the market, or society at-
large, with the product of higher education manifested in 
local institutions. By resting the responsibility for 
success on the shoulders of the state, Richardson suggested 
that "states that fail to establish an appropriate role for 
managing the conflicting pressures of professional values 
and the market end up with less satisfying outcomes than 
those that do" (p. 15). 
Tierney (1998) and colleagues, in The Responsive 
University, portrayed higher education institutions as the 
proper center of change to meet societal values. Their 
premise, that responsive universities will eliminate state 
intrusion, suggested that the fundamental values of 
teaching, research, and service are adequate foundations 
for higher education. While Tierney did not find system 
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improvement antithetical, he did argue for solid 
restructuring at the campus level. 
Newman (1984) took the middle ground between the 
suggestions of Richardson (1999) and Tierney (1998). He 
wrote that each entity, especially the state and the 
campus, have important but unique roles to play in higher 
education. He insisted that states, when creating 
appropriate public policy, fill an important function by 
setting goals, allocating resources, holding institutions 
accountable, and encouraging those who govern universities. 
When states overstep their bounds into tasks best done by 
education professionals, Newman claimed states were 
inappropriately intrusive. Newman appealed to leaders in 
both camps to create a strong, but appropriate relationship 
between states and campuses. 
Lewis and Maruna (1999) echoed Newman's (1984) 
sentiment: 
From a political perspective, governors and 
legislators present the appearance of movement and 
reform, but the need to show improvement within an 
electoral time-frame makes them less sensitive to the 
long-term effectiveness of reforms. The real world of 
state politics has to do primarily with the 
distribution of resources and symbols. Educating 
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young people is the business of schools and teachers. 
It is the task of future scholars to tie these two 
levels together into a meaningful synthesis. (p. 428) 
State Roles 
The following literature demonstrates how the state 
role and involvement in higher education has evolved and 
expanded over the years. In his 1984 book, Conflict in 
Higher Education: State Government Coordination Versus 
Institutional Independence, Millet traced the evolution of 
state involvement in public education. Nine royal or 
colonial charter schools for higher education existed in 
America between 1607 and 1776. The Northwest Ordinance of 
1787 authorized land grants for states to start new public 
institutions. 
As expansion of the united States pushed westward, 
public and private colleges opened in almost every new 
state. New England remained an exception in public higher 
education. These states were satisfied with successful 
private colleges like Dartmouth, Harvard, Columbia, and 
others. 
The Morrill Act of 1862 from the federal government 
gave further motivation for states to establish colleges of 
agriculture and mechanical arts. Twenty-two states formed 
land grant universities because of the Morrill Act. 
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Before World War II most public colleges were in rural 
areas, fearing unwelcome worldly influence from big cities. 
Soldiers returning from the war wanted a chance at higher 
education and influenced their politicians to provide 
access to institutions near their homes. The Supreme Court 
ruled in 1950 that states should provide a geographical 
balance in access to higher education. Another influence 
of the war, increased interest in jobs requiring higher 
education and the financial ability to continue past high 
school, manifested itself in growing enrollments. Millett 
(1984) reported that an early state goal for higher 
education was to provide adequate institutions so any high 
school graduate with appropriate intellect, resources, and 
motivation would have the opportunity to attend a college 
or university in their state. 
Millet (1984) outlined key state government issues for 
higher education in the 1980's. First, he summarized that 
the issues fell into two primary categories: (a) 
administrative management concerns of economy and 
efficiency and (b) statewide coordination. 
One state issue in the early 1980s presented a clash 
of values for state higher education authorities to 
reconcile. A popular conception emerged that geographic 
access and an open-door policy was diluting the academic 
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quality of higher education. A public accustomed to 
relatively unrestrained access accused selective colleges 
of racial and ethnic discrimination. 
A second serious issue facing states in the 1980s was 
declining state revenues that forced cutbacks to 
educational funding. The combined result of rising tuition 
at state campuses and falling appropriations and student 
aid increased state pressure to solve affordability 
questions for the pUblic. 
A third issue reflected major transformations in the 
missions and goals of state institutions. Traditionally, 
the state institutions had clear, differentiated roles. 
Millet (1984) explained that these roles were overlapping 
for two reasons: (a) Institutions with previously single 
missions began to acquire mUltiple missions and (b) campus 
administrators and faculty became insistent for increased 
research and graduate education. These situations created 
an issue of program duplication for state consideration. 
A fourth issue advanced in the 1980s as states had to 
balance the relationships between and among public 
institutions, private institutions, and state involvement. 
Initially, states had little regard for the private higher 
education sectors. As states began to realize that the 
private sector created legitimate competition for public 
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institutions, they undertook efforts to embrace them within 
the state landscape. Millet (1984) explained the climate 
for private education debate: 
The problem of state government assistance to private 
higher education arose at a time when most state 
governments were hard pressed financially to maintain 
their public institutions. Even though state 
political leaders might be sympathetically disposed 
toward the private colleges and universities, they 
were likely to see their primary responsibility as 
the support of public colleges and universities. 
Some leaders might appreciate the argument that 
private institutions achieved levels of quality and 
of a~demic freedom that could serve as standards for 
public institutions. Other leaders might appreciate 
the argument that the loss of private institutions 
would increase public enrollment and the costs of 
public higher education. (p. 153) 
Millet summarized that the public expected state government 
and higher education boards to help private institutions 
without depriving public institutions of resources. 
A final important issue in the 1980s raised by Millet 
(1984) involved financial planning. Millet summarized this 
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concern as affecting five areas: (a) appropriations for 
operations and renovations to physical plants; (b) proper 
delineation of funds for instruction, research, service, 
and student financial aid; (c) fair distribution among all 
state institutions; (d) appropriate and reasonable costs 
for state and federal goal achievement through higher 
education; and (e) appropriate policies and philosophies 
concerning the balance between costs to students and costs 
to the public. McGuinness (1995) echoed four policy issues 
introduced in the 1980's as statewide responsibilities: (a) 
policy agenda setting, (b) performance funding, (c) state 
assessments for student learning, and (d) performance 
accountability reporting. 
The increased scrutiny and elevated expectations 
resulting in an era of assessment in the 1980's developed 
into a movement of accountability in the 1990's (Ruppert, 
1997). Alexander (2000) explained that the fundamental 
presupposition of the accountability movement was that 
self-evaluation of higher education and market choice were 
not sufficient indicators of educational value. 
The accountability movement described a situation 
where states began to take more responsibility for direct 
coordination. As the state began to take more of a 
directional role, the issues of higher education policy 
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began to grow. Questions emerged regarding allocation and 
its link to performance; questions of performance led to 
increased accountability and assessment requirements; 
questions of assessment and accountability began to open 
the door to statewide regulation of academic practices. 
Research literature has traced the evolution of statewide 
policy development. 
As the relationship and roles between the state and 
campus have evolved, the policies this relationship 
manifested have evolved as well. The following subsections 
will trace the policy literature about (a) affordability, 
(b) tuition and appropriations, (c) direct student aid, (d) 
funding and access, (e) performance funding, (f) 
performance, (g) private institutions, and (h) additional 
policy issues. 
Affordability 
Financial accessibility of higher education has been 
an explicit American goal since the inception of the GI 
Bill following World War II. Consequently, the rapid 
increases of tuition and fees over the last two decades, 
especially as compared to median family income, have become 
an increasingly anxious issue for our society. Maintaining 
affordability of higher education for the masses is a 
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concern for families, businesses, higher education leaders, 
and government policymakers. 
Several analysts have sought plausible explanations 
for substantial tuition increases. Their attempts to 
understand reasons for higher tuition laid foundations for 
efforts to create policies and practices to maintain 
affordability for all Americans. 
Hauptman and Merisotis (1997) used national data sets 
and case studies of individual colleges to analyze six 
hypotheses for the increase in tuition and other college 
prices. They listed (a) increased costs for institutional 
goods and services, (b) expanded or improved service 
expenses, (c) decreased nontuition revenue, (d) increased 
availability of student aid, (e) tighter competition among 
institutions, and (f) declining traditional enrollment as 
classic hypotheses to explain higher tuition. 
They maintained that no single explanation was 
sufficient to explain higher tuition. Instead, a 
combination of factors was responsible for the increases, 
and some factors had a stronger influence than others did. 
Among the most important factors, Hauptman and 
Merisotis (1997) included: (a) The cut-backs in state 
appropriations; (b) increased expenses for faculty and 
staff salaries, student services, nontraditional 
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recruitment and retention, administrative requirements, 
campus-based research, and technological equipment. They 
found that neither reduced income from endowments and 
private gifts, nor federal student aid were significant 
contributors to rising tuition. Their final analysis 
maintained that if the economy did not substantially 
improve, college prices would probably continue to rise 
faster than inflation. 
Mumper (2001) also analyzed reasons for tuition 
increases. He interviewed state and campus policymakers 
for their explanations for tuition increases in their 
states. Using these extensive interviews, Mumper 
constructed five causal narratives of rising tuition. The 
five explanations included: (a) Decline in state support 
inevitably necessitated tuition hikes; (b) State budget 
decisions prioritized Medicaid and prisons to satisfy voter 
needs; (c) Campuses increased tuition to maintain quality 
programming; (d) Lack of accountability by local 
institutions caused wasted funds; and (e) Rising tuition 
was really not a problem, because enrollments continue to 
grow. 
Mumper (2001) concluded that the disparate views of 
rising tuition unveiled by his analysis revealed a 
fundamental difficulty for resolving the issue. Since four 
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distinct reasons and one non-reason existed, policymakers 
did not address rising tuition by unified policy direction. 
Mumper maintained that the inherent political nature of the 
various concepts required effort by state and campus 
leaders to communicate with each other in assessing plans 
to control college costs. 
Taxpayer concerns about the affordability of college 
precipitated Congress in 1997 to appoint the independent 
National Commission on the Cost of Higher Education to 
comprehensively review costs and prices of higher education 
in America. Congress chartered the commission to review 11 
specific issues related to trends, causes, and potential 
controls for rising tuition and institutional costs. The 
work of the commission is published as Straight Talk about 
College Costs and Prices (1998). 
One of the first tasks of the commission was to 
delineate between prices for higher education paid by 
students and costs of higher education incurred by the 
institutions. Commission members adamantly expressed the 
importance of distinction between cost and price. Even in 
the face of higher prices for students, American higher 
education remains a value, because students only pay a 
small portion of the actual costs. 
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The commission's six-month tenure included analyses of 
existing data, presentations by key political and higher 
education leaders, and. study of commissioned policy papers. 
The conclusion of thei+ work manifested itself in five 
action agenda areas. 
First, members advised institutions to strengthen 
their cost control efforts. They encouraged institutions 
to evaluate their productivity and to prioritize key 
endeavors to eliminate unnecessary or superfluous 
programming. Second, the commission admonished the entire 
academic community to improve market information and public 
accountability. They emphasized the importance of 
informing the public about the actual costs of education, 
the value of student services, and the specifics of where 
consumer money is spent. Third, the commission recommended 
deregulation of higher education. They concluded through 
testimony that over-regulation increased costs for 
institutions. They advised government to stress 
performance, not compliance, and differentiation of 
mission, not standardization. Fourth, the commission 
recommended that accreditation be a tool to evaluate 
outputs of student achievement. Fifth, the commission 
recommended enhancement and simplification of federal 
student aid. They surmised that federal aid did not drive 
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tuition up, but rather was an important tool in providing 
access for low-income families. 
The commission's report was approved and presented to 
Congress and the president in February, 1998. One of the 
commissioners, Frances McMurtray Norris, was not available 
to vote but presented a dissenting statement. He related 
that the work of the commission was a good beginning, but 
the report lacked useful substance. He was disappointed 
that the commission did not address tenure, the cost and 
value of research, duplication of facilities, teaching 
loads, and the relationship of student loan programs to 
rising tuition. 
Recent policy papers have continued to address the 
affordability issue. Bell and Michelau (2001), higher 
education specialists with the National Conference of State 
Legislatures, explained the onerous problem of higher 
education affordability for state policy-makers. Not only 
are legislators working hard to solve the problem, but 
their fiscal policies also helped create the dilemma. 
State higher education appropriations are accounting for 
fewer overall revenues to colleges and institutions. 
Institutions raise tuition to make up for the difference. 
A shift from higher education as a public common good to a 
consumable private investments seems to be occurring. 
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Bell and Michelau (2001) outlined several 
controversial new policies states are enacting to combat 
higher tuition. Financial aid based on merit, like 
Georgia's HOPE scholarship, is one state strategy to make 
higher education more affordable and to keep the best 
students in-state. Legislators prefer these policies, 
because the voting constituency responds positively to 
them. 
Legislators also promote prepaid tuition plans, 
college savings programs, and tuition tax credits. Bell 
and Michelau (2001) report that state policymakers applaud 
these incentives as both good education policy and good 
politics. 
Opponents of these new programs warn the public that 
these are only financial tools for middle and upper-class 
families who could already afford to pay. Critics hold 
that the proper place for state support in higher education 
is through need-based financial aid. They contend that 
states benefit economically and socially from educated 
citizens and that merit programs will exclude the most 
financially needy, yet academically prepared, students. 
Bell and Michelau (2001) concluded that state legislators 
must continue to engage in questions about affordability, 
access and the proper state role in higher education. 
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The National Center for Public Policy and Higher 
Education (NCPPHE) addressed the affordability issue in a 
special report, Losing Ground: A National Status Report on 
the Affordability of Higher Education. An advisory 
committee, reviewers, and consultants prepared this report 
as a tool for state policymakers. 
The officials working with NCPPHE defined 
affordability as a function of tuition and fee prices, 
available financial aid, and family income. They outlined 
five trends in state affordability: (a) Increasing tuition 
is making higher education less affordable for most 
American families; (b) Federal and state financial aid has 
not kept pace with tuition; (c) More students and families 
at all income levels are borrowing more money than ever 
before to pay for college; (d) The steepest increases in 
public college and university tuition have been imposed 
during times of greatest economic hardship; and (e) State 
financial support of public higher education has increased, 
but tuition has increased more. 
The NCPPHE assured states that effective policy could 
combat poor affordability. They maintained that a given 
state achieves affordable higher education through tuition 
policy accounting for state family income, need-based 
financial aid, and low-cost colleges. 
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The NCPPHE officials also criticized state policy 
strategies like merit aid and tax incentives. They warned 
that the enrollment gap between high and low-income 
Americans was growing. The recommended that states rethink 
their policies to break the cycle of poor affordability and 
to create long-term strategies that will withstand economic 
peaks and valleys. 
Longanecker (2002) also addressed policy integration 
strategies in a commentary for the State Higher Education 
Executive Officers (SHEEO). He explained that current 
state fiscal policy toward higher education usually takes 
one of two approaches: either across-the-board cuts on 
discretionary items or focused cuts. Longanecker 
maintained that intentional strategies to align tuition, 
appropriations, and financial aid could diminish the ill 
effects of budget cuts. He also advised that integrated 
strategy would keep access available for low-income 
families. 
The NCPPHE supplemented their Losing Ground report 
with a review of surveys on public opinion about American 
Higher Education affordability (NCPPHE, 2002). Public 
Agenda conducted the review at the request of NCPPHE. They 
studied research from two previous NCPPHE reports, an 
American Council on Education report, and survey results 
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from an online research database. They also explored the 
quantitative results in two focus groups in the 
Philadelphia area. 
Five major themes emerged from their work. First, a 
majority of Americans believed it is very important to 
receive higher education. They viewed higher education as 
preparation for careers and jobs, acquisition of general 
skills and maturity, and development of social skills. 
Second, many parents were concerned about the affordability 
of higher education. They also realized that they could 
compensate rising prices by attending less expensive 
community colleges. Third, the public supported a 
governmental role in higher education. They preferred 
financial aid support in the form of tax breaks and work-
study. Fourth, Americans opposed higher education finance 
strategies that reduced access. They were against raising 
tuition and lowering admissions, but they were supportive 
of greater contributions from the state or cost savings by 
local institutions. 
The State Higher Education Executive Officer's 
organization (SHEEO) also conducted a survey related to 
state affordability in higher education. They questioned 
state higher education finance officers in late June 2002 
about five areas of higher education policy: (a) tuition 
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philosophy, (b) tuition setting, (c) student fees, (d) 
student financial assistance, and (e) affordability. The 
mailed survey resulted in responses from 44 different 
states. 
The results of the survey for tuition philosophy 
indicated variation among states in their fundamental ideas 
that guided tuition setting. Fourteen states indicated 
that tuition should be as low as possible, 12 states 
indicated that institution-level needs or standards solely 
guided tuition policy, and six states indicated that 
tuition should be moderate. No state responded that they 
believed tuition should be high. 
Authority to set tuition also varied among the states. 
In four states, the legislature had primary authority. In 
18 states, the state higher education coordinating or 
governing agency had primary authority. In 12 states, a 
higher education system board had primary authority. In 16 
states, individual institutions had primary authority. 
Some states indicated a shared responsibility between two 
entities. The majority of states responded that they had 
no formal regulations to limit tuition. 
The SHEEO survey also asked respondents about factors 
used in setting resident and non-resident tuition. The 
survey listed 16 factors and asked respondents to indicate 
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how influential each factor was on a 5-point, Likert-type 
scale (1 = no influence; 5 = significant influence). For 
resident tuition, responses indicated that state general 
fund appropriations were the most influential factor (~ = 
4.4), followed by prior year's tuition (~ = 3.7). 
Decision-makers usually based nonresident tuition on the 
full cost of instruction. Nineteen states indicated that a 
cap, freeze, curb, or some limitation had been placed on 
tuition at some point during the previous three years. 
The SHEEO survey also revealed a variety of 
philosophies among states for financial assistance 
programs. States differed on the emphasis they placed on 
need-based aid like grants and loans versus merit-based aid 
to recognize talent and reward student effort. 
The survey asked respondents to indicate on a 5-point, 
Likert-type scale (1 = no influence; 5 = significant 
influence) how influential seven goals of financial aid 
policy were to their states. The results indicated 
promoting broad access to higher education as the most 
influential goal (~ = 4.6), followed by improving the 
affordability of higher education (~ = 4.5). Six states 
indicated that recognizing student talent and effort was 
the most influential goal (~ = 3.3). Other goals included 
promoting retention (p = 3.5), facilitating student choice 
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(~ = 3.4), preparing students for specific careers (~ = 
2.9), and helping equalize public and private tuition (~ = 
2.1). The survey also indicated that student aid is 
available in most states in a variety of forms. Programs 
included need-based grants, statewide merit-based 
scholarships, targeted merit scholarships, loan 
forgiveness, state-funded work-study and guaranteed loans, 
specific-group aid, and state tax credits or deductions. 
Broad issues of affordability constituted the final 
inquiries of the SHEEO survey. Many state respondents 
recognized the need to address issues of decreasing 
affordability for higher education. Some state had 
instituted special commissions or task forces to review the 
affordability issue, while other states had taken 
initiatives to inform the public about college costs and 
prices. Thirty-three states had developed some form of a 
prepaid tuition or college savings plan, and three others 
indicated a plan was under construction. The responses 
about overall affordability to the SHEEO survey indicated 
that states are just beginning to comprehensively address 
that issue. 
A 2003 publication of the NCPPHE reacted to the 
effects on affordability by the current recession and state 
budget cuts. Tuition hikes at public universities ranged 
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from 4.6% to 13%. Analysts warned that states are 
experiencing serious budget problems. 
The NCPPHE again called for states to formulate policy 
based on thoughtful priorities. Callan (2003), writing for 
the NCPPHE publication, admonished states to consider four 
important principles: (a) Disproportionate budget cuts to 
higher education lead to higher tuition and hurt 
accessibility; (b) To protect access, tuition increases 
should be limited to what is necessary to assure 
institutional capacity to educate students; (c) Tuition 
increases must be accompanied by financial aid; and (d) The 
protection of low-cost higher education institutions must 
be prioritized as a safety net for low-income families 
during economic downturns. 
As this compendium of policy analyses reveals, finance 
policy is an important role for state higher education 
coordination. The relationship among tuition, 
appropriations, and financial aid determines the 
affordability of higher education. The following 
subsections review literature associated with the 
individual aspects of affordability. 
Tuition and Appropriations 
Historically, states have supported public 
institutions of higher education through direct 
89 
appropriations to institutions. This source of funding 
continues to be among the highest financial resource for 
public higher education, providing more than $50 billion 
dollars nationwide by the late 1990's (Hauptman, 2001). 
The purpose of state appropriation had been to keep 
individual tuition costs to students at a minimum. By the 
early 1970's public opinion was suggesting a shift from 
primarily state support to a balance in cost sharing 
between the state and students. (Hauptman, 2001). Over the 
last 30 years, states have reduced their subsidies and 
tuition has risen (Heller, 2001). 
The policymaking process of tuition setting often 
presents a paradox of ideology. Mumper (2001) suggested 
that since "tuition levels in each state are negotiated 
among many institutions through a process in which 
guidelines are regularly ignored, the perspectives of the 
individual participants inevitably shape the outcome. Yet, 
those participants may enter the negotiation with different 
assumptions and understandings of the dynamics that drive 
tuition rates" (pg. 43). 
Peterson (1976) assessed environmental and political 
variables associated with state higher education 
appropriation. He used three secondary data sets of 
independent variables to determine their influence on state 
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appropriations: (a) state socioeconomic status, (b) state 
higher education environment, and (c) state politics. The 
dependent variable included appropriations in three 
categories of public higher education institutions, 
representing both per capita and per student expenditures: 
(a) all institutions, (b) four-year institutions, and (c) 
two-year institutions. A study of the literature provided 
Peterson (1976) with 20 independent variables and 12 
measures of the dependent variable. 
For each variable, he used Pearson correlation to see 
if a significant relationship existed between the variable 
and state appropriations. If the correlation was 
significant at the .05 level, Peterson (1976) used the 
variable in one of three mUltiple regression analyses 
representing each of the sets of variables. In each 
regression, he controlled for another set of variables to 
determine the independent contribution of the set in 
question. He also tested each variable measurement for 
1960 and 1969. 
Although the article did not contain complete 
regression information, tables provided information 
concerning the correlations and how they changed upon entry 
into a regression equation. In the analysis of 
socioeconomic variables, controlling for political 
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variables, Peterson (1976) found significance in these 
variables as predictors of per capita appropriations to all 
institutions: (a) industrialization in 1960 (r = -.57, p < 
.05) and 1969 (r = -.28, p < .05); (b) affluence in 1960 (r 
= .51, p < .05) and 1969 (r = .48, p < .05); (c) median 
school years in 1960 (r = .50, p < .05) and 1969 (r = .48, 
p < .05); and (d) college educated percentage in 1960 (r = 
.28, p < .05) and 1969 (r = .40, p < .05). He found 
significance in the same variables as predictors of per 
capita appropriations to four-year and two-year 
institutions individually with these exceptions: (a) the 
college educated percentage variable was not significant in 
relationship to four-year colleges; (b) the percentage of 
population college-aged was significant in 1969 for four-
year colleges (r = .31, P < .05); and (c) the 
industrialization variable was not significant in 
relationship to two-year colleges. 
The analysis for per student appropriations was 
significant for these variables: (a) industrialization in 
1969 (r = .52, P < .05); (b) affluence in 1960 (r = .33; p 
< .05); (c) median school years in 1960 (r = .33, p < .05); 
(d) personal income in 1960 (r = .39, p < .05) and 1969 (r 
= .53, p < .05); (e) corporate income in 1969 (r = .35, P < 
.05); and (f) college educated percentage in 1960 (r = .35, 
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p < .05) and 1969 (r = .48, P < .05). The analysis for 
appropriations per student to four-year institutions 
yielded the same significant variables. The analysis for 
appropriations per student to two-year institutions yielded 
no significant variables. 
In the analysis of higher education environment 
variables, controlling for socioeconomic variables, 
Peterson (1976) found significance in these variables as 
predictors of per capita appropriations to all 
institutions: (a) public school enrollment in 1960 (r = 
.83, p < .05) and 1969 (r = .75, P < .05); (b) two-year 
enrollment in 1960 (r = .55, p < .05) and 1969 (r = .52, P 
< .05); (c) four-year enrollment in 1960 (r = .73, P < .05) 
and 1969 (r = .50, P < .05); (d) private school enrollment 
in 1960 (r = -.48, p < .05) and 1969 (r = -.36, p < .05); 
(e) number of private institutions in 1960(r = -.40, p < 
.05) and 1969 (r = -.37, P < .05); and (f) percentage of 
students in public schools in 1960 (r = .74, P < .05) and 
1969 (r = .58, p < .05). The analysis for appropriations 
per capita to four-year colleges yielded the same 
significant variables. The analysis for two-year colleges 
showed the same significance, except the four-year college 
enrollment variable and the private school enrollment 
variable were not significant. 
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The analysis of appropriations per student for all 
institutions showed significance for these variables: (a) 
public school enrollment in 1969 (r = -.28, p < .05); (b) 
four-year enrollment in 1969 (r = -.40, p < .05); (c) 
number of private institutions in 1960 (r = -.31, p < .05); 
and (d) percentage of students in public schools in 1969 (r 
= -.32, p < .05). The analysis for per student 
appropriations to four-year schools yielded the same 
significant variables. The analysis for per student 
appropriations to two-year schools showed no significant 
variables. 
In the analysis of political variables, controlling 
for socioeconomic variables, Peterson (1976) found 
significance in these variables as predictors of per capita 
appropriations to all institutions: (a) competition-
turnout in 1960 (r = .42, p < .05) and 1969 (r = .39, p < 
.05); (b) legislative professionalism in 1960 (r = -.35, p 
< .05); and (c) centralization of decision-making in 1960 
(r = -.34, p < .05). The analysis for per student 
appropriations to four-year schools yielded the same 
significant variables with these additions: (a) legislative 
professionalism in 1969 (r = -.30, p < .05) and (b) 
innovative legislation in 1960 (r = -.29, p < .05). The 
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analysis for per student appropriations to two-year schools 
showed no significant variables. 
The analysis of appropriations per student for all 
institutions showed significance for these variables: (a) 
legislative professionalism in 1969 (r = .46, p < .05) and 
(b) legislative innovation in 1969 (r = .29, P < .05). The 
analysis for per student appropriations to four-year 
schools yielded the same significant variables with the 
addition of the governor's power in 1969 (r = .33, p < 
.05). The analysis for per student appropriations to two-
year schools showed no significant variables. 
The results of this study were the first to indicate 
political and environmental factors related independently 
to appropriations policies in higher education. Peterson 
(1976) concluded that policy makers were sensitive to the 
reactions of political constituents. 
Coughlin and Erekson (1986) studied the determinants 
of state aid and voluntary support for higher education. 
They used secondary data from 52 major public and 
independent universities across six athletic conferences. 
One dependent variable was state appropriations per 
student. Other dependent variables were total voluntary 
support and voluntary support per student (a) for current 
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and capital costs and (b) by corporate and alumni donors. 
The unit of analysis was the individual institution. 
The results of mUltiple regression analyses for 
prediction of state aid per student showed significant 
positive effects for (a) undergraduate quality (b = .80, p 
< .01); (b) relative tuition (b = .88, p < .01); (c) state 
tax effort (b = .02, p < .05); and (d) NCAA tournament 
appearance (b = .63, p < .05). Tuition had a significant 
negative effect on the dependent variable (b = -.0008, 
p < .01). The linear combination of the independent 
variables explained 76% of the variance in the dependent 
variable. 
The results of the regression to predict the voluntary 
support per student from all sources showed significant 
positive effects for (a) SAT scores (b = .004, p < .05); 
(b) private school (b = 1.56, p < .01); and (c) athletic 
contributions (b = .0003, p < .01). The linear combination 
of these variables predicted 76% of the variance in the 
dependent variable. 
The results of the regression to predict total 
voluntary support per institution from all sources showed 
significant positive effects for (a) SAT scores (b = 55.14, 
p < .05); (b) private school (b = 16538.62, p < .01); (c) 
student enrollment (b = .78, P < .01); and (d) athletic 
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contributions (b = 4.54, P < .05). The linear combination 
of these variables predicted 60% of the variance in the 
dependent variable. 
St. John (1991) used case studies of the Minnesota and 
Kansas higher education system to examine policy strategies 
for resource management. These states represented 
purposive sampling of one state with tension among local 
institutions and state lawmakers (Minnesota) and one state 
with a positive relationship between the state and local 
institutions (Kansas). 
St. John (1991) used interviews, document and database 
review, and site visits to develop this qualitative study. 
The data from these case studies allowed St. John to 
compare traditional strategic master planning against 
emerging issues in higher education resource management. 
St. John (1991) found that state planning was based on 
both explicit and implicit higher education goals. 
Explicit goals included equity, quality, and economic 
development. One implicit goal common to both states was 
having propitious financial management in institutions. 
A second observation provided by the case studies was 
the need for more coordination among five areas of 
strategy: (a) program and facility planning, (b) cost 
management, (c) institutional subsidies, (d) student aid, 
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and (e) enrollment management. St. John (1991) insisted 
that a comprehensive approach to policy would have to 
integrate these five arenas. 
St. John (1991) also recommended awareness of and 
strategy to incorporate external intervening factors in 
higher education resources: (a) state tax revenues, (b) 
other state financial obligations, (c) federal financial 
strategies, and (d) other institutional revenue sources. 
While many of these were beyond the control of state higher 
education policymakers, they were important considerations 
in the policy process. Other exogenous factors having an 
influence on resources were (a) demographic trends, (b) 
economic conditions, (c) technological development, and (d) 
public attitudes. 
St. John (1991) encouraged higher education 
policymakers to examine comprehensively their state 
financial resource policy strategy to ensure it encompasses 
the complete array of issues. He explained that many 
states have a default policy of incrementalism in higher 
education finance. He insisted that a comprehensive 
framework of evaluation for resource management issues 
would allow states to coordinate levels of tuition, state 
aid, educational expenditures, and state grants. 
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Gittell and Sedgley (2000) investigated the effects of 
higher education on the state economy by studying the 
relationship between state appropriation expenditures and 
high-technology employment. They discussed that theories 
of human capital and economic growth would suggest a 
positive relationship between expenditures for higher 
education and economic prosperity. 
The dependent variable in this study was state 
economic performance measured by the percentage of high-
technology employment in the state. The dependent variable 
was compared with the independent variable, state 
expenditures per full-time (FTE) student, on scatter plots 
with expenditures on the vertical axis and employment on 
the horizontal axis. The plot showed no significant 
relationship between 1996 FTE appropriations and high-
technology employment. Gittell and Sedgley (2000) made 
these observations: (a) None of the four technology 
leaders is a leader in FTE appropriations; and (b) New 
Hampshire was the leading technology employer and ranked 
next to last in higher education expenditures. 
Gittell and Sedgley (2000) tested the relationship of 
economic growth and expenditures over time with the average 
annual growth from 1976 to 1996 in state higher education 
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appropriations against 1996 high-technology employment. 
The results yielded no significant linear relationship. 
The authors also tested the relationship between 1996 
high-technology employment and the linear combination of 
higher education appropriations and appropriations growth 
from 1976 to 1996. They obtained their combination 
coefficients from an ordinary least squares regression. 
The scatter plot showed a negative relationship between 
spending and employment, but the researchers reported that 
the standard errors of the estimates and the t values were 
not statistically significant. 
Gittell and Sedgley (2000) discussed complicating 
factors in determining linear relationships between higher 
education expenditures and economic growth. They 
identified these issues as (a) trade-offs in the state 
priorities of higher education, (b) density of higher 
education, (c) state economic and social environment, (d) 
state quality-of-life lures, (e) private institutions, and 
(f) student migration. These various situations all 
contributed to a complex relationship between state higher 
education and economy. 
Lowry (2001) conducted a secondary analysis of data to 
determine what political and economic factors predicted 
state government funding and tuition for 428 campuses in 50 
100 
states. His data set included all public, four-year higher 
education institutions in the 50 states that had complete 
financial and enrollment information on the IPEDS and that 
were classified by U.S. News and World Report as a national 
or regional university. 
His dependent variables were the dollar amount of 
state government appropriations, grants and contracts per 
100,000 voting-age residents in the state and net tuition 
and fee revenues per 100,000 voting-age residents in the 
state. His predictor variables for government funding were 
various measures of (a) state government resources, (b) 
state political interests, (c) enrollments by student 
categories at individual campuses, (d) public outputs at 
individual campuses, (e) qualitative attributes of 
individual campuses that may affect legislators, (f) cost 
of inputs at individual campuses, and (g) additional 
revenues at individual campuses. His predictor variables 
for tuition and fees were (a) financial autonomy of state 
campuses, (b) enrollments by student categories at 
individual campuses, (c) student willingness to pay for 
instruction, (d) cost of inputs at individual campuses, and 
(e) additional revenues at individual campuses. 
Lowry (2001) analyzed the data in Stata using two-
state least squares regression. The results of this study 
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concerning government funding included that (a) government 
funding was higher in states with more tax revenues, (b) 
funding was affected by political factors, and (c) public 
goods targeted to specific state constituencies were funded 
higher than broadly targeted goods. The specific political 
factors affecting government funding included (a) the 
number of higher education governing boards, (b) the 
fraction of voting-age population 65 years or older, and 
(c) private college enrollment. Total variance in the 
dependent variable explained by all the independent 
predictors was 94% (R2 = .942). 
The results of this study concerning tuition and fees 
included that net tuition and fees were (a) higher in 
states where campuses have more local autonomy, and (b) 
higher in states with high per capita income. Total 
variance in the dependent variable explained by the 
independent variables was 95% (R2 = .948). 
Berger and Kostal (2002) analyzed the supply and 
demand factors determining enrollment in public higher 
education. They studied 1990-1995 secondary data from 48 
US states. 
The researchers developed a model to predict the 
demand for enrollment with these predictor variables: (a) 
public school tuition, (b) average wage of production 
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workers, (c) private school tuition, (d) medium household 
income, (e) the wage ratio between production and non-
production workers, (f) the unemployment rate, (g) the 
percentage of population 25+ with at least a bachelor's 
degree, (h) the ratio of non-white people in the 
population, and (i) the percentage of urban population. 
The supply model had these predictor variables: (a) public 
school tuition, (b) amount of state appropriations to 
higher education, (c) additional revenue of public 
institutions, (d) average faculty salaries in public 
institutions, (e) the degree of administrative flexibility, 
(f) the degree of academic flexibility, (g) the number of 
public institutions per 100,000 people between age 18 and 
24, and (h) the percentage of the ages 18-24 population 
enrolled in private institutions. 
Berger and Kostal (2002) used two-stage least squares 
analysis to determine the significance of the independent 
variables in predicting enrollment supply and demand. The 
first equation yielded these significant variables for 
demand: (a) public school tuition (~ = -.0063, p < .01); 
(b) average wage of production workers (~ = .00058, p < 
.01); and (c) the percentage of population 25+ with at 
least a bachelor's degree (~ = .91969, p < .01). The 
equation for supply yielded these significant predictor 
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variables: (a) state appropriations (~ = .00513, p < .01); 
(b) other revenue (~ = .00411, p < .01); (c) medium 
administrative flexibility (~ = -4.14813, p < .01); (d) 
high administrative flexibility (~ = -4.81235, P < .01); 
(e) medium academic flexibility (~ = 4.67350, p < .01); and 
(f) high academic flexibility (~ = -2.72733, p < .05). 
Using the results of the equation, Berger and Kostal 
(2002) simulated three policy scenarios to determine how 
they affected enrollment. The first policy scenario 
involved higher tuition and constant state appropriations. 
The results of that situation indicated that the demand-
side of enrollment would decrease by five percent. 
The second scenario was higher tuition and lower state 
appropriations. This situation resulted in a decrease in 
demand-side enrollment by three percent. 
The third scenario compared state appropriations and 
state regulation. The results indicated that state 
regulation on budgetary matters allowed appropriations to 
drop by 61% and maintain constant enrollment levels. 
Berger and Kostal (2002) summarized that higher 
education enrollment tends to decrease as tuition increases 
and state appropriations decrease. They also concluded 
that states who must lower appropriations due to budgetary 
constraints may maintain current enrollment if the state 
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government exercises more rigid regulation over its 
institutions. 
The relationship between tuition and state 
appropriations is complex and, as the previously reviewed 
literature demonstrated, highly subject to many political, 
social, and environmental variables. Policy researchers 
have indicated a possible shift in ideology from a service 
approach to education, maintaining low tuition rates and 
directing funds to institutions, toward a market approach, 
providing majority funding directly to students. 
Sontheimer (1994) even called for states to remove 
direct subsidies in favor of direct aid. He theorized that 
this arrangement of privatizing higher education would 
actually create a more efficient system and would optimize 
choice. The following subsection presents literature and 
empirical studies related to the variables and effects of 
direct student aid. 
Direct Student Aid 
Not only do states financially support education 
through direct appropriations to institutions, but they 
also provide support by direct funds to students. Heller 
(2001) reported that financial aid to students has grown in 
the amount of money available and the number of students 
receiving it. In the period between 1971 and 1998, college 
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enrollment grew 60 percent and financial aid from state, 
federal and institutional sources grew 723 percent. 
Several issues are important in examining the 
affordability of college. The price charged by colleges, 
the amount of available aid, and the family ability to pay 
must be examined together to determine affordability 
(Heller, 2001). 
As tuition prices continue to rise, researchers have 
begun to look for policies that link tuition and direct aid 
to students. Griswold and Marine (1996) examined five 
states to see if or how they linked policies for tuition 
and aid. 
Griswold and Marine (1996) conducted case studies of 
two states with explicitly linked tuition and aid policies 
(Minnesota and washington) and three states with no formal 
linkage (New York, Massachusetts, and California). The 
authors analyzed policy proposals, research, and state 
newspaper articles, and they conducted interviews with 
state policymakers to collect data for their study. 
To provide context for their study, Griswold and 
Marine (1996) explained that political players often are 
torn between the unpopular decisions of raising tuition or 
raising taxes to support higher education. In some states, 
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politicians choose the apparent lesser evil of rising 
tuition, since it ultimately affects fewer votes. 
Griswold and Marine (1996) found evidence in Minnesota 
and Washington of reactionary increases due to economic and 
political factors. Tuition levels rose without consistent 
rational planning to account for the increases and without 
sufficient aid to counteract the effects of rising tuition. 
In the three states with compatible policies, tuition 
levels also rose, but policy was in place to partially 
alleviate financial hardships. 
The authors discussed several implications for their 
research: (a) When states did not coordinate tuition and 
aid policies, they threatened the equity of opportunity for 
higher education; (b) financial distress was seemingly the 
largest motivator of change within the states; and (c) 
Garnering support and constructing implementation of a 
higher-tuition/higher-aid policy strategy may be difficult 
for politicians. 
Hearn, Griswold, and Marine (1996) tested the effects 
of certain regional and policy variables on levels of 
tuition and student aid. They used a theoretical framework 
to construct a hypothesis that postsecondary tuition and 
aid approaches were a function of (a) ideologies associated 
with a particular part of the country; (b) social and 
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economic conditions in a state; and (c) the governance 
framework whereby states structure their postsecondary 
policy decision making. 
The two research questions for this study addressed 
(a) the ways that postsecondary financing policies were 
associated with the 13 independent variables and (b) which 
state characteristics were most closely associated with 
financing policy. Of particular interest to these 
researchers was the policy strategy of high/tuition-
high/aid. Four secondary data sources provided the 
information for 50 states. 
The six dependent variables for the study were (a) 
tuition in 4-year public institutions, (b) tuition in 2-
year public institutions, (c) tuition differential favoring 
students in 2-year institutions, (d) per-capita state 
student aid, (e) average tuition in public institutions, 
and (f) index of tuition/aid rationalization. The authors 
explained that the differential variable represented state 
priority in making two-year institutions an entry point, 
and the rationalization variable represented state policy 
combining high tuition with high aid or low aid with low 
tuition. 
Six two-way analyses of variance (ANOVA) provided 
group mean differences for each of the dependent variables. 
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Significant group differences were found for (a) four-year 
tuition in regions and governance, (b) two-year tuition in 
regions, (c) tuition differential in regions, (d) average 
tuition in regions and governance, (e) per capita aid in 
regions, and (f) rationalization in regions. 
Hearn, Griswold, and Marine (1996) used four separate 
multiple regressions for each dependent variable for a 
total of 24 regression analyses. For each dependent 
variable they tested the predictive power of (a) each of 
four regions, (b) five resource variables and four 
governance variables, (c) a full model combining the region 
and governance variables, and (d) a best fit model with all 
variables in a backward entry method. 
The results of the analysis for the best fit 
regression model predicting four-year tuition showed 
significance for (a) the Northeast region (~ = .49, p > 
.001), (b) the Midwest region (~ = .24, p > .01), and (c) 
the Southwest region (~ = -.25, p < .05), (d) planning 
agency governance (~ = .25, p < .05), and (e) the complete 
regression model (adj. R2 = .51, p < .001). The results of 
the analysis for the best fit regression model predicting 
two-year tuition showed significance for (a) the Northeast 
region (~ = .32, p < .05); (b) the Midwest region (~ = .37, 
P < .001); (c) average disposable income (~ = -.41, p < 
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.01); (d) population percentage with a high school 
education (~ = .28, p < .01); (e) reliance on public 
postsecondary system (~ = -.43, p < .01); (f) a weak 
coordinating board (~ = -.29, p < .01); and (g) the 
regression model (adj. R2 = .63, p < .001). 
The results of the best fit regression model 
predicting the tuition differential showed significance for 
(a) the Midwest region (~ = -.34, p < .01); (b) average 
disposable income (~ = .53, p < .001); (c) population 
percentage with a high school education (~ = -.40, p < 
.01); (d) reliance on public postsecondary system (~ = .57, 
p < .001); (e) a weak coordinating board (~ = .33, p < 
.01); (f) a planning agency (~ = .28, p < .05); and (g) the 
regression model (adj. R2 = .36, p < .001). 
The results of the best fit regression model 
predicting average tuition showed significance for (a) the 
Northeast region (~ = .39, p < .001); (b) the Midwest 
region (~ = .30, p < .001); (c) the Southwest region (~ = 
.25, p < .05); (d) average disposable income (~ = -.31, p < 
.01); (e) reliance on the public postsecondary system (~ = 
-.44, p < .001); (f) a strong coordinating board (~ = .20, 
p < .05); and (g) the regression model (adj. R2 = .66, p < 
.001) . 
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The results of the best fit regression model 
predicting per-capita student aid showed significance for 
(a) the Northeast region (~ = .28, p < .05); (b) the 
Southeast region (~ = -.31, p < .01); (c) the Southwest 
region (~ = -.37, P < .01); (d) state population (~ = .50, 
p < .001); and (e) the regression model (adj. R2 = .44, P < 
.001) . 
The results of the best fit regression model 
predicting tuition/aid rationalization showed significance 
for (a) the Northeast region (~ = .28, p < .05); (b) the 
Southeast region (~ = -.35, p < .01); (c) the Southwest 
region (~ = -.42, P < .42); (d) state population (~ = .31, 
P < .05); and (e) the regression model (adj. R2 = .59, P < 
.001) . 
Hearn, Griswold, and Marine (1996) summarized that 
region was the variable most associated to state tuition 
and aid policy. Further research could clarify what 
characteristics of regions most predicted policy. This 
research also elucidated the role of governing boards. 
More decentralized structures were associated with higher 
tuition rates. Finally, the authors concluded that aid 
policies and tuition policies were only slightly 
associated. According to this research, states have not 
developed integrative aid and tuition policies. 
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Hossler (1997) and colleagues studied state higher 
education financing for correlates between student aid and 
tuition. They described the current policy environment of 
higher education funding to examine (a) the extent to which 
state demographics, resources, and politics explain 
allocation decisions, (b) how various state policies are 
related, and (c) trends associated with state higher 
education characteristics and state economic health. 
The researchers used secondary data, survey results, 
and telephone interviews in their study. National 
databases provided information about higher education 
governance, state economic conditions and political 
variables for all 50 states. Two surveys, one to state aid 
directors and one to state higher education executive 
officers (SHEEOs), provided information on financial aid 
policies, appropriations, tuition policies, and state 
policy goals. In-depth telephone interviews with SHEEO's, 
state aid directors, other policymakers, and analysts from 
Oregon, Washington, and Indiana helped the researchers 
extend the results of the quantitative analyses. 
Hossler (1997) used regression analyses, exploratory 
factor analysis, and frequency distributions to examine 
relationships among the state characteristic variables and 
various funding policies in the states. In the multiple 
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regressions, the researchers sought predictor variables to 
explain (a) levels of state appropriations to schools, (b) 
levels of state appropriations to financial aid, (c) 
dominant political values in states, and (d) links between 
policy goals and appropriations. 
The results of each analysis were similar. There were 
few predictors or relationships between or among the 
research variables. The only significant predictor 
variable for levels of state appropriation was previous 
levels of state appropriation. 
Hossler (1997) discussed the possibility that a 
market-model for higher education allowed policymakers to 
decrease funding, envisioning a high-tuition/high aid 
approach. He maintained that the results of this study 
indicated a mythical reality, because state strategy for 
student aid did not relate to tuition increases. He 
explained that the problem for state policymakers "is that 
we have reached a point in our history at which higher 
education has become viewed as a universal right at the 
very moment when the rising costs of higher education and 
state and federal budget constraints appear unable to 
support the expectations of the American public" (p. 182). 
Hossler (1997) called for policy discussion and research 
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among all the key players in the higher education arena, 
including state and local level administrators. 
A study by Alexander (1998) analyzed patterns of 
direct student aid appropriations among states to determine 
if a philosophical shift in higher education funding had 
occurred at the state level. He used a longitudinal 
comparative analysis of frequencies and percentages 
associated with direct student aid in 50 states. variables 
studied were (a) state direct student aid grant program 
resources as a percentage of state appropriations for 
selected states; (b) number of states establishing direct 
student aid programs; (c) average state need-based grant 
program awards to students in public institutions; (d) 
average state need-based grant program awards to students 
in private institutions; (e) state dollars spent on need-
based student aid versus merit-based aid programs; and (f) 
percentage point change in lower-income freshman as a share 
of all freshman population in public and private 
institutions. 
Alexander (1998) explained the evolution of 
appropriations granted directly to students against funding 
given to an institution. The introduction of direct 
student aid was through the G.I. Bill after World War II. 
In the succeeding years, federal policy shifted more toward 
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direct student aid, also known as vouchers, and 
consequently, began to affect higher education funding at 
the state level. Initial justification for vouchers was to 
expand educational opportunities and to provide lower-
income students with high quality educational choices at 
private institutions. 
The results of this study suggested that state direct 
student aid programs were a growing proportion of all state 
funding for higher education. State direct student aid 
grant program resources as a percentage of state 
appropriations for states ranged from less than 1% in 
Hawaii to 22.4% in New York. The United States average was 
6.6%. The ratio of need-based student aid to merit-based 
student aid steadily reduced from $7.53/$1 in 1981 to 
$5.66/$1 in 1996. 
Average state need-based grant program awards to 
students in private institutions (M = $833 in 1976; M = 
$2,015 in 1996) was consistently higher than average state 
need-based grant program awards to students in public 
institutions (M = 439 in 1976; M = $1,268 in 1996). The 
percentage point change in lower-income freshman as a share 
of all freshman population between 1975 and 1996 increased 
for public two-year institutions by 3.5%, increased for 
public four-year institutions by 4.6%, decreased for 
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private two-year institutions by 1.8%, and decreased for 
private four-year institutions by 1%. 
These statistics led Alexander (1998) to conclude that 
a disparity existed between direct student aid expenditures 
for students attending private and public colleges, and 
that lower-income student access to private colleges had 
not grown. He defined the statistical results as a 
"shortchange" for public higher education. 
The ramifications of funding sources and amounts 
exceed the issue of affordability (Zusman, 1999). As this 
literature review unfolds, research and analyses will 
demonstrate the broader social effects of funding policies 
and strategies. One of these broader concerns is access, 
the opportunity for diverse ethnicities and social classes 
to participate in higher education. The next subsection 
presents empirical studies associated with funding and 
access. 
Funding and Access 
Access to higher education has long been an explicit 
goal of American society (Benjamin & Carroll, 1998; Callan, 
1991), but the definition of access has encompassed many 
dimensions (Eaton, 1997). Eaton described five areas of 
access important in various historical periods of public 
higher education: (a) financial accessibility, 
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(b) accessibility for the academically under-prepared (c) 
minority accessibility, (d) geographic accessibility, and 
(e) accessibility for prospective but uninformed students. 
In an essay tracing the evolution of access policy, 
Eaton (1997) explained that geographical access was an 
early priority dating back to the Colonial period of 
American history. Government and higher education leaders 
strove to provide local institutions to an ever-expanding 
geographic landscape. 
After World War II, the GI Bill introduced and 
provided for a broad value in financial accessibility. 
President Truman's Commission on Higher Education (1947) 
reported the need to provide higher education to all social 
classes, "If college opportunities are restricted to those 
in the higher income brackets, the way is open to the 
creation and perpetuation of a class society which has no 
place in the American way of life" (vol. 2, p. 23). 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Higher Education 
Act of 1965 opened the door for minorities and low-income 
families to fully participate in higher education. As a 
result, more underrepresented populations sought education 
for professional and skilled employment (Heller, 2001). 
Contemporary American culture ostensibly requires 
higher education for any lifestyle above poverty (Callan, 
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1999; Hunt, 2000). The knowledge-based, technological 
economy of contemporary American society demands fewer 
unskilled laborers and more highly educated employees. 
According to Callan (2001), "If opportunity is broadly 
defined as the chance to participate fully in society, 
higher education has become the only road to opportunity 
for most Americans" (p. 85). 
Alexander (2000) discussed quality effects of the new 
accessibility demands. He reasoned that: 
Governments see higher education as a product that 
ensures economic growth. Universities, once portrayed 
as cultural training grounds for young minds, have 
become major agents for government investment in human 
development ... in this environment, higher education is 
viewed as a vehicle to increase the stock of human 
capital that enables more competition in world 
markets. (p. 415) 
According to Alexander, the effect of this "massification" 
is increased pressure on both universities and state 
policymakers to allow greater accessibility while still 
improving educational quality and performance. 
Congress established the Advisory Committee on Student 
Financial Assistance in 1986 to provide independent advice 
and counsel on student financial aid policy. The 
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committee's primary focus is improving access. In a 2001 
report to Congress, the committee found three factors that 
threatened higher education access: (a) shifting 
priorities of policymakers from low-income to middle-income 
affordability; (b) growing unmet financial need for low-
income students; and (c) decisions by low-income students 
to work long hours, attend college part-time, and take 
large student loans. The committee recommended that 
Congress should (a) recommit to the goal of affordability 
for all Americans; (b) increase need-based aid; and (c) 
revitalize state, campus, and federal partnerships in 
support of access. 
Several policy analysts have admonished officials on 
the increasing difficulty of minorities and lower 
socioeconomic classes to afford higher education (Hauptman, 
1997; Zusman, 1999; Callan, 2001). Callan (2001) explained 
that universal access has been an important national 
priority; but, opportunities of access are declining due to 
financial policies that have not accounted for long-term 
participation implications. 
St. John (1999) tested the association between state 
student aid and persistence in a study of washington 
institutions and state grant policies. He controlled for 
student background variables, income, achievement, college 
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characteristics and experiences to test how increases in 
Washington grant money affected student persistence in 
1991, 1992, and 1993. 
St. John (1999) used a logistic regression analysis 
for each of the three test years to determine the 
likelihood of a student to continue in school. In 1991, 
these variables had a positive effect on persistence: 
(a) high income family, (b) having an "A" average in high 
school, (c) full-time enrollment, and (d) sophomore and 
junior years in college. These variables had a negative 
effect on persistence: (a) age; (b) being African-American, 
Hispanic, or Asian-American; (c) having less than a "C" 
high school grade average; and (d) attendance at a 
comprehensive university. In addition, these financial aid 
variables were significantly related to persistence in 
1991: (a) having a grant/loan package (~-p = .04, p < .01) 
and (b) having a grant/loan/work package (~-p = .06, p < 
.01) . 
From the fall of 1991 to the fall of 1992, the average 
grant award in Washington increased by $74, the average 
loan increased by $250, and the average tuition charge 
increased by $80. The results of the logistic regression 
for 1992 showed being Hispanic or Asian-American was not 
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significantly related to persistence as it had been in 
1991. Other variables had similar results. 
From the fall of 1992 to the fall of 1993, the average 
grant award in Washington increased by $430, the average 
loan increased by $1230, and the average tuition charge 
increased by $233. The results of the logistic regression 
for 1993 showed no significant effect for ethnicity in 
persistence. In addition, all forms of financial aid 
packages had a significant positive effect for persistence: 
(a) grant only (~-p = .04, p < .01); (b) loan only (~-p = 
.04, p < .01); (c) loan/work (~-p = .08, p < .10); (d) 
grant/loan (~-p = .06, p < .01); (e) grant/work (~-p = .05, 
p < .05); and (f) grant/loan/work (~-p = .07, P < .01). 
St. John (1999) offered this research as an example of 
a successful model of state evaluation of grant program 
effects. He also maintained that the results of this study 
demonstrated the association between state aid and the 
opportunity for minority students to persist. Finally, he 
advocated similar studies for all states to examine whether 
their tuition policies and aid policies were coordinated 
sufficiently. 
St. John, Hu, and Weber (2001) used the same 
logistical regression methodology and analytical model to 
examine the effects of financial aid packages on student 
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persistence in Indiana. Several factors in the policy 
strategy of Indiana differed from washington: (a) Aid 
package composition changed over time reflecting a greater 
reliance on loans; (b) total grant awards increased over 
time but did not keep up with rising tuition; and (c) state 
grants increased to account for decreased federal grants. 
As in his 1999 study of washington, St. John (2001) 
found that student background variables and college 
experience variables affected persistence among college 
students, but financial aid packages reduced the effects of 
student background and college experience variables. The 
aid packages provided students of minority backgrounds an 
equal opportunity for persistence as Whites. 
He also found a disconnection between federal and 
state policy strategy and between state tuition and aid 
policy strategy. He called for more coordination between 
and among these structures. 
In a complementary study, Hu and St. John (2001) used 
the same data base and analytical model but dis aggregated 
the data to study individual effects for African American 
and Hispanic students comparable to White students. The 
researchers also stratified the sample in each ethnic group 
by four socioeconomic levels. The purpose of this study 
was to understand the persistence trends and factors 
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related to these particular ethnic groups by social level 
and year. 
The results for African American students revealed (a) 
a decline in persistence over time and (b) increased 
efficacy in financial aid packages. In addition, these 
variables had a significant positive relationship to 
persistence in 1996-97: (a) junior status (~-p = .053, p < 
.001) and (b) senior status (~-p = .096, p < .001). These 
variables had a significant negative association with 
persistence: (a) age (~-p = -.008, p < .001) and (b) GPA 
(~-p = -.434, p < .001). 
The results for Hispanic students revealed (a) a 
decline in persistence over time, (b) increased persistence 
by year in school, and (c) increased efficacy in financial 
aid packages. In addition, these variables had a 
significant negative relationship to persistence in 1996-
97: (a) being male (~-p = -.059, P < .01); (b) age (~-p = 
-.007, p < .05); (c) having a GPA below C (~-p = -.317, p 
< .001). 
The results for White students revealed (a) a very 
slight decline in persistence over time, (b) increased 
persistence by year in school, and (c) a small increase in 
efficacy in some financial aid packages. Age (~-p = -.005, 
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p < .001) and low GPA (~-p = -.366, p < .001) had a 
significant negative relationship with persistence. 
Hu and St. John (2001) concluded that the persistence 
rates between various ethnic groups compared with the 
effects of their financial aid packages showed Indiana's 
success in maintaining persistence by ethnic groups. The 
researchers maintained that adequate financial aid is 
necessary to sustain enrollment by minority groups. 
Further, they questioned the policy of high tuition/high 
aid in sustaining levels of enrollment by all ethnic 
groups. 
Paulsen and St. John (2002) examined the financial 
relationship between college choice and persistence by 
members of different races and social classes. They 
departed from traditional developmental and change models 
to further develop a financial nexus model to examine 
persistence. They posited that college choice and 
persistence were highly influenced by diverse student 
perspectives formed by experiences of race and social 
class. 
Using secondary data from a national database of more 
than 25,000 students, the researchers conducted logistic 
regression to determine the effects of student backgrounds, 
college costs and college experience on persistence of 
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students from four income levels. Paulsen and St. John 
(2002) conducted three regressions for each income level: 
(a) an initial model including background, perception and 
expectation variables; (b) a second model adding fixed cost 
variables of tuition and financial aid; and (c) a final 
model accounting for controllable costs of housing and 
food. Every complete model was statistically significant. 
The results of this study indicated significant 
effects for class differences in student choice and 
persistence. Paulsen and St. John (2002) reported these 
significant findings: 
1. Lower-income students were not as likely as 
higher-income students to attend private colleges or four-
year colleges, to enroll full-time, or to live on campus. 
2. Lower-income women were less likely than men to 
persist. 
3. Lower-income students who had GED's were more 
persistent than lower-income students with high school 
diplomas. 
4. African-American students in lower and lower-
middle income groups were more persistent than whites in 
the same groups. The opposite was true in middle and 
upper-middle class groups. 
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5. Lower-income students were more likely to attain A 
grades than middle and upper-class students, but their 
attainment aspirations were lower. 
Paulsen and St. John (2002) also reported class-based 
enrollment patterns related to student perceptions of 
college costs. Middle and upper-class students showed 
better persistence by choosing colleges based on low 
tuition and/or high aid. Lower and lower middle-class 
students showed better persistence when they chose schools 
based on controllable costs of food and housing. Loans and 
work-study aid showed negative effects for the persistence 
of lower-class students. 
Paulsen and St. John (2002) offered these results as 
important policy considerations regarding non-traditional 
students and the coordination of financial aid and college 
costs. They insisted, "the high-tuition, high-loan 
approach to higher education finance does not appear to be 
working" (p. 230). 
As demonstrated in many of these empirical studies, 
and explained by Callan (2001), the affordability of higher 
education is closely linked to the opportunity of access to 
various social groups. St. John, Kline, and Asker (2001) 
extended the call to states to include accountability 
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measures that examined quality in terms of access even to 
the detriment of efficiency. 
Analysts often define affordability, access, and 
quality as the three most important issues in contemporary 
higher education analysis (Heller, 2001). As seen in this 
section of review, these are difficult goals to pursue in 
tandem. Obtaining balance among the three worthy pursuits 
often produces tension among the various players in higher 
education policy and practice (Zusman, 1999). One policy 
strategy attempting to coordinate state goals in higher 
education is performance funding. 
Performance Funding 
Performance funding is a state policy to link some 
amount of state appropriations to goals achieved by higher 
education institutions. Alexander (2000) proposed that 
states have made a fundamental shift in ideology about the 
purpose of higher education. He explained, "universities, 
once portrayed as cultural training grounds for young 
minds, have become major agents for government investment 
in human development" (p. 415). As a result, state 
lawmakers are tying appropriations to quantitative 
evidence, performance-based Q4ality, and utilitarian goals. 
Tennessee was the first state to implement a 
performance-funding program in 1979 and was continuing to 
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use this policy after four revisions. Banta, Rudolph, Van 
Dyke, and Fisher (1996) studied the efficacy of Tennessee's 
higher education performance funding policy. 
The authors gathered data for their study through a 
survey of 23 campus performance coordinators. The survey 
was distributed by mail and returned from all participants 
for a 100% response rate. The participants represented all 
23 of Tennessee's public colleges and universities, 
including four technical institutes, ten community 
colleges, six comprehensive universities, and three 
campuses of the University of Tennessee (UT). The survey 
had been piloted previously on four campuses to test for 
validity and reliability. 
The 1993-1997 version of the performance funding 
policy consisted of ten quality standards: (a) 
accreditation, (b) major field tests, (c) measurement of 
general education outcomes, (d) alumni and enrolled student 
surveys, (e) improvement actions taken to remedy identified 
weaknesses, (f) peer review of non-accreditable 
undergraduate programs, (g) master's program reviews or 
placement, (h) enrollment goals for campus-specific groups, 
(i) persistence to graduation minority and all students, 
and (j) mission-specific objectives. Directions in the 
survey asked participants to assess each standard based on 
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(a) the standard's measurement of higher education quality, 
using a 5-point, academic scale (A = outstanding 
measurement, F = poor measurement); (b) whether the 
standard affected institutional improvement, using a three-
choice response (yes, no, or too soon to tell); (c) what 
the most helpful aspects of the standard's application were 
on their campus, using open-ended responses; and (d) how 
the respondent would change the standard to make it more 
helpful, using open-ended responses. 
The responses on this survey showed campus performance 
coordinators gave five performance standards a B-minus or 
higher as a measurement of higher education quality: (a) 
peer review of undergraduate programs (M = B+); (b) 
master's reviews or placement (M = B+); (c) accreditation 
(M = B); (d) improvement actions (M = B); and (e) student 
and alumni surveys (M = B-). The same standards, plus 
major field tests, were perceived by more than 50% of the 
respondents to be effective in promoting institutional 
improvement. 
Responses to the survey led Banta, Rudolph, Van Dyke, 
and Fisher (1996) to conclude that Tennessee's performance-
funding policy was responsible for several positive 
outcomes at state higher education institutions. They 
further summarized that the Tennessee policy, as 
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implemented, had become an attractive motivation for 
continuous evaluation and improvement over the fifteen 
years of its existence. 
Serban (1998) conducted a survey and reported 
descriptive results of state and campus policymaker 
opinions and attitudes about performance funding. A panel 
of experts helped develop and revise a survey instrument 
mailed to higher education state policy makers and various 
campus representatives (N = 1,813). After a follow-up 
mailing, 918 individuals had returned completed surveys for 
an overall response rate of 50.6 percent. Serban (1998) 
did not include legislators and system governing board 
chairs due to a low response rate. 
Directions in the survey asked respondents to react to 
performance funding issues in general and in relation to 
their state. Questions included elements such as purpose 
of performance funding programs, values reflected in the 
programs, performance indicators, funding levels, and 
sources of funding. Questions also explored operational 
issues of performance funding like participation in 
development of the program, planning and implementation, 
advantages and disadvantages, effectiveness, methods of 
improvement and future prospects. 
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Serban and Burke (1998) used information from the 
survey to further explore performance funding. using the 
1996 survey, they conducted a comparative analysis of nine 
states to investigate the opinions and attitudes of higher 
education individuals involved in designing and/or 
implementing their performance funding policy. The nine 
states had adopted performance funding in one of three 
categories: (a) mandated by the state legislature with 
prescribed implementation and/or indicators; (b) mandated 
by the state legislature with flexibility and coordination 
for implementation and assignment of indicators; or (c) not 
mandated by the state but adopted, designed and implemented 
by higher education coordinating boards. 
Serban and Burke (1998) categorized survey responses 
based on literature's discussion of the primary goals of 
performance funding: (a) increased accountability, (b) 
quality in higher education, (c) state funding, and (d) 
improved public perceptions of higher education. They also 
separated responses among (a) the governors' offices, (b) 
members of higher education coordinating agencies, (c) 
state system administration officers, and (d) senior campus 
officers. 
131 
The results of the analysis concerning potential for 
performance funding to accomplish its goals varied among 
constituents: 
1. A majority of state-level stakeholders viewed 
performance funding as having positive potential to impact 
higher education quality, accountability, funding and 
public perception. Overall percentages of positive 
responses for governors' offices was 56%, for coordinating 
agency officers was 58%, and for system administration 
officers was 52%. 
2. A majority of campus-level administrators reported 
an undecided or negative opinion of performance funding's 
potential to achieve its goals. Forty-eight percent of 
campus respondents were undecided, 11% had a negative 
opinion, and 41% had a positive opinion. 
Serban and Burke (1998) concluded from the responses 
and the divergent attitudes that more communication between 
state and campus officials would have been beneficial to 
performance funding policy. The researchers observed that 
increased accountability and local institutional 
improvement were complementary when credibility and trust 
had been established across constituent levels. 
Performance funding across different states have had 
mixed results. Burke and Modarresi (2000) used information 
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from a 1996 survey of state and campus officials from nine 
states to identify characteristics that separate states 
with stable or unstable higher education performance 
funding programs. Since the time of the survey, four 
states (i.e., Arkansas, Colorado, Kentucky, and Minnesota) 
had dropped performance funding. The authors labeled these 
as unstable states. Two states, Missouri and Tennessee, 
retained strong performance funding programs. The authors 
labeled these as stable states. Three states, Florida, 
Ohio, and South Carolina, maintained performance funding, 
but Burke and Modarresi (2000) deemed the programs to be 
uncertain and controversial. They did not use these three 
states in their analysis. 
Burke and Modarresi (2000) used literature to 
hypothesize 11 characteristics of stable performance 
funding programs: (a) collaboration among governors, state 
coordinating boards, and campus officials; (b) goals of 
institutional improvement, external accountability, and 
increased state funding; (c) policy values stressing 
quality over efficiency; (d) sufficient time for planning 
and implementation; (e) optimum number of performance 
indicators; (f) success standards emphasizing institutional 
improvement with peer comparisons; (g) restricted but 
substantial funding; (h) additional, not reallocated, 
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funding; (i) protecting mission diversity and campus 
autonomy; (j) stability of state programs and requirements; 
(k) prospects for a positive future. These 11 standards, 
operationalized by survey responses, were the independent 
variables entered into a discriminant analysis procedure. 
Dependent variables were the two groups of stable and 
unstable programs. 
Results of the discriminant analysis differentiated 
the independent variable responses between the stable and 
unstable groups. The mean scores suggested significant 
differences between the two groups, confirming most of the 
researcher's hypotheses. Specifically, stable and unstable 
groups differed the most on achievement of performance 
funding goals, importance of stakeholder input, choice of 
performance indicators, and future potential. 
The effectiveness of performance funding and quality 
is an important consideration. When states use performance 
funding and performance indicators, they assume a linkage 
between the motivation for institutions to improve and the 
amount of government funding they receive. 
Brown (2000) examined the relationship between higher 
education faculty quality and institutional funding 
sources. The dependent variable, teaching quality, was 
operationalized by student ratings of faculty quality and 
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~ ~ faculty accessibility as reported in a national 
r 
publication. Independent predictor variables were various 
sources of funding for higher education institutions as 
reported by the U.s. Department of Education. 
Separate mUltiple regression analyses using first the 
faculty quality rating and then the faculty accessibility 
rating as dependent variables provided information on how 
sources of funds predicted faculty quality. The results 
indicated that state and federal government funding 
significantly predicted teaching quality variables in a 
negative direction (~ = -11.76, p <.05 for state; 
~ = -37.77, P < .05 for federal). Private giving and 
endowment income predicted teaching quality in a positive 
direction (~ = 25.25, p < .05 for private giving; ~ = 
16.62, P < .05 for endowment income). Funding sources 
accounted for 69% of the variance in faculty teaching 
quality (R2 = .691) and faculty accessibility (R2 = .688). 
Brown (2000) addressed the implications of these 
results on public policy. He suggested that increased 
educational subsidies may not increase educational quality, 
but that increased government funding may provide more 
access and enhance basic research. Once again, literature 
demonstrated the awkward relationship among pursuits of 
access, quality, and funding. 
135 
As states coordinate the goals of higher education, 
they strive to determine suitable means and measures of 
academic quality. Assessment, accountability, quality, and 
performance are all terms used to measure the effectiveness 
of higher education at meeting explicit and implicit goals. 
The next subsection profiles research associated with 
higher education performance. 
Performance 
Performance funding is only one aspect of addressing 
the rising issue of accountability in higher education. 
Ruppert (1998) reported the increasing interest by states 
of pursuing results-oriented accountability procedures for 
colleges and universities. She emphasized the new consumer 
mentality of the public and encouraged institutions to 
consider the needs and wants of various stakeholders, 
including legislators, students, and business leaders. 
Heller (2001) expressed the new focus on 
accountability in higher education as a result of rising 
scrutiny from business, government, and students who demand 
evidence that their money is well spent. Even as the 
perspective of performance broadens, states vary on their 
approaches to achieve progress in quality. 
Every method of measuring quality begins with a 
discussion of how quality is measured. States must choose 
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what performance indicators will be included in assessment 
and which indicators will be deleted. 
Schmitz (1993) analyzed the validity of indicators of 
higher education quality utilized by u.s. News and World 
Report (USN&W) describing academic quality of undergraduate 
programs. The secondary analysis included data from four 
categories of higher education institutions: (a) national 
universities and colleges (n = 189); (b) national liberal 
arts colleges (n = 135); (c) Midwestern regional liberal 
arts colleges (n = 130); and (d) Northern regional 
universities and colleges (n = 141). 
The predictor variables were input indicators for 
higher education (i.e., acceptance rate, mean entrance test 
scores, and class standing); process indicators (i.e., 
faculty/student ratios, faculty background, and 
instructional budget); outcome indicators (i.e., retention 
and graduation rates); and two neutral variables (i.e., 
percentage of male students and cost of room and board) . 
The criterion variable was reputation score collected by 
USN&W through an annual survey sent to college presidents, 
academic deans and admissions officers. These university 
officials (N = 3,900) assessed the reputation of schools 
from their own institutional categories. The lowest 
response rate, 56%, was from national universities, and the 
137 
highest response rate, 74%, was from national liberal arts 
colleges. 
Schmitz (1993) tested the convergent validity of the 
quality indicators by observing the relationships among all 
variables using Pearson correlation coefficients. She used 
a minimum Pearson correlation coefficient (r = .40) to 
determine intercorelations among the indicators within each 
institutional category 
Schmitz (1993) tested the relationship of input to 
outcome indicators and the divergent validity of the 
indicators with a stepwise mUltiple regression for each 
institutional category. The input, process and neutral 
indicators were predictor variables and the outcome 
indicators were criterion variables. 
Finally, she tested the generalizability of the 
indicators by analyzing each of the regressions against the 
regressions for other categories. The amount of variance 
accounted for in a single regression comparable to the 
amount of variance in another regression indicated the 
strength of prediction for each institutional category. 
The results of this study indicated differences in the 
validity of various indicators to predict higher education 
quality according to institutional category. Indicators 
were highly correlated within the national categories, but 
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were not highly intercorrelated for the regional 
categories. 
The validity of input and process indicators as 
predictor variables for retention rate was stronger for 
national categories (R2 = .53 and .52) than it was for 
regional categories (R2 = .23 and .29) . The indicators were 
stronger predictors of graduation rate for national 
categories (R2 = .32 and .50) than they were for regional 
categories (R2 = .12 and .22). Finally, indicators were 
stronger predictors of reputational score for national 
categories (R2 = .64 and .84) that they were for regional 
categories (R2 = .38 and .47). 
The results of this study did not demonstrate clear 
discriminant relationships among indicators paired with 
neutral variables. Both gender and room and board showed 
statistically significant correlations and prediction of 
criterion variables. These results suggest that either 
these variables were not neutral, as presumed, or the 
indicators of quality were not discriminant. 
Schmitz (1993) reported the limitations and criticism 
of reputational ratings to determine higher education 
quality. Reputational scores are subject to halo effects 
and alumni bias. Schmitz (1993) concluded that quality is 
a multifaceted construct to measure. She suggested that 
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future research continue to seek alternative measures of 
quality for various categories of institutions. 
Donald and Denison (2001) compared student perceptions 
of student quality to student performance indicators 
identified by administrative and faculty stakeholders. The 
researchers distributed a questionnaire to 400 students at 
a major university who were enrolled in four undergraduate 
programs. The survey asked for student background 
information about gender, program of study, and year of 
study. The survey also listed 25 student quality criteria 
and asked students to respond to each criterion using a 5-
point, Likert-type scale as to its importance for student 
quality (1 = not at all important, 5 = extremely 
important). The Spearman correlation between student and 
other stakeholder ranks of importance was .71, p < .001. 
Donald and Denison (2001) tested the relationship 
among student responses to the various criteria with a 
principle components analysis (PCA) with a varimax 
rotation. The PCA resulted in five factors, accounting for 
57.3% of the variance. The factors were (a) generic skills 
and abilities, comprised of 11 criteria; (b) academic 
performance, comprised of four criteria; (c) employment 
competence, comprised of three criteria; (d) specific 
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skills, comprised of two criteria; and (e) academic 
preparedness, comprised of three criteria. 
Using multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), the 
researchers tested the relationship between the importance 
of each criterion and the point of time in college-entry, 
during study, or upon graduation. They found four patterns 
of interaction between importance and time: 
1. The majority of criteria (17 of 25) showed an 
increasing importance over time. 
2. One criterion, secondary school preparation, 
showed a decreasing importance over time. 
3. Four criteria, general academic preparedness, 
commitment to learning, effective study skills, and 
academic performance in course, showed a peaking 
performance. These criteria were lower in importance at 
entry and -graduation but higher in importance during study. 
4. Three criteria, basic mathematical competency, 
personal student development, and completion of program 
requirements, demonstrated a plateauing importance over 
time. These criteria increased importance from entry to 
studies and maintained importance through graduation. 
Donald and Denison (2001) concluded that student 
perception of performance was multifaceted. They 
appreciated the need for value-added developmental factors 
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over the course of their experience. They also recognized 
the importance of both income and output variables. 
Traditionally, comprehensive performance assessments 
have been at the institutional level. No statewide 
performance assessments across the 50 states existed until 
2000 when the National Center for Public Policy in Higher 
Education (NCPPHE) conducted an extensive analysis of 
higher education performance. NCPPHE graded all 50 states 
on five categories: (a) performance, (b) participation, 
(c) affordability, (d) completion, and (e) state economic 
benefit. Each of the five categories was comprised of data 
representing several measures of each category. NCPPHE 
weighted the data, benchmarked the states for each category 
and assigned letter grades, A through F, to every state for 
each category. 
Martinez, Farias and Arellano (2002) conducted a study 
to determine the relationship among the five measures of 
state higher education performance used by the National 
Center for Public Policy in Higher Education (NCPPHE) and 
to understand the relationship between these measures of 
performance and elements of state higher education 
environment. The researchers used secondary data analysis 
from all 50 states included in the NCPPHE's report, 
Measuring Up 2000: A Report Card for Higher Education, as 
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well as geographic, economic and demographic information 
from aliSO states. 
The variables for Martinez's (2002) study were the 
state letter grades for each performance category and 14 
sets of data representing various state environmental 
conditions (e.g., income per capita, percentage of children 
in poverty, and ratios of state appropriation). The 
purpose of this study was to determine the relationship 
among the five NCPPHE performance categories and to explore 
what environmental factors might predict the state 
performance grades. 
The predictor variables were the 14 environmental 
factors measured in at least interval measures. The 
criterion variables were numerical scores of the state 
grades for each of the performance categories. 
Martinez, Farias and Arellano (2002) used two-tailed 
Pearson correlations to test significant relationships 
among the performance categories. They used backward 
stepwise multiple regressions for each of the performance 
categories with the 14 environmental factors as predictor 
variables and the numerical performance grade as the 
criterion variable. 
The results of the Pearson correlation analysis 
resulted in several statistically significant 
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relationships. Preparation significantly correlated with 
participation (r = .550, p < .01), with completion (r = 
.301, p < .05), and with benefits (r = .551, p < .01). 
Affordability had a significant negative correlation with 
completion (r = -.356, p < .05). Participation also 
significantly correlated with completion (r = .318, p < 
.05) and with benefits (r = .642, P < .01). The negative 
correlation between affordability and completion 
demonstrated that state aid, college expenses, and measures 
of income are not significantly related to enrollment in 
postsecondary education. 
The results of the backward stepwise mUltiple 
regressions yielded significant models for every category 
of performance. The significant predictor variables in the 
preparation model explained 56% of the variance in the 
state preparation grades (adj. R2 = .562). The variables 
included in the preparation model were: (a) 1997 K-12 
spending per $1000 of state wealth, (b) income per capita, 
and (c) percentage of children in poverty. 
The significant predictor variable in the 
participation model explained 28% of the variance in state 
participation grades (adj. R2 = .283). The only variable 
included in the participation model was income per capita. 
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The significant predictor variables in the 
affordability model explained 29% of the variance in the 
state affordability grades (adj. R2 = .287). The variables 
included in the affordability model were: (a) ratio of 
higher education appropriations to tax revenues per capita 
and (b) ratio of total population to enrollment in higher 
education institutions. 
The significant predictor variables in the completion 
model explained 45% of the variance in the state completion 
grades (adj. R2 = .452). The variables included in the 
completion model were: (a) 1998-99 public four-year 
tuition and fees, (b) 1998-99 state spending on student 
aid, and (c) percentage of minority enrollment in higher 
education. 
The significant predictor variable in the benefits 
model explained 17% of the variance in the state benefits 
grades (adj. R2 = .166). The only variable included in the 
completion model was the percentage of children in poverty. 
Five environmental variables failed to enter any of 
the regression models in which they were entered: (a) 
public two-year tuition and fees, (b) ratio of total 
population to the number of higher education institutions, 
(c) ratio of total population to enrollment in K-12, and 
(d) percentage of minority population in the state. 
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Martinez, Farias and Arellano (2002) concluded that 
measures of income and ethnicity were important in 
explaining variance in the NCPPHE performance grades for 
states. In fact, they reported that measures of wealth 
were significant in every category in which he entered 
them. 
A final observation by the authors was the amount of 
variance left unexplained by the environmental variables he 
used. Since environmental variables represent 
circumstances largely outside the control of the state, 
they theorized that variables associated with policy might 
help account for some of the unexplained variance. 
As the trend for assessment and accountability 
developed, questions arose as to the support by 
institutional-level personnel. Welsh, Petrosko, and 
Metcalf (2003) examined faculty and administrator 
differences and support for institutional effectiveness 
activities at two-year institutions. They mailed a survey 
to 236 faculty and 122 academic administrators who 
participated in Southern Association of College (SACS) 
self-evaluation practices. The responses provided 
information about perceptions of (a) the importance of 
institutional effectiveness, (b) the primary motivation for 
institutional effectiveness, (c) the definition of quality, 
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(d) the depth of implementation, and (e) the personal level 
of involvement. 
The dependent variable in this study was the perceived 
importance of institutional effectiveness activities. The 
independent variable was the status of the survey 
respondent, whether faculty or administrator. 
Welsh, Petrosko, and Metcalf (2003) used hierarchical 
multiple regression analysis to test the predictive nature 
of the survey attitudinal variables, faculty/administrator 
status, and interaction effects. The attitudinal variables 
were entered first as control variables. 
The results of this study showed that the four control 
variables were significantly predictive of the importance 
faculty and administrators placed on institutional 
effectiveness activities (R2 = .738). The 
faculty/administrator status was not a significant 
predictor of importance for institutional effectiveness 
activities. There were no significant interaction effects. 
A second regression analysis demonstrated that all 
four of the attitudinal variables were significant 
predictors of importance faculty and administration placed 
on institutional effectiveness activities: (a) primary 
motivation (~ = .301, p < .01); (b) level of involvement 
(~ = .324, p < .01); (c) depth of implementation (~ = .214, 
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p < .05); and (d) definition of quality (~ = .180, P < 
.05) . 
Welsh, Petrosko, and Metcalf (2003) concluded that 
faculty and administrators at two-year institutions were 
more likely to support institutional effectiveness 
activities if (a) they were personally involved in the 
process, (b) there was an outcomes orientation, (c) 
institutions implemented findings, and (d) the primary 
motivation was internal rather than external. When these 
variables were controlled, faculty and administrator 
attitudes toward institutional effectiveness activities 
were similar. 
Ewell (1997) summarized three reasons for the 
difficulty in measuring the complete impact of assessment 
policies: (a) The span of time since assessment policy 
initiation has been too short to measure depth of impact; 
(b) individual state strategies are dissimilar; and (c) 
externally mandated policies are subject to many 
institutional variations in implementation. 
The impact of state policies and strategies is not 
limited to the public universities. Private institutions 
are gaining importance in the total landscape of state 
systems. Although strategies of inclusion for private 
institutions vary among the states, many researchers 
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support consideration of them in a balanced market (Zumeta, 
1996; Martinez, 2003). The following subsection reviews 
empirical studies associated with private institutions of 
higher education. 
Private Institutions 
The empirical studies in this section show a 
relationship between public policies and private education. 
The literature progresses from simple effects of policies 
toward actual public strategies to include private 
institutions. 
Astin and Inouye (1988) assessed the effects of state 
policies and programs on the enrollment and finances of 
private higher education institutions. The independent 
variables for their study were measures of student 
financial aid, direct institutional aid, and public 
tuition. They used secondary data recorded in databases 
generated by several agencies. Information from more than 
1000 private institutions provided the data for this study. 
Astin and Inouye (1988) used numerous multiple 
regression analyses to test the ability of these 
independent variables to predict both total enrollment and 
enrollment by race, socioeconomic status, and student 
achievement at private institutions. They also used the 
independent variables to test their ability to predict 
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tuition rates and educational expenditures for private 
institutions. The researchers were interested in testing 
their variables across time, so they used longitudinal data 
to control for changes. In each regression, a pre-test 
component of the dependent variable score provided a 
control variable for the outcome measurement. 
The overall results of this study indicated the 
greatest predictor of each dependent variable was always 
the pretest score for that variable. The strongest 
predictor of an institution's 1977 enrollment was its 1972 
enrollment (R = .97); the strongest predictor of 1982 
tuition was 1973 tuition (R = .91); the strongest predictor 
of low-income student enrollment in 1980 was low-income 
student enrollment in 1970 (R = .85); the strongest 
predictor of 1980 medium-income student enrollment was 1970 
medium-income student enrollment (R = .64); the strongest 
predictor of low-achieving student enrollment in 1980 was 
low-achieving student enrollment in 1970 (R = .81). The 
policy variables that entered any of the regressions were 
(a) in the prediction of total enrollment, per-student 
change in financial aid dollars (r = .01, ~ = .02) and 
change in percentage receiving financial aid (r = -.08, ~ = 
-.03); (b) in the prediction of tuition for private 
institutions, per-student change in direct institutional 
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aid (r = -.03, ~ = -.03); (c) in the prediction of low-
income enrollment, per-student change in financial aid (r = 
.10, ~ = .10); (d) in the prediction of medium-income 
enrollment, per student change in financial aid dollars (r 
= .33, ~ = .15); and (e) in the prediction of low-achieving 
student enrollment, change in percentage receiving 
financial aid (r = .35, ~ = .13). 
Astin and Inouye (1988) concluded that enrollment and 
finances at private institutions were highly stable over 
time. Current state policy has not largely affected these 
factors, except for the following: 
1. When states increased the total amount of student 
aid dollars, enrollment increased in private institutions, 
especially less selective ones. 
2. When states increased the total number of awards, 
enrollment tended to decrease in private institutions. 
3. When states increased the total amount of state 
aid dollars, tuition tended to decrease in medium and 
highly selective private institutions. 
4. When states increased the total amount of student 
aid dollars, low and middle-income student enrollment 
tended to increase in private institutions. 
Zumeta (1992) surveyed state higher education agency 
executive officers (SHEEOs) and state independent college 
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association leaders about state policies affecting private 
higher education. The survey resulted in an 87% response 
rate. The instrument design included open-ended responses, 
ranking of importance factors, and Likert-type scales 
regarding the association between private higher education 
and various state-level planning issues and policy-making. 
Respondents to the survey identified these state 
policies as integral to the health of private higher 
education: (a) state spending on student grants; (b) 
programs of direct state funding for private institutions; 
(c) public sector tuition policies; and (d) involvement by 
private institutions in state planning. Zumeta (1992) used 
independent samples t-tests and Pearson correlations to 
test relationships among these policies and among state 
environmental characteristics. 
The results of this study indicated that policies 
friendly toward independent institutions were positively 
correlated. These state characteristics were correlated to 
various policy patterns: (a) region; (b) state private 
enrollment; (c) independent legislative lobbying; (d) type 
of state governance structure; and (e) amount of per-capita 
state expenditures on higher education. 
Zumeta (1996) used information from his 1992 survey to 
further examine the relationships among state policies and 
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private higher education. He also used secondary data on 
state student aid funding from an annual survey by the 
National Association of State Scholarship and Grant 
Programs and da~ on tuition policies from a survey of the 
State Higher Education Executive Officers. 
Zumeta (1996) defined three types of policy postures 
of states toward private higher education: (a) Laissez-
faire model where states largely ignore the private sector; 
(b) central planning model where states plan and regulate 
the roles of private institutions; and (c) market-
competitive model where states see private institutions as 
important partners and set policy to reflect market-driven 
supply and demand forces. The purpose of this study was to 
understand how these policy dimensions influenced public 
and private enrollment, funding and quality. 
The initial methodology was cluster analysis to see 
how states grouped according to six policy criteria: (a) 
state student aid funding level, (b) absence or presence of 
direct state payments to private institutions, (c) public 
tuition levels, (d) private sector involvement in planning, 
(e) consideration of private institution programs in review 
of new public university programs, and (f) degree of state 
mandates affecting private institutions. The four cluster 
results without preconditions had (a) cluster one with 21 
153 
states, (b) cluster two with 13 states, (c) cluster three 
with 13 states, and (d) cluster four with one state. 
Zumeta (1996) characterized each of the six policies 
lJ 
to reflect one of the three policy arenas and examined 
those against the four clusters. He developed six new 
clusters reflecting states with these policy structures: 
(a) laissez-faire (N = 13), (b) laissez-faire/market 
competitive (If/mc) hybrid (N = 4), (c) market-competitive 
(N = 8), (d) central planning (N = 5), (e) central 
planning/market competitive (cp/mc) hybrid (N = 14), or (f) 
other states that failed to qualify for any cluster (N = 
3) . 
Zumeta (1996) tested for relationships among private 
enrollment and state variables using Pearson correlation 
coefficients. He found significant correlations between 
private sector share of enrollment and (a) state student 
aid per student (r = .41, p < .001); (b) state student aid 
per capita (r = -.52, p < .001); (c) state personal income 
per capita (r = .43, p < .001); (d) state tax effort (r = -
.24, p < .05). 
Next, Zumeta (1996) examined the distribution of state 
policy clusters on state characteristic variables. He 
found the highest private enrollment share in the cp/mc 
hybrid cluster (M = 30%), and the lowest share in the 
154 
laissez-faire cluster (M = 14%). The highest state wealth 
was in the central planning cluster (M = $16,909), and the 
lowest state wealth was in the laissez-faire cluster (M = 
$12,988). The highest state tax effort was in the laissez-
faire (M = 16.9%) and If/mc (M = 16.9%,) clusters, and the 
lowest state tax effort was in the central planning cluster 
(M = 15.5%). The highest growth in private education was 
in the If/mc cluster (M = 11.3%), and the lowest growth was 
in the unclassified cluster (M = 1.6%). The highest state 
spending per student was in the If/mc cluster (M = $8,232), 
and the lowest spending per student was in the central 
planning cluster (M = $5,700). 
Zumeta (1996) summarized from his research that (a) 
there was a systematic relationship among state policies 
affecting private education; (b) the state policy postures 
were categorical according to their affect on private 
education; and (c) tentative implications could be drawn 
concerning state policy and private education. He concluded 
that state policy posture that strategically includes the 
private sector, particularly the market-competitive model, 
could aid states in delivering an attractive combination of 
outcomes. He offered high participation rates, reasonable 
quality, average taxpayer per-capita spending, and below-
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average taxation as favorable higher education outcomes in 
the market-competitive model. 
Thompson and Zumeta (2001) replicated the 1988 Astin 
and Inouye study and used the data to examine the supply 
and demand structure of private higher education. The 2001 
study results were similar to the 1988 results, confirming 
the accuracy of the 1988 findings. Thomson and Zumeta 
(2001) further tested the validity of these results by 
using marketing theory to draw two competitive statistical 
models to test for direction of causation. 
Using a series of multiple regressions, Thompson and 
Zumeta (2001) tested these independent variables: (a) 
tuition, state student aid, and institutional density; and 
(b) changes in tuition and state student aid. The 
dependent variables were market share of private colleges 
and universities, the number of private colleges and 
universities per student, and the change in market share. 
The results of this study indicated that increases in 
public tuition led to an increase in the market share of 
private colleges and universities. Increases in state 
student aid growth also led to an increased market share 
for private institutions. 
The researchers concluded that state policies of high 
public tuition and high student aid increase the market 
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share for private higher education. They maintain that 
financial policies maximizing private education will ease 
the burden of increased demand for higher education and are 
a cost-effective alternative to expensive expansions. 
The inclusion of private education institutions in the 
broad spectrum of statewide agenda is further evidence of a 
growing tendency for states to adopt wider perspectives on 
their role in forming and guiding higher education. 
McGuinness (1999) suggested that state policymakers were 
becoming more interested in the micro-level issues of 
higher education to direct a comprehensive statewide 
agenda. The following subsection reviews literature 
associated with relatively new areas of leadership in 
statewide policies. 
Policy 
Policy is the means by which the state steers, guides, 
and establishes coordination of statewide higher education 
goals. Policies reflect the values and priorities of the 
policymakers who try to synthesize current issues with 
higher education environment (Gill & Saunders, 1995). The 
following policy analyses help to explicate the issues 
within policymaking, the implementation of state policy at 
the local level, and the responses of campus personnel to 
state policy. 
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Epper (1997) conducted a case study of three states to 
examine their policies on distance education. She analyzed 
the coordination and competition elements of policy 
structure and implementation. The research for this study 
examined: (a) how competition in higher education affected 
decisions concerning distance education; (b) if distance 
education could improve access to state higher education; 
and (c) how introduction of distance education issues into 
the state higher education environment affected traditional 
roles of statewide coordination. 
Epper (1997) collected data through document analysis, 
unstructured interviews with high-level higher education 
officials, and on-site observation. She categorized her 
data through both conceptual frameworks based on literature 
review and emerging design. 
The three case-study states were Minnesota, Maine and 
Colorado. Epper (1997) chose these states based on the 
guidance of an expert panel. 
The results of this study for Minnesota showed an 
attempt by the state to implement a policy on distance 
education. The policy was controversial and did not pass 
the legislature. 
The case study for Maine also revealed an attempt for 
statewide distance education coordination that faced 
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political and academic controversy. Disagreements among 
faculty, legislators, trustees, and the state coordinating 
board resulted in po~tponement of distance education 
implementation and the resignation of key higher education 
leaders. 
The Colorado case study revealed a historical 
resistance to statewide coordination of distance education 
based on (a) institutional skepticism of statewide 
governance, (b) competition among individual institutions, 
and~(c) lack of policy direction from the state 
coordinating board. The state did address distance 
education in 1995 by (a) making it a budget priority, 
(b) changing geographic boundary policies, and (c) creating 
the Colorado Electronic Community College (CECC). The CECC 
was under the leadership of the community college system 
president. 
Epper (1997) discussed the case study in relation to 
her original research questions. To address the first 
question, she explained that competition affected distance 
education issues by (a) creating urgency for states to 
address the issue before an outside entity did and (b) 
expanding the market of traditional higher education. She 
also maintained that state discussion for distance 
education showed a drift in ideology from higher education 
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being "product based" to being "market based." She 
explained that the traditional product-based concept 
originated with the institution and anticipated enrollment 
by reputation and prestige. The market-based concept 
originates with the student market and anticipates 
enrollment by customer satisfaction. Epper (1997) 
explained that the results of her data indicated three 
forces that ran counter to the market concept: (a) 
traditional focus on the products of higher education; (b) 
rivalry among individual institutions; and (c) political 
influences in statewide coordination. 
Epper (1997) addressed the results of the case study 
in relation to the second research question by explaining a 
continuum of approach to state policy regarding distance 
education, from laissez-faire where the state ignores the 
issue to comprehensive where the state adopts distance 
education as a matter of public policy. She explained that 
the Colorado approach began with laissez-faire, but moved 
quickly toward the comprehensive approach. Minnesota was 
in the middle of the continuum, operating through a 
coordinating council. Maine's approach was comprehensive. 
Epper's (1997) third research question examined the 
effect of distance education issues on the role of 
statewide coordinating entities. She concluded that the 
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results of the three case studies showed a substantial 
change in the both the need and the elements of statewide 
coordination: 
1. The traditional role of statewide coordination 
eliminated program duplication and defended geographic 
territory. The new mission involved partnerships, market-
needs assessment, and institutional capacity. 
2. Statewide quality was based on inputs. New 
quality assumptions were based on outputs. 
3. Education delivery was campus-based. Current and 
future education delivery was broad-based, including home, 
community, and business. 
4. Funding issues were based on equality for mission 
and degree level and appropriations for campuses. New 
funding issues included state and market needs, 
appropriations for students, and strategic goals. 
5. The traditional scope of statewide coordination 
was limited to traditional post-secondary institutions. 
The new scope encompassed businesses, K-12 education, and 
government agencies. 
A study by Mills (1998) examined the implementation 
process of a policy on remedial education in Oklahoma. He 
used a qualitative case study of three institutions to 
understand their approach in implementing the state-
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mandated policy. Social construction and organizational 
culture provided the theoretical framework to examine the 
methods and meanings each campus attached to the 
implementation of state policy. 
Mills (1998) chose three Oklahoma schools: (a) 
Langston University (LU), a historically black institutioni 
(b) Tulsa Community College (TCC), a metropolitan college 
with four campuseSi and (c) The University of Central 
Oklahoma (UCO), a comprehensive school with 15,000 
students. He purposed that these schools provided 
diversity in their remediation needs and balance between 
selectivity and access. 
Mills (1998) collected data primarily through semi-
structured interviews of institutional assessment staff, 
faculty, department chairs, and support service staff (N = 
15 at LUi N = 20 at TCC & UCO). He supplemented his 
interviews with document analysis and coded all data to 
identify broad themes associated with (a) faculty and staff 
understanding of the intentions of remediation policy and 
its relevance to their institution, (b) existence of 
tension between institutional tradition and policy mandates 
and how institutions dealt with any such tension, and (c) 
faculty and staff attitude toward state-mandated policy 
that affected curriculum and teaching decisions. 
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The results of this study indicated a successful 
implementation of a state policy with three variations 
based on institutional situation. Mills (1998) concluded 
that each institution interpreted and implemented the 
remediation policy according to institutional culture, 
mission, and role in the state higher education system. He 
found that (a) Faculty tended to be skeptical of state-
mandated practices and did not always understand what 
criteria policymakers used to make decisions; (b) local 
administrators tailored implementation toward existing 
missions and procedures; and (c) symbolic meanings of 
policy are important in understanding responses from campus 
constituents. Mills summarized that policy-making and 
implementation worked best when there was interaction 
between campus and state stakeholders. 
Welsh (2000) conducted a case study of the Kansas 
higher education system policy formation on course 
ownership against the sociological concept of problem 
definition. He collected data through (a) interviews with 
the Board of Regents and campus student, faculty and 
administrative leaders; (b) observation; and (c) study of 
documents, including agenda and minutes of key meetings, 
policy papers, and correspondence. 
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Welsh (2000) explained that problem definition is an 
explanation of the process of societal issues evolving into 
social problems. The primary theory of problem definition 
outlines the human behavior associated with defining a 
problem, determining the origin of a problem, understanding 
who is affected by the problem, and evaluating the 
significance of a problem. 
In the Kansas case study, Welsh (2000) assessed the 
Kansas higher education Board of Regent's course ownership 
policy formation to determine what phases of problem 
definition were apparent in the process. He discussed the 
importance of understanding policy formation in higher 
education to (a) recognize ideological changes, (b) 
identify key influences and authority, (c) predict 
important public agenda, and (dl appreciate acceptable 
social issue resolutions. 
The results of the Kansas case study identified four 
phases of policy formation attributable to the problem 
definition process: 
1. Emergence of an issue. Chief academic officers 
introduced a need to discuss and formulate a policy on 
copyrights of intellectual property. This initial phase 
encompassed two years of dialogue among chief academic 
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officers, a special committee to research intellectual 
property patents, and an attorney for the Board of Regents. 
2. Legitimation of the issue. The original policy 
draft by the special committee stirred controversy from 
faculty and student governance and chief academic officers. 
Regents agreed to lead a process to develop a new policy. 
3. Mobilization for action. various constituencies 
began to formulate their unique perspectives on the issue. 
As a result, competing policy suggestions were introduced 
into the process. Welsh (2000) found the greatest conflict 
existed between faculty and academic administrators points 
of view. The Regents formed a new task force to synthesize 
information. 
4. Formation of policy. The new task force 
deliberated over the various viewpoints and finally 
accepted a position favorable to the academic officers. 
The Board of Regents adopted the policy and instructed 
campuses to change their governance policies to reflect the 
new regulations. Welsh (2000) summarized that this 
represented a move away from local campus autonomy and 
represented accountability and reform unpopular to many 
faculty. 
Welsh (2000) concluded that this case study shed light 
on the process of state policy formation and who 
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represented authority and influence. He added that faculty 
and staff might pursue leadership in defining issues early 
in the process to set the tone for policy formation. 
Welsh and Kjorlien (2001) studied the transfer 
function of state higher education boards. They 
interviewed state chief academic officers, chief research 
officers and/or principal policy analysts for alISO states 
and Puerto Rico based on a piloted interview protocol. 
Welsh created a database of responses based on five 
dimensions from student information literature: (a) 
purpose of the information system, (b) structure of the 
information system, (c) scope and content of the 
information system, (d) uses of the information system, and 
(e) impact of the information system. 
The results of this study showed a majority of states 
(N = 43) collected and stored information on transfer 
students. The two primary objectives of transfer student 
information systems identified by the respondents in the 
survey were (a) enhancing transfer effectiveness (n = 14) 
and (b) supporting institutional and state planning (n = 
11) . 
The data regarding structure, capacity and content of 
transfer information systems provided this information: 
(a) 93% had continuous data collection; (b) 77% collected 
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student unit records; (c) 73% could track inter-
institutional mobility; (d) 30% had interactivity between 
institutions and the database; (e) 89% included transfer 
students in retention and graduation rates; and (f) 70% 
included additional academic outcomes data. 
Fifty-five percent of the respondents cited evidence 
of the transfer student information system having an impact 
on the transfer environment in their state. Specific 
examples of the most-cited effects included (a) amendment 
of transfer and articulation agreements (n = 7), (b) 
changes in formula or performance funding awards (n = 7), 
(c) influence of state policy regarding course numbers or 
general education (n = 4), (d) initiation of new policy 
studies on transfers (n = 4), and (e) reevaluation of 
course equivalencies and degree requirements (n = 4). 
Welsh and Kjorlien (2001) concluded that states have 
not synthesized their capabilities to collect data, their 
existing databases, and the utilization of all information 
to enhance the transfer environment. They urge 
policyrnakers and higher education leaders to employ 
existing information to improve the prospects of all 
students in obtaining a complete range of higher 
educational opportunities. 
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Welsh (2002) examined the transfer function of state 
higher education boards. He interviewed state chief 
academic officers, chief research officers and/or principal 
policy analysts for all 50 states and Puerto Rico based on 
a piloted interview protocol. Welsh (2002) created a 
database of responses based on five dimensions from student 
information literature: (a) purpose of the information 
system, (b) structure of the information system, (c) scope 
and content of the information system, (d) uses of the 
information system, and (e) impact of the information 
system. 
Welsh (2002) reported the importance of state boards 
in serving as liaison between institutions and state 
legislators. He described literature demonstrating both 
the importance of following transfer students throughout 
the higher education structure, and the ability of state 
higher education boards to coordinate the tracking 
function. 
The results of this study showed a majority of states 
(N = 43) collected and stored information on transfer 
students; a smaller group (N = 24) used information to 
impact the transfer policy environment. Based on this 
information, Welsh (2002) reported five benchmarks of best 
practices of state higher education boards related to 
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transfer student information: (a) Best practice states 
understand and communicate policy goals associated with 
improving transfer student environment; (b) best practice 
states have the ability to track student transfers 
throughout the entire state system on a continuing basis; 
(c) best practice states can assess academic progress and 
performance of transfer students; (d) best practice states 
have interactive information systems accessible to all 
postsecondary institutions; and (e) best practice states 
use the data on transfer students to create policy and 
inform decisions to improve transfer student coordination. 
The communication and coordination among state and 
campus levels of higher education is one factor affecting 
faculty and administrative response to policy mandates. 
Colbeck (2002) studied the attitudes of campus personnel 
concerning two state policies intended to improve 
undergraduate teaching. Her case study included an 
examination of a law addressing professorial teaching loads 
in Ohio and performance funding legislation in Tennessee. 
She used Ohio State University (OSU), Youngstown State 
University (YSU), University of Tennessee at Knoxville 
(UTK), and Tennessee Technological University (TT) as her 
sample institutions. 
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Colbeck (2002) discussed literature's description of 
state policy mandates and inducements. Mandates legislated 
behavior consistent with imposed rules. Inducements were 
rewards contingent upon stipulated behavior. Ohio's 
teacher workload law constituted a state mandate; 
Tennessee's performance funding was characteristic of 
inducement. 
Participants in the study were central administrators, 
deans, chairs and associate chairs, and faculty (N = 170). 
Researchers conducted semi-structured interviews of each 
participant. Questions of faculty members related to their 
teaching practices, motivations for those practices and 
knowledge of state policies. Questions of administrators 
related to their perceptions of faculty teaching practices, 
their management of undergraduate teaching, and their 
influence from state policy. 
Colbeck (2002) used a coding scheme to categorize 
participant responses. Researchers analyzed the case 
studies for similarities and differences between faculty 
and administration, institutional types and states. 
The results of this case study showed differences in 
faculty and administration responses based on (a) 
institutional context, (b) elapsed time from initial policy 
establishment, (c) and conflicting state policies. Colbeck 
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(2002) discussed the efficacy of state policy as 
implemented on the institutional level. Most faculty and 
administrators in this study said faculty strive for 
undergraduate teaching excellence regardless of state 
policy. Improvement was a matter of professionalism, not 
policy. Colbeck theorized that state policy might be most 
effective when professional knowledge and public control 
are integrated. 
Summary 
The role of state government in higher education has 
changed throughout the years and continues to evolve as 
politics, economics and environmental factors influence the 
relationship between the state and local campuses. As state 
legislature, campus personnel, and the general public 
interact concerning priorities and needs in education, the 
relationship between state and campus moves between the 
extremes of institutional autonomy and statewide 
regulation. 
This literature review presented conflicting research 
about the balance of autonomy and regulation between 
campuses and state government. One study indicated 
autonomy had decreased at the institutional level (Sabloff, 
1997) as state governments exercised more control over 
universities, while other research presented evidence that 
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autonomy at the institutional level had increased (Volkwein 
& Malik, 1997). 
~his review also gave examples of state governance 
structures and how these were formed and restructured in 
states. Researchers used frameworks and theory to 
understand the systems of coordination within states. 
Studies explained state higher education system 
frameworks as having two dimensions, the political 
environment and the structural environment. One study 
suggested that leadership was most effective when the two 
environments worked in harmony (Bracco, Richardson, Callan, 
& Finney, 1999). Another study proposed that tension 
between the two dimensions helped to induce change 
(Martinez, 2002). 
Many studies recognized the need for statewide 
coordination of higher education (Banta, Rudolph, Van, & 
Fisher, 1996; Marcus, 1997; Epper, 1997; Martinez, 1999; 
Welsh, 2002). Several researchers explained that the 
coordination worked best when: (a) it was evaluated for 
contemporary needs (Epper, 1997); (b) policy allowed for 
flexibility at campus-level implementation (Mills, 1998); 
and (c) communication existed among state-level and campus-
level leadership (Colbeck, 2002). 
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A final section of this review explained research 
about the state role in higher education. Researchers 
demonstrated how state responsibility evolved from simple 
resource allocation (Alexander, 1998) to more complex 
issues of performance funding (Banta, 1996; Serban & Burke, 
1998; and Burke & Modarresi, 2000) and policy enactment. 
Frost and Marine (1997) suggested that the relationship 
between state and campus was often strained, because state 
level decisions were made without input from the campus. 
Rather, policy decisions relied on political action instead 
of research. To shed light on what priorities policymakers 
often reflect, a study by Marcus (1997) found that state 
decisions regarding cost reduction and accountability had 
the highest passage rate in the legislatures. 
The relationship between state government and local 
institutions is an important area to understand. The issue 
has implications in many areas of higher education and 
relates to access, affordability, academic quality, 
participation, and economic success. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this study was to understand 
variability in state system performance in affordability 
using variables describing the state political environment 
and the higher education governance structure. Specific 
variables of interest reflect research illuminated in 
Chapter II of this work. This chapter addresses the 
methodology to address the five research questions listed 
in Chapter I. 
Theoretical Framework 
Two previous studies provided the theoretical 
framework for this present research. Martinez (2002) 
conducted a quantitative study of economic and ethnic 
variables related to the variance in grades on the National 
Report Card for Higher Education, a study of state system 
performance conducted by the National Center for Public 
Policy and Higher Education. Richardson, et al. (1999) 
conducted qualitative case studies of effects of state 
policy environments on system performance. 
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Martinez (2002) analyzed variance in state performance 
grades using economic and ethnic variables. His regression 
analysis resulted in a model explaining 29% of variance in 
affordability. This study drew from Martinez's suggestion 
for further research of variables that might explain 
additional variance in affordability scores. 
Richardson, et al. (1999) examined seven states to 
construct a qualitative observation of the effect of 
structural and political culture on the performance of 
state higher education systems. From their case studies, 
they concluded that there was a strong link between 
affordability performance and state higher education 
governance structure. They also determined that political 
culture was responsible for differences in state work 
processes, policy creation, and policy implementation. 
This current study builds on the findings of the case 
studies prepared by Richardson and his colleagues. 
Research Design 
This study used an ex post facto correlational 
research design with secondary data representative of the 
complete population of the 50 states. The correlational 
design was appropriate to address the research questions 
concerning degrees of association among the study variables 
(Shavelson, 1981). 
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Subjects 
This study included the complete population of the 50 
states of the United States of America. No sampling was 
necessary, because the population was small (N = 50), and 
data were available for every state. 
Independent Variables 
Four independent variables applied to this study. 
Three of the variables were characteristics describing 
state political culture and one variable described the 
state system of higher education governance. 
This study used previously published secondary data 
from political science literature and the NCPPHE National 
Report Card database. Data collection proceeded as 
compilation from the appropriate databases and tables. The 
following section discusses each variable data source, 
measurement, and measurement scale. 
Special Interest Group Strength 
Thomas and Hrebenar (1999) offer the most 
comprehensive comparative study and classification of the 
overall strength of interest groups (SIGs) on policy in the 
American states (Hill, 1997). Their research included 
studies of state interest groups over the past twenty 
years. They classified states into five categories 
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descriptive of their influence on policy formation with 
each category representing a stronger impact. 
Thomas and Hrebenar (1992) developed their typology 
using a conceptual framework of five major categories that 
affected the development, makeup, operating techniques, and 
influence of interest groups in the American states. 
Following is a list of the five categories with the 
rationale that Thomas and Hrebenar reported for the 
importance of each category in determining the influence of 
special interest groups: 
1. Available resources and extent of socioeconomic 
diversity. Key elements of this category included the 
socioeconomic development level of the state, the 
governmental expenditure and revenue levels, and the extent 
of social development and social/demographic diversity. 
Thomas and Hrebenar (1992) contended that these state 
elements produced a competitive and diverse system of 
influence. The more diversity in a state, the less 
influential anyone interest group was. In addition, 
diversity promoted sophisticated lobbying techniques and 
professionalized lobbyists. 
2. State Political Environment. Key elements of this 
category included political attitudes, relationships 
between political parties and interest groups, and the 
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level of campaign costs and sources of support for the 
special interest groups. Thomas and Hrebenar (1992) 
reported that this category affected the types of policies 
~ 
that SIGs pursued and the context in which SIGs operated. 
These characteristics helped determine how beholden 
lawmakers were to SIGs. 
3. Governmental Institutional Capacity. Key elements 
of this category included state policy domain, level of 
integration or fragmentation of the policy process, state 
government professionalization level, and extensiveness and 
enforcement of public disclosure laws. Thomas and Hrebenar 
(1992) stated that these state elements helped to determine 
the patterns of access for SIGs. 
4. Intergovernmental and external influences. Key 
elements of this category included intergovernmental 
spending and policy-making authority and the 
nationalization of issues and intergovernmental lobbying. 
Thomas and Hrebenar (1992) contended that these state 
elements influence the amount of resources available to 
SIGs. When an issue was broader than the state level, 
state groups had access to national, out-of-state 
resources. 
5. Short-term state policy-making environment. Key 
elements in this category included political party 
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effectiveness in government and state public policy and 
spending priorities. Thomas and Hrebenar (1992) reported 
that these state elements affected the control and 
effectiveness of preferential treatment for individual 
SIGs. 
The authors used the above five categories as a 
protocol to examine the influence of interest groups in 
each state. They admitted that using identical methodology 
among states was impossible. Differences among state 
records, regulations, and environmental conditions 
prevented identical retrieval of data. They also negated 
the use of purely quantitative methods, because interest 
group and political dynamics needed qualitative perceptual 
information for definitions, understanding, and influence. 
The ultimate approach by Thomas and Hrebenar (1992) 
combined extensive quantitative measurement when data were 
available with supplemental qualitative contributions from 
political science colleagues in every state. They 
developed a conceptual framework using a set of guidelines 
for qualitative interviews and observation. They asked 
each state contributor to use a qualitative methodology 
incorporating (a) SIG activity over the last twenty years, 
(b) the types of SIG's operating currently, (c) the tactics 
SIG's used to achieve their goals, and (d) the makeup of 
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the lobbying community. In addition, Thomas and Hrebenar 
developed a common definition for many elements of interest 
group description and activity. 
The result of their methodology was an ordinal, 
categorical scale describing interest group strength on 
state policy formation. The levels and number of states in 
each category were (a) dominant (N = 5), meaning that SIGs 
in those states were consistently the strongest influence 
on policy making; (b) dominant/complementary (N = 25), 
meaning that SIG influence on policy alternated between the 
two levels; (c) complementary (N = 16), meaning that SIGs 
tended to work in conjunction with or were moderated by 
other aspects of the political system; (d) 
complementary/subordinate (N = 4), meaning that the SIGs 
alternated between those two levels; and (e) subordinate (N 
= 0), meaning that SIGs were consistently subordinate to 
other aspects of the political system. 
Hill (1997) addressed the reliability and validity of 
the Thomas and Hrebenar index. She indicated that the 
replication of the study among all 50 states, the 
collaboration of mUltiple authorities, and the consistency 
of periodic updates increased both the stability of the 
measure and the surface plausibility. 
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Sabloff (1997) utilized the Thomas and Hrebenar (1992) 
classification in her study of state politics and higher 
education. Her correlation study required her to convert 
the Thomas and Hrebenar ordinal classification into a 
continuous variable with four levels, representing 
increasing amounts of influence (1 = 
complementary/subordinate; 2 = complementary; 3 = 
dominant/complementary; and 4 = dominant). Sabloff did not 
use the subordinate category, because no states qualified 
for that classification. This present study followed the 
Sabloff (1997) precedent by using the Thomas and Hrebenar 
(1992) classificationJconverted to a continuous scale with 
four levels (see Appendix A) . 
Legislative Professionalism 
Political scientists often ca~egorize state 
legislatures based on the length of sessions, the size of 
legislative operations, and the amount of legislator 
salaries (Hamm & Moncrief, 1999). These characteristics 
define the professionalization of the state legislature. 
Squire (1992) developed a state legislative 
professionalization index. He compiled 1986-88 data on 
member pay, staff members per legislator, and total days in 
session and compared these scores against the same measures 
for Congress. He converted each of the three state scores 
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to percentages of the congressional figure, totaled the 
three percentages, and divided by three to have a composite 
score ranging from 0 to 1. The three components were 
equally weighted. 
In a critical examination of state legislative 
professionalization indices, Mooney (1994) addressed the 
reliability of the Squire (1992) index. He noted that the 
Squire index was the best measurement for replication, 
because it only involved three, nationally documented 
variables. Mooney also observed that the Squire index was 
valid as a measure based on high correlations with other, 
more comprehensive indices (r = .82 to .87). 
King (2000) updated the Squire study. He calculated 
legislative professionalization for a two-year period in 
four decades. His most recent calculation was for 1993-94. 
King (2000) modified the Squire (1992) index by 
substituting expenditures for services and operations per 
legislator as a measure of staff size. King modified the 
Squire items, because Squire had used a one-time study for 
number of staff members, and accurate data were not 
available for other years. The substitution of 
expenditures by King correlated highly with staff size (r = 
.922). The King index provided the legislative 
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professionalization measure for this study (see Appendix 
B) . 
Gubernatorial strength 
Beyle (1999) calculated a scale for the institutional 
strength of governors. The scale is a composite score of 
six indicators of gubernatorial power: (a) separately 
elected executive branch officials, (b) tenure potential of 
governors, (c) governor's appointment powers in six major 
functional areas, (d) governor's budgetary power, (e) 
governor's veto power, and (f) gubernatorial party control. 
The measurement for the first individual item, 
separately elected officials, was an ordinal scale 
representing decreasing numbers of officials elected by the 
citizenry (1 = governor with seven or more process and 
several major policy officials elected; 1.5 = governor with 
six or fewer officials elected, but two are major policy 
officials; 2 = governor with six or fewer officials 
elected, including one major policy official; 2.5 = 
governor with six or fewer officials elected, but none are 
major policy officials; 3 = governor/lieutenant governor 
team with process officials, and some major and minor 
policy officials elected; 4 = governor/lieutenant governor 
team with some process officials elected; 4.5 = governor or 
governor/lieutenant governor team, with one other elected 
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official; 5 = only governor or governor/lieutenant governor 
team elected). The second individual item in the Beyle 
scale, tenure potential measurement, was an ordinal scale 
representing increasing years allowed in office (1 = two-
year term, only two terms permitted; 2 = two-year term, no 
restraint on reelection; 3 = four-year term, no consecutive 
reelection permitted; 4 = four-year term, only two terms 
permitted; 4.5 = four-year term, only three terms 
permitted; 5 ~ four-year term, no restraint on reelection) . 
The third individual item, measurement of the 
governor's appointment power, measured appointment power in 
six major functional areas: corrections, K-12 education, 
health, highways/transportation, public utilities 
regulation, and welfare. Beyle totaled, then averaged the 
six individual office scores, and rounded to the nearest .5 
for the state score. The result was an ordinal scale 
representing increasing responsibility/privilege for 
appointment in major state functions (1 = someone else 
appoints, no approval or confirmation needed; 2 = someone 
else appoints, governor and others approve; 3 = someone 
else appoints, governor approves or shares appointment; 4 = 
governor appoints, a board, council, or legislature 
approves; 5 = governor appoints, no other approval needed) . 
The fourth individual item, measurement for the governor's 
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budgetary power, was an ordinal scale representing 
increasing responsibility (1 = governor shares 
responsibility with other elected official, and legislature 
has unlimited power to change executive budget; 2 = 
governor shares responsibility, and legislature has 
unlimited power to change executive budget; 3 = governor 
has full responsibility, and legislature has unlimited 
power to change executive budget; 4 = governor has full 
responsibility, and legislature can increase special 
majority vote or subject to item veto; 5 = governor has 
full responsibility; legislature may not increase executive 
budget) . 
The fifth individual item in the Beyle scale, 
measurement for governor's veto power, was an ordinal scale 
representing increasing veto privilege (1 = no item veto, 
only a simple legislative majority needed to override; 2 = 
no item veto, with a special legislative majority needed to 
override it; 3 = has item veto with only a majority of the 
legislators present needed to override; 4 = has item veto 
with a majority of the legislators elected needed to 
override; 5 = has the item veto and a special majority vote 
of the legislature is needed to override a veto). The 
sixth individual item, gubernatorial party control, was an 
ordinal scale representing increasing personnel from the 
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governor's party in the state legislature (1 = governor's 
party is 25% or less in both houses; 2 = simple majority in 
both houses, or a simple minority of 25% or less in one and 
a substantial minority of more than 25 % in the other; 3 = 
split party control in the legislature or a nonpartisan 
legislature; 4 = a simple majority in both houses of less 
than 75%, or a substantial majority in one house and a 
simple majority in the other; 5 = governor's party is 75% 
or more in both houses) . 
The composite score for the Beyle scale of governor's 
institutional powers was the sum of the scores for each 
individual characteristic, divided by six, and rounded to 
the nearest tenth of a point. The independent variable 
measurement in this current study for gubernatorial 
strength is the Beyle (1999) composite score (see Appendix 
B) . 
State higher education governance structure 
Measurement for the governance structure (see Appendix 
C) utilized a taxonomy developed by McGuinness (1997). 
Higher education research literature, discussed in Chapter 
II, outlined the McGuinness classification and numerous 
studies that used his classification as a variable. 
The stability of the McGuinness index over time and 
across comparative state studies is evidence to its 
186 
reliability. The support throughout higher education 
literature speaks to the construct and the surface 
plausibility of the classification. 
In correlation studies, researchers converted the 
original nominal scaled description to continuous scales 
representing increasing centralization of coordination. 
This current study used the four-point continuous scaled 
levels of structure that Sabloff (1997) used in her study 
(1 = least centralized planning agencies; 2 = weak 
coordinating boards with no program approval; 3 = strong 
coordinating boards with program approval; 4 = most 
centralized consolidated boards) . 
Dependent Variable 
The National Report Card for Higher Education (NCPPHE, 
2000) affordability grade provided the measurement for the 
dependent variable: state performance in higher education 
affordability (see Appendix D). The state grade for 
affordability addressed family ability to pay for higher 
education based on the economy of the state. The final 
grade was a composite score for financial characteristics: 
(a) the family ability to pay at community colleges and 
public and private 4-year institutions; (b) the amount of 
state aid focused toward low-income families as a percent 
of federal Pell Grant aid to low-income families; (c) the 
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share of income needed by poorest families to pay for 
tuition at lowest-priced institutions; and (d) the average 
loan amount students borrow each year. 
The committee computed the composite score in several 
steps. First, they chose the individual indicator items 
with consideration for their collection by reliable, public 
sources practicing approved data collection techniques. 
They also chose indicators that were comparable across all 
50 states. Second, the committee assigned mathematical 
weights for each indicator based on research and policy 
experience. Family ability to pay figured 50%; the amount 
of need-based state aid figured 20%; the low-priced 
colleges figured 20%; and the average student debt figured 
10 percent. Third, the committee indexed results for each 
individual item to a scale of 0 to 100. The top five 
states were benchmarks. The median score for the top five 
states (i.e., the third best state) was 100. The NCPPHE 
committee chose this indexing method to set a standard for 
performance in each category. Fourth, the committee 
mUltiplied the indexed scores for each item by the assigned 
weight and added the scores to achieve the affordability 
category score. Fifth, the committee indexed the raw 
affordability composite score to a scale of 0 to 100, using 
the top performing state as the benchmark. 
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Prior to the completion of the national report card, 
The National Center for Higher Education Management Systems 
(NCHEMS) conducted extensive review of the data and 
methodology for the grades. The purpose of the NCHEMS 
statistical analyses was to gain an understanding in the 
relationships among indicators and between indicators and 
overall performance grades (NCPPHE, 2001). NCPPHE credited 
these statistical tests with contributing to the fair and 
accurate comparison of state performance. 
The NCHEMS review maintained that formal scaling 
analyses were inappropriate for the affordability grade, 
because the composite score contained both additive and 
discounted measures. The NCHEMS analysts addressed 
reliability by indicating that correlational analyses 
guided the selection of the final indicators. They also 
reported robust correlations (between 0.8 and 0.9) for 
stability over time by comparing data from earlier years 
with data in the report card (NCPPHE, 2001). 
The NCHEMS reviewers also assessed the validity of the 
affordability measure, especially in light of the weighted 
scores. They emphasized that experts reviewed the 
methodology and that the scores accurately reflected 
current research (NCPPHE, 2001). 
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Data Analysis 
The data analysis for the present study included (a) 
descriptive information for all variables, (b) Pearson 
Product Moment correlations to represent simple 
relationships among all variables, and (c) multiple 
regression analysis results of statistics explaining the 
variability in the dependent variable as predicted by the 
independent variables. SPSS was the statistical software 
used for all procedures. 
As a population study, this research is not concerned 
with inferential statistics to generalize about the 
population from random sampling (Huck, 2000). Data for the 
complete population are available. As a result, 
statistical significance and the testing of null hypotheses 
are not relevant to this study. Instead, the emphasis will 
be on measures of effect size, proportion of variance 
accounted for by statistical models, and the analysis of 
outlier cases. 
Multiple Regression 
Multiple regression is a data analysis procedure that 
provides information concerning the relationship of two or 
more independent variables to a dependent variable (Cohen & 
Cohen, 1975). Standard entry multiple regression is a 
simultaneous analysis of the combined effects of all 
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independent variables on the dependent variable (Keppel & 
Zedeck, 1989). While hierarchical analysis is helpful for 
understanding the incremental variance explained by each 
independent variable, simultaneous analysis is useful in 
exploratory situations where substantive knowledge has not 
informed entry order of predictor variables. Simultaneous, 
or standard entry, analysis was appropriate in addressing 
the research purpose and questions of the explanatory 
effect of political environment on affordability. 
The results of interest for the mUltiple regression 
equation are R2, srand sJ? The R2 value computed by SPSS is 
the proportion of variance in the dependent variable, 
affordability, by the linear combination of the independent 
variables. This result addresses the research question 
regarding the combined effect of political environment and 
governance structure on affordability. 
The semipartial correlation, sr, explains unique 
variance in the dependent variable accounted for by each 
independent variable. This result addresses the research 
questions related to the unique variance of political 
culture variables after the correlation or variance 
accounted for by other independent variables is removed. 
The squared semipartial correlation, sJ?, is the percentage 
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of unique variance in the dependent variable that the 
independent variable represents. 
The exploratory nature of this study may present 
reasons to test additional post hoc regression models to 
illuminate maximum effect of the research variables. Table 
1 summarizes the variables, their measurements and sources 
used in this study. 
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Table 1 
Description of Variables, Measurements, and Sources 
variable 
Predictors 
SIG impact 
complementary/subordinate 
complementary 
dominant/complementary 
dominant 
Higher Ed Governance 
Planning 
Weak Coordinating 
Strong Coordinating 
Consolidated 
Gubernatorial Strength 
SEP 
TP 
AP 
BP 
VP 
PC 
Code/ 
Measure 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Composite 
0-5 
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Source 
Thomas and Hrebenar 
(1992) 
McGuinness (1997) 
Beyle (1999) 
Table 1 (continued) 
Description of Variables, Measurements, and Sources 
Code/ 
variable Measure Source 
Legislative Pro. Composite King 
Salary/living expenses 0-100 (2000) 
Session length 
Staff expenses 
Dependent 
Affordability Composite NCPPHE 
Family ability to pay 0-100 (2000) 
Low student debt 
Financial aid 
Low-priced colleges 
Note. SEP = separately elected powers, TP = tenure 
potential, AP = appointment power, BP = budgetary power, VP 
= veto power; PC = party control (Beyle, 1999). 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
The purpose of this study was to examine higher 
education affordability using variables defining the state 
political environment and the higher education governance 
structure. One research question addressed the combined 
effect of the impact of special interest groups, the 
professionalization of the state legislature, the 
institutional strength of the governor, and the state 
higher education governance structure on state higher 
education affordability performance. The four other 
research questions explored the unique contributions of the 
four independent variables on affordability. This chapter 
reports the results of statistical analysis examining the 
research questions in five sections: (a) reliability 
analyses, (b) descriptive statistics, (c) omnibus results 
of the multiple regression analysis, (d) results of the 
analysis of semi-partial regression coefficients, and (e) 
additional information from residual scores. 
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Reliability Analyses 
Two measurement scores of independent variables 
consisted of composite scores. Legislative 
professionalization, measured by the King (2000) scale, was 
a three-item composite score. The Beyle (1999) scale, 
measuring the institutional strength of the governor, was a 
six-item composite score. 
A reliability analysis of the Beyle (1999) scale 
yielded a six-item coefficient alpha of .33. This 
coefficient was well below the Nunnally and Bernstein 
(1994) suggested minimum criterion of .70. 
Dilger, Krause, and Moffett (1995) corroborated the 
low reliability of the Beyle scale. They noted that 
researchers frequently used and often cited the Beyle 
scale; but the inconsistency in the composite score evoked 
debate among political researchers. 
The alpha-if-removed figures did not indicate 
potential improvement in the total alpha level. Analysis 
of the reliability results for the six items indicated that 
all six items ostensibly measured different constructs. 
Use of the composite score could affect the measurement 
error and could reduce the actual effect size of governor 
strength on affordability. 
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The use of all six individual items of the Beyle 
(1999) scale was a problematic solution to the low 
reliability, because the regression analysis contained only 
50 observations. Stevens (1996) recommended one predictor 
variable per 15 observations to prevent overfitting of 
regression models. Choosing one of the individual Beyle 
items to represent institutional strength was a solution. 
A Pearson product moment correlation of the six 
individual Beyle (1999) items to the dependent variable of 
this study resulted in the variable, tenure potential of 
the governor, having the highest relationship to 
affordability (r = .40). Results of this correlation 
analysis are in Table 2. In light of the reliability and 
correlation analyses of the Beyle (1999) scale, this study 
included results for two mUltiple regressions, one using 
the composite Beyle score, and the other using the governor 
tenure potential measure. 
The reliability analysis for the individual items in 
the King (2000) legislative professionalization scale 
resulted in a three-item standardized coefficient alpha of 
.72. This figure exceeded the Nunnally and Bernstein 
(1994) suggested minimum criterion of .70 and provided 
confidence in the reliability of the King composite score 
as a measurement of legislative professionalization. 
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Table 2 
Intercorrelations for Affordability and the Individual 
Items of Beyle (1999) Scale for Institutional Strength of 
the Governor 
variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Affordability 
2. SEP -.166 
3. AP -.030 .328 
4. BP -.185 .222 .145 
5. VP .186 -.007 -.255 .077 
6. PC .205 .063 .031 .006 .194 
7. TP .404 -.006 -.155 -.025 .479 .116 
Note. SEP = separately elected powers, AP = appointment 
power, BP = budgetary power, VP = veto power; PC = party 
control, TP = tenure potential (Beyle, 1999). 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Data collection for this study proceeded as outlined 
in Chapter III. Political science and higher education 
literature provided theoretical support and data 
measurement for the dependent variable and all independent 
variables for all 50 states. 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the 
participants. Number (n) and percentage (%) describe the 
categorical variables. The range, mean, and standard 
deviation (SD) describe interval-level variables. 
Descriptive statistics showed that the governor tenure 
potential in most states (74%) was a four-year term with 
the possibility of two additional terms. Fifty percent of 
the states had dominant/complementary special interest gour 
(SIG) structures, while 32% of the states had complementary 
SIG structures. Ninety percent of the states had the two 
most centralized higher education governance structures: 
(a) strong coordinating boards or (b) consolidated 
governing boards. Legislative professionalization scores 
ranged from .06 to .90 with the average being .26. The 
average affordability score for the states was 74.44 with a 
range of 49 to 100. 
199 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics (N = 50) 
Variable n % Range Mean SD 
Predictor variables 
Tenure Potential 
1 = two-year (x2)a 
2 = two-year (+)b 2 4 
3 = four-year 1 2 
Impact of SIGs 
1 = Complementary/ 
subordinate 4 8 
2 = Complementary 16 32 
3 = Dominant/ 
complementary 25 50 
4 = Dominant 5 10 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Descriptive Statistics 
variable n % Range Mean SD 
Higher Ed Governance 
1 = Planning 2 4 
2 = Weak 
coordinating 3 6 
3 = Strong 
coordinating 21 42 
4 = Consolidated 
governing 24 48 
Legislative 
professionalization .06 -.90 .26 .15 
Institutional strength 
of the governor 2.70 -4.10 3.41 .45 
Dependent Variable 
Affordability 49.00 - 100.00 74.44 11.72 
a(x2) = up to two reelections. 
b(+) = unlimited reelections. 
C(x3) = up to three reelections. 
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Multiple Regression Analysis 
Multiple regression analysis provided the predictive 
potential of the independent variables for the dependent 
variable. Several analyses provided by SPSS indicated that 
the cases in this study met the assumptions for multiple 
regression. First, standardized residuals indicated no 
influential outliers in the data, because no cases in this 
study were greater than 3.00 or less than -3.00. The 
Cook's distance analysis also indicated no influential 
cases; no distance was greater than 1.00. 
A normal curve superimposed over the standardized 
residual histogram and a plot of standardized residuals 
along a diagonal line indicated that the cases met the 
normality assumption. Evidence for the assumption of 
homoscedasticity existed as scatterplot points for the 
standardized predicted value compared to the studentized 
residual were scattered randomly above and below the 
vertical axis line at zero. 
Omnibus Results (Research Question One) 
The simultaneous entry of independent variables 
produced an omnibus result for the proportion of effect of 
the independent variables on the dependent variable. Table 4 
shows the result of Pearson product-moment correlations 
among the criterion variable and the predictor variables 
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Table 4 
Intercorrelations of Variables for Affordability Regression 
with Beyle (1999) Composite Score 
variable 1 2 3 4 
1. Affordability 
2. Institutional 
strength of the 
governor .082 
3. Legislative 
professionalization .188 .143 
4. Impact of SIGs .081 -.183 -.036 
5. State HE 
governance -.130 -.034 -.387 -.018 
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using the composite Beyle (1999) score. Table 5 shows the 
result of Pearson product-moment correlations among the 
criterion variable and the predictor variables using the 
score for the tenure potential of the governor. 
Tables 6 and 7 display the results of the simultaneous 
entry regression analyses of the political culture and 
higher education governance structure to affordability. 
The tables include the unstandardized regression 
coefficients (B), the standard errors of regression 
coefficients (SEB), the standardized regression 
coefficients (~), and the squared semi-partial correlations 
(sr2 ). The tables also show the sum of the squared semi-
partial coefficients and the proportion of variance in the 
criterion accounted for by the linear combination of the 
predictor variables (R2 ). 
Regression with tenure potential. The omnibus R2 for 
the regression model was .19, signifying that 19% of the 
variance in the state affordability grade was explained by 
the combination of political culture and governance 
variables (see Table 6). Cohen, Cohen, Aiken, and West 
(2003) characterized a population R2 of .13 as a medium 
effect size and a population R2 0f .26 as a large effect 
size. The observed R2 in this study fell between these 
standard population effect sizes. 
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Table 5 
Intercorrelations for Variables for Affordability 
Regression with Beyle (1999) Tenure Potential Score 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
l. Affordability 
2. Tenure potential of 
the governor .404 
3. Legislative 
professionalization .188 .143 
4. Impact SIGs .081 -.183 -.036 
5. State HE governance -.130 -.034 -.387 -.018 
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Table 6 
Summary of Standard Regression Analysis with Affordability 
Variable B SEB f3 sr2 
HE governance -1.366 2.214 -.090 .007 
Impact of SIGs .695 2.031 .046 .002 
Tenure potential of 
the governor 7.479 2.653 .385 .143 
Legislative 
professionalization 7.830 11.699 .099 .008 
aE = .160 
Note. R2 = .190 
aThe sum of the squared semi-partial coefficients indicates 
the amount of variance accounted for by adding the unique 
contribution of each independent variable. The difference 
between the sum of squared semi-partial coefficients and 
the R2 is an indication of variance due to overlap in the 
independent variables. 
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Table 7 
Summary of Standard Regression Analysis with Affordability 
Variable B SEB f3 sI? 
HE governance -.987 2.390 -.065 .004 
Impact of SIGs 1.494 2.220 .099 .010 
Institutional 
strength of the 
governor 1. 980 3.922 .075 .005 
Legislative 
professionalization 12.334 12.601 .156 .020 
az =.039 
Note. R2 = .052 
aThe sum of the squared semi-partial coefficients indicates 
the amount of variance accounted for by adding the unique 
contribution of each independent variable. The difference 
between the sum of squared semi-partial coefficients and 
the R2 is an indication of variance due to overlap in the 
independent variables. 
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The standardized Beta coefficients in the regression 
model provided the relative contributions of the 
independent variables. Tenure potential of the governor 
had the highest Beta coefficient (~ = .385), followed by 
legislative professionalization (~ = .099), higher 
education governance structure (~ = -.090), and impact of 
special interest groups (~ = .046). The three predictor 
variables with positive Beta coefficients (i.e., governor 
tenure potential, legislative professionalization, and 
impact of SIGs) were associated with increased 
affordability as their levels increased. Higher education 
governance structure had a negative coefficient 
representing an inverse relationship with affordabilitYi 
therefore, more decentralized governance structures were 
more affordable. 
Regression with Beyle (1999) composite score. The 
omnibus R2 for the regression model was .05, signifying that 
5% of the variance in the state affordability grade was 
explained by the combination of political culture and 
governance variables (see Table 7). Cohen et al. (2003) 
characterized a population R2 of .02 as a small effect size 
and a population R2 of .13 as a medium effect size. The 
observed R2 in this study fell between these standard 
population effect sizes. 
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The standardized Beta coefficients in the regression 
model provided the relative contributions of the 
independent variables. Legislative professionalization had 
the highest Beta coefficient (~ = .156), followed by the 
impact of special interest groups (~ = .099), institutional 
strength of the governor (~ = .075), and higher education 
governance structure (~ = -.065). The three predictor 
variables with positive Beta coefficients (i.e., 
legislative professionalization, institutional strength of 
the governor and impact of 8IGs) were associated with 
increased affordability as their levels increased. Higher 
education governance structure had a negative coefficient 
representing an inverse relationship with affordabilitYi 
therefore, more decentralized governance structures were 
more affordable. 
The results of these omnibus multiple regression 
analyses addressed the first research question and provided 
evidence to reject the first null hypothesis of this study. 
The combination of political culture and governance 
structure variables did explain variance in state 
affordability for higher education in both regression 
models. 
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Squared Semi-partial Coefficient Analysis (Research 
Questions 2-5) 
The second through fifth research questions addressed 
the unique contribution of each independent variable to the 
variance in the dependent variable. In addition to the 
omnibus results, the mUltiple regression analysis also 
provided squared semi-partial coefficients (s~) for each 
independent variable. The s~ shows the individual variable 
correlation to the dependent variable with variance from 
other independents removed. Analysis of these s~ 
coefficients provided information as to their unique 
contribution. 
Regression wi th tenure potential. The s~ for each 
independent variable, shown in Table 6, was (a) tenure 
potential of the governor (s~ = .143), (b) legislative 
professionalization (s~ = .008), (c) higher education 
governance (s~ = .007), and (d) impact of SIGs (s~ = .002). 
Cohen et al. (2003) characterized the s~value of one 
independent variable as the proportion of the dependent 
variable that the other independent variables did not 
explain. Cohen et al. defined small effects of variables 
as squared semi-partial correlations of 2%, medium effects 
as 15%, and large effects as 35%. By these standards, 
three of the variables had very little unique effect on 
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affordability. Higher education governance, impact of 
SIGs, and legislative professionalization had sz2values 
less than 1%. The tenure potential of the governor 
explained 14% of unique variance in affordability. This 
value is very near the medium effect size. 
The results of the squared semi-partial analysis for 
this regression gave evidence to reject null hypotheses 
two, three, four, and five. The impact of special interest 
groups, legislative professionalization, and higher 
education governance structure contributed to the variance 
in affordability, but the effect was very small. Tenure 
potential of the governor explained 14% of the unique 
variance in affordability. 
The sum of the squared semi-partial coefficients was 
.160. Subtracting this figure from the total proportion of 
variance (R2) indicated that overlap among the independent 
variables accounted for 3% of the total variance in the 
dependent variable. 
Regression with Beyle (1999) composite score. The sz2 
for each independent variable (see Table 7) was (a) 
institutional strength of the governor (sz2 = .005), (b) 
legislative professionalization (sz2 = .02), (c) higher 
education governance (sz2 = .004), and (d) impact of SIGs 
(sz2 = .01). By the Cohen et al. (2003) standards, three of 
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the variables had very little unique effect on 
affordability. Higher education governance, impact of 
SIGs, and the institutional strength of governors had sy2 
values of 1% or less. Legislative professionalization 
explained 2% of unique variance in affordability. This 
represented a small effect by Cohen et al. standards. 
The results of the squared semi-partial analysis for 
this regression gave evidence to reject null hypotheses 
two, three, four, and five. The impact of special interest 
groups, institutional strength of the governor, and higher 
education governance structure provided some unique 
contribution to the variance in affordability, but the 
effect was very small. Legislative professionalization 
explained 2% of the unique variance in affordability. 
The sum of the squared semi-partial coefficients was 
.039. Subtracting this figure from the total proportion of 
variance (R2) indicated that overlap among the independent 
variables accounted for about 1% of the total variance in 
the dependent variable. 
Residual Scores 
Residual diag~ostic analysis provided information 
about the difference between predicted affordability scores 
for states and actual affordability scores. Residual 
numbers indicated how well each state fit into the 
212 
regression prediction model with four variables predicting 
affordability. Table 8 provides the case summaries of 
states with residual scores equal to or higher than 1.00 
and equal to or lower than -1.00. The table includes the 
affordability score, the predicted affordability score, and 
the standardized residual for each state for the first 
regression with tenure potential. Table 9 provides the 
same summaries for the second regression with the composite 
institutional strength of the governor score. States with 
positive residuals exceeded the affordability prediction of 
the regression equation. States with negative residuals 
were lower than the predicted regression affordability. In 
both regressions, the two states with the highest positive 
residual were North Carolina and Utah. In both 
regressions, the two states with the highest negative 
residual were New York and Rhode Island. 
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Table 8 
Case Summaries for Regression Model Predicting 
Affordability with Impact of SIGs, Higher Education 
Governance Structure, Legislative Professionalization, and 
Governor Tenure Potential 
Standardized Affordability Predicted 
State 
Residual Score Value 
-2.21719 New York 60.00 84.40544 
-2.01554 Rhode Island 49.00 71.18581 
-1. 60306 Maine 54.00 71.64550 
-1.25555 Ohio 62.00 75.82030 
-1. 09425 Oregon 61.00 73.04478 
-1.03047 Massachusetts 63.00 74.34273 
-1.02311 Montana 61. 00 72.26179 
1.09857 Illinois 95.00 82.90768 
1.22675 Kansas 86.00 72.49669 
1.35051 Minnesota 94.00 79.13447 
1.73825 California 100.00 80.86648 
2.09722 Utah 98.00 74.91515 
2.12721 North Carolina 96.00 72.58508 
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Table 9 
Case Summaries for Regression Model Predicting 
Affordability with Impact of SIGs, HE Governance 
Structure, Legislative Professionalization, 
and Beyle (1999) Composite Score 
Standardized Affordability Predicted 
State 
Residual Score Value 
-1.70401 Rhode Island 49.00 69.28802 
-1. 69151 New York 60.00 80.13920 
-1. 61082 New Hampshire 50.00 69.17855 
-1.47822 Maine 54.00 71.59981 
-1.41074 Ohio 62.00 78.79633 
-1.05912 Oregon 61. 00 73.60992 
-1.03978 West Virginia 63.00 75.37965 
-1.03866 Montana 61. 00 73.36639 
-1. 03622 Florida 64.00 76.33730 
1.01340 Kansas 86.00 73.93439 
1.06748 Wisconsin 87.00 74.29054 
1.39407 California 100.00 83.40214 
1.54578 Illinois 95.00 76.59582 
1. 88040 Minnesota 94.00 71. 61186 
2.04147 North Carolina 96.00 71. 69408 
2.17976 Utah 98.00 72.04762 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
This study examined the combined predictive potential 
of political culture and higher education governance 
variables in higher education affordability. Multiple 
regression and Pearson Product Moment correlations provided 
statistical information about the influence of the 
predictor variables on the dependent variable. 
The significance of this study lay in public outcries 
for more affordable higher education combined with little 
previous research helpful in understanding state variance 
in affordability. This chapter presents discussion of the 
research findings in four sections: (a) Discussion of the 
results for each research question, (b) Implications for 
policy, restructuring, and leadership, (c) Future research, 
and (d) Conclusions. 
Discussion of the Results 
Research Question 1 
Research question one explored the degree that 
combined political culture and governance structure 
characteristics contributed to explaining differences in 
216 
higher education affordability among states. The results 
of the mUltiple regressions on affordability gave evidence 
to reject the first null hypothesis. The combination of 
political culture and governance structure variables did 
explain variance in the affordability performance of 
states. 
In the regression using the Beyle (1999) composite 
score for the institutional powers of the governor along 
with legislative professionalization, impact of SIGs, and 
higher education governance structure, the effect size on 
affordability was small. In the regression using the Beyle 
tenure potential item in place of the composite score, the 
effect size of the variables was medium. These results 
confirm previous research that state political culture and 
governance structure variables are important in predicting 
matters of performance and affordability in higher 
education (Hearn & Griswold, 1993; Bracco, Richardson, 
Callan, & Finney (1999); Griswold, 1999; McGuinness, 2002). 
Research Question Two 
Research question two addressed the degree that the 
impact of special interest groups uniquely explained 
differences in higher education affordability among states. 
The analysis of semi-partial coefficients showed that the 
impact of SIGs had either a very small unique effect (1%) 
217 
or almost no unique effect (.2%). The Beta coefficients 
for the impact of SIGs were positive in both regressions 
showing that the dominance of SIG influence in a state did 
not hurt, but even helped, affordability. Higher education 
literature hypothesized that SIG influence was negative 
toward state higher education interests (Benjamin & 
Carroll, 1998; Gittell & Kleiman, 2000; Pusser, 2001), but 
in the area of affordability, this research did not support 
those claims. 
Research Question Three 
Research question three explored the degree that the 
professionalization of the state legislature uniquely 
explained differences in higher education affordability 
among states. The analysis of semi-partial coefficients 
showed that the professionalization of the legislature had 
very small (.8%) or small (2%) unique effects. The Beta 
coefficients for legislative professionalization were 
positive in both regressions showing that more 
professionalized legislatures were associated with 
increased affordability. 
In previous research, Peterson (1976) found 
significant negative correlations between legislative 
professionalization and state appropriations to higher 
education. Sabloff (1997) found significant correlations 
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between legislative professionalization and legislation 
increasing regulation of higher education institutions. 
The results of this present study in light of the 
negative correlation in the Peterson study prompted two 
observations. First, the role of the legislature may have 
changed in the 24 years between the Peterson study and the 
present study so that more professionalized legislatures 
are associated with higher appropriations. Second, more 
professionalized legislatures may be associated with 
broader affordability policies to counteract lower 
appropriations. Future research could explore these 
disparities. In either case, even though professionalized 
legislatures were associated with better affordability, the 
effect was small. 
Research Question Four 
Research question four explored the degree that the 
institutional strength of the governor uniquely explained 
differences in higher education affordability among states. 
The analysis of semi-partial coefficients showed that the 
institutional strength of the governor in the second 
regression had a very small (.5%) unique effect. The 
tenure potential of the governor in the first regression 
had a moderately large (14%) unique effect. The Beta 
coefficients for this variable were positive in both 
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regressions showing that institutionally stronger governors 
and longer governor tenures were associated with increased 
affordability. 
The reliability of the Beyle (1999) composite score 
for the institutional power of the governor is very 
important in interpreting the results of this variable. 
Both higher education and political science literature 
reported in previous chapters are in overwhelming agreement 
about the substantial role of the governor in higher 
education policy. There was a low effect of the 
institutional power of the governor in the second 
regression analysis. It seems unlikely that this reflects 
the true relationship between the construct, institutional 
power of the governor, and affordability. Measurement 
error from low consistency in the composite score appears 
to be a more plausible explanation of the low effect size. 
Further analysis of the relatively large effect of 
governor tenure potential is also necessary. Is the effect 
size actual or spurious in the first regression? Results 
of a Griswold (1999) study indicated that changes in 
presidential administration often affected the work of the 
National Commission on Student Financial Assistance. New 
leadership altered goals, timeframes, and priorities. 
Griswold noted that the changes in administration diluted 
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the work of the commission. Presidential changes at the 
national level could be analogous to gubernatorial changes 
on the state level. Beyle (1999) noted that governors in 
office longer had more time to carry out their programs. 
In the same vein, Lewis and Maruna (1999) observed that 
governors were often ineffectual in education matters due 
to operating in electoral timeframes. In consideration of 
these studies, tenure potential is a reasonable indicator 
of governor strength and a plausible predictor of 
affordability. 
Research Question Five 
Research question five explored the degree that the 
state higher education governance structure uniquely 
explained differences in higher education affordability 
among states. The analysis of semi-partial coefficients 
showed that higher education governance structure had very 
small (.4% or .7%) unique effects in both regressions. The 
Beta coefficients for this variable were negative in both 
regressions showing that decreasing centralization was 
associated with increased affordability, although the 
effect was very small. 
These results parallel the work of Hearn and Griswold 
(1993) who found that centralized governance structures 
were not associated with innovative affordability policies. 
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These results also help confirm studies indicating that 
state higher education governance systems have not 
adequately coordinated all aspects of affordability policy, 
including financial aid, appropriations, and tuition, 
particularly in light of state economic conditions (Hearn, 
Griswold, & Marine, 1996; Hossler, 1997; Merisotis, 1997; 
Marcus, 1997). 
Implications 
This study contributes to the body of research about 
the effect of political and structural factors on higher 
education affordability. Results have implications for 
policy, higher education structuring, and state leadership. 
Policy 
In October of 2003, Republicans in the United States 
House of Representatives introduced a bill to penalize 
colleges that increase their tuition by suspending some 
federal student aid for their campuses (Burd, 2003). 
Breneman (2003) criticized this move, because it ignored 
the role that states play in the affordability of higher 
education. Democrats responded to the Republican bill with 
a proposal to penalize states that decrease their 
appropriations to higher education (Potter, 2003). 
This most recent national debate reiterates an ongoing 
controversy of the appropriate distribution of 
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responsibility and authority for state higher education 
performance. As the literature reviewed in previous 
chapters illustrated, pundits have debated the proper roles 
and contributions of the state, the campus, and the market 
throughout the history of American public higher education. 
In the matter of a~fordability, the results of this 
study, as well as those in the Martinez (2003) study, 
indicated that the state had a substantial effect in 
performance. The linear combination of state political 
culture and governance structure variables contributed 19% 
to the variance in state affordability grades. 
Higher Education Restructuring 
McGuinness (2002) reported that states typically 
restructured their higher education governance systems as a 
method of achieving educational reform. He admonished that 
restructuring often failed to meet objectives, because 
leaders had not adequately evaluated the effects of 
structure on educational outcomes. 
This study shows that governance structure has very 
little effect on the affordability of higher education. 
The small, observed effect indicates increased 
affordability with decreased centralization structures. 
Previous research indicated an association between 
centralized structures and lower tuition (Hearn, Griswold, 
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& Marine, 1996; Lowry, 2001) and higher affordability 
(Richardson et al., 1999). Future research should explore 
whether decentralization increases the efficiency for local 
campuses, or if the strength of the governor regulates 
affordability and creates redundancy in the effect of 
higher education governance structures. 
Leadership 
The effect size for the governor tenure potential 
indicates at least two effects for the role of the governor 
in affordability. First, longer governor tenure potential 
states are associated with increased affordability. 
Second, governors with longer tenure have affected the 
affordability of higher education in their states. While 
the tenure variable measured the potential for effect, the 
positive direction of the relationship indicated that 
governors have uniquely contributed to better affordability 
in their states. These results are both an indication of 
structure and leadership and confirm what Richardson et al. 
(1999) maintained: that structural factors and leadership 
character combined to contribute to higher education 
performance. 
Future Research 
This research was only the second study evaluating 
predictor variables for state affordability grades. 
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Martinez (2003) examined state appropriation and state 
characteristic variables to predict affordability. This 
current research used state political culture and 
governance structure variables to predict affordability. 
Future research might evaluate further predictors of state 
affordability, including characteristics of local campuses. 
The body of research concerning state affordability 
would also benefit from more information concerning the 
role of the governor in higher education affordability. 
While this study examined institutional powers, future 
research might examine personal powers of the governor to 
glean information about specific leadership styles and 
priorities. 
The residual values of this study presented one more 
possibility for future research. Case studies of states 
that were more affordable or less affordable than the 
regression prediction observations would illuminate further 
information concerning state affordability. 
Conclusion 
The problem that precipitated this study and 
illustrated by the most recent national debate was that 
state leaders could not create effective policy to improve 
affordability without understanding factors affecting 
public university performance. This study ascertained that 
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the combined influence of political culture and the higher 
education governance structure affected the affordability 
of higher education. 
This research supports the need for state and campus 
officials to collaborate on issues of affordability and 
higher education performance. This study reinforces the 
suggestion by numerous researchers and analysts reviewed in 
previous chapters that education stakeholders work together 
in establishing comprehensive policies that coordinate 
state appropriations, local tuition prices, and financial 
aid. 
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APPENDIX A 
State Classification for Thomas and Hrebenar (1999) Impact 
of Special Interest Groups 
Dominant 
Alabama 
Florida 
Nevada 
S. Carolina 
w. Virginia 
Dominant/ 
complementary 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
Alaska 
California 
Connecticut 
Georgia 
Idaho 
Illinois 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Maryland 
Mississippi 
Montana 
Complementary 
Colorado 
Delaware 
Indiana 
Hawaii 
Maine 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Missouri 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 
New York 
N. Carolina 
N. Dakota 
Pennsylvania 
Utah 
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Complementary/ 
subordinate 
Minnesota 
Rhode Island 
South Dakota 
Vermont 
Appendix A (continued) 
Dominant Dominant/ Complementary Complementary/ 
complementary subordinate 
Nebraska Wisconsin 
New Mexico 
Ohio 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 
Tennessee 
Texas 
Virginia 
Washington 
Wyoming 
N = 5 N = 24 N = 16 N = 4 
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Appendix B 
State Scores for Legislative Professionalization and the 
Institutional Power of the Governor 
State LPS GIP SEP TP AP BP VP PC 
AL .14 2.7 1.0 4.0 2.0 3 4 2 
AI< .45 3.8 5.0 4.0 3.5 3 5 2 
AZ .28 3.3 1.5 4.0 2.5 3 5 4 
AR .15 2.8 2.5 4.0 2.5 3 4 1 
CA .90 3.0 1.0 4.0 3.0 3 5 2 
CO .27 3.7 3.0 4.0 4.0 3 5 3 
CT .32 3.7 4.0 5.0 3.0 3 5 2 
DE .19 3.3 2.0 4.0 3.0 3 5 3 
FL .35 3.1 3.0 4.0 1.5 3 5 2 
GA .14 2.9 1.0 4.0 .5 3 5 4 
HI .32 4.1 5.0 4.0 2.5 3 5 5 
ID .17 3.7 2.0 5.0 2.0 3 5 5 
IL .38 3.3 4.0 5.0 3.0 3 5 3 
IN .19 3.2 3.0 4.0 4.0 3 2 3 
IA .24 3.8 3.0 5.0 3.0 3 5 4 
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Appendix B ( continued) 
State LPS GIP SEP TP AP BP VP PC 
KS .18 3.7 3.0 4.0 3.0 3 5 4 
KY .17 3.5 3.0 4.0 3.0 3 4 4 
LA .25 3.1 1.0 4.0 3.5 3 5 2 
ME .16 3.4 5.0 4.0 3.5 3 4 1 
MD .27 4.1 4.0 4.0 2.5 5 5 4 
MA .33 3.0 4.0 4.0 1.0 3 5 1 
MI .50 3.6 3.0 4.0 3.5 3 5 3 
MN" .25 3.6 4.0 5.0 2.5 3 5 2 
MI .22 2.8 1.0 4.0 2.0 3 5 2 
MO .30 3.5 2.0 4.0 2.5 3 5 4 
MT .15 3.6 3.0 4.0 2.5 3 5 4 
NE .25 3.7 3.0 4.0 3.0 4 5 3 
NV 
.20 3.0 2.5 4.0 3.5 3 2 3 
NH .06 2.8 5.0 2.0 3.0 3 2 2 
NJ .37 4.1 5.0 4.0 3.5 3 5 4 
NM .09 3.5 3.0 4.0 4.0 3 5 2 
NY .66 4.1 4.0 5.0 3.5 4 5 3 
NC .28 2.7 1.0 4.0 3.0 3 2 3 
ND .10 3.8 3.0 5.0 2.5 3 5 4 
OH .43 4.1 4.0 4.0 4.5 3 5 4 
OK .28 2.7 1.0 4.0 1.0 3 5 2 
OR .25 3.1 2.0 4.0 2.5 3 5 2 
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Appendix B ( continued) 
State LPS GIP SEP TP AP BP VP PC 
PA .40 4.1 4.0 4.0 4.5 3 5 4 
RI .19 2.8 2.5 4.0 4.0 3 2 1 
SC .21 2.8 1.0 4.0 2.0 2 5 3 
SD .11 3.8 3.0 4.0 3.5 3 5 4 
TN .18 3.6 4.5 4.0 4.0 3 4 2 
TX .23 3.3 1.0 5.0 3.5 2 5 3 
UT .10 4.0 4.0 4.5 3.5 3 5 4 
VT .28 2.9 2.5 2.0 4.0 3 2 4 
VA .24 3.3 2.5 3.0 3.5 3 5 3 
WA .30 2.9 1.0 4.0 2.5 3 5 2 
WV .16 3.8 2.5 4.0 4.5 5 5 2 
WI .33 3.7 3.0 5.0 2.0 3 5 4 
WY .07 3.6 2.0 4.0 3.5 3 5 4 
Note. LP = legislative professionalization score (King, 
2000) ; GIP = composite gubernatorial institutional power 
score, SEP = separately elected powers, TP = tenure 
potential, AP = appointment power, BP = budgetary power, VP 
= veto power; PC = party control (Beyle, 1999) . 
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Appendix C 
State Classifications for McGuinness (1997) Higher 
Education Governance Structure 
Consolidated 
governing 
boards 
Alaska 
Arizona 
Florida 
Georgia 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Maine 
Minnesota 
Mississippi 
Montana 
Nevada 
New Hampshire 
Strong 
coordinating 
board 
Alabama 
Arkansas 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Missouri 
Nebraska 
New Jersey 
New York 
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Weak 
coordinating 
board 
California 
New Mexico 
Pennsylvania 
Planning 
agency 
Delaware 
Michigan 
Appendix C ( continued) 
Consolidated Strong Weak Planning 
governing coordinating coordinating agency 
boards board board 
North Carolina Ohio 
North Dakota Oklahoma 
Oregon South Carolina 
Rhode Island Tennessee 
South Dakota Texas 
Utah Virginia 
Vermont washington 
West Virginia 
Wisconsin 
Wyoming 
N = 24 N = 21 N = 3 N = 2 
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Appendix D 
State Affordability Scores 
Ability to Pay 
(50%) 
Aid LPO Debt 
State Scorea 
CC PU4 PR4 (20% ) (20% ) (10%) 
AL 65 77 77 65 1 47 88 
AK 75 82 88 100 0 61 90 
AZ 71 72 72 62 2 93 77 
AR 77 85 80 67 20 73 92 
CA 100 66 62 42 35 215 71 
CO 81 81 87 53 45 65 81 
CT 73 78 70 44 76 56 72 
DE 70 84 69 74 14 71 76 
FL 64 72 73 46 9 63 81 
GA 68 75 81 54 0 73 80 
HI 71 77 70 60 2 87 86 
ID 80 89 89 57 2 78 100 
IL 95 83 80 58 116 72 74 
IN 79 73 75 57 73 47 92 
IA 85 87 100 62 57 54 91 
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Appendix D (continued) 
Ability to Pay Aid LPO Debt 
(50%) 
State Scorea (20% ) (20% ) (10%) 
CC PU4 PR4 
KS 86 102 99 71 16 71 91 
KY 83 100 91 70 31 63 93 
LA 70 95 82 39 1 68 85 
ME 54 51 65 35 27 33 86 
MD 66 65 69 50 37 50 75 
MA 63 80 71 38 68 44 66 
MI 75 73 68 73 47 59 93 
MN 94 91 97 59 103 44 98 
MI 79 112 78 64 1 69 96 
MO 69 75 81 60 14 68 79 
MT 61 73 70 62 1 42 97 
NE 77 86 91 65 10 69 88 
NV 83 73 84 71 31 89 89 
NH 50 64 64 50 8 29 
NJ 83 75 67 54 100 50 86 
NM 84 91 72 46 26 100 91 
NY 60 48 54 36 87 26 71 
NC 96 80 94 54 25 149 85 
ND 74 79 85 102 8 49 106 
OH 62 65 65 52 36 37 86 
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Appendix D (continued) 
Ability to Pay (50%) Aid LPO Debt 
State Scorea (20% ) (20% ) (10% ) 
CC PU4 PR4 
OK 81 95 94 65 17 65 92 
OR 61 64 64 43 22 53 81 
PA 74 72 65 47 93 46 79 
RI 49 64 52 35 18 44 76 
SC 73 77 72 63 22 73 87 
SD 67 0 88 60 0 34 99 
TN 73 88 84 53 15 66 86 
TX 76 83 77 54 12 86 85 
UT 98 85 114 151 3 82 91 
VT 61 66 49 41 78 35 74 
VA 76 85 73 62 39 68 80 
WA 81 83 85 50 56 59 84 
WV 63 72 67 48 21 44 94 
WI 87 75 107 61 54 52 95 
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Appendix D (continued) 
Aid LPO Debt 
Ability to Pay (50%) 
State Scorea (20% ) (20% ) (10%) 
CC PU4 PR4 
WY 79 89 86 o 1 72 104 
Note. These scores are the indexed scores provided by the 
National Report Card (NCPPHE, 2000). CC = community 
college; pu4 = public four-year colleges; PR4 = private 
four-year colleges; Aid = need-based financial aid; LPO = 
low-priced college options; Debt = low-student debt. 
as core = the indexed composite affordability grade. 
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